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ABSTRACT
Studies in the literature on intrastate conflict onset have focused on
opportunities and material grievances whereas non-material issues have not been
given sufficient attention. The increasing importance of the ethnic dimension of
intrastate conflicts since the mid-1970s suggests a growing prominence of
ethnonationalist ideologies as a cause. Following constructivist and
institutionalist theories on nationalism, this study argues that assimilationist
policies, mainly centered around educational languages, induce the spread of
minority ethnonationalism to the masses. This spread results from
assimilationist policies being perceived as attacks on their dignity by the
members of a discriminated minority group who, as a result, feel like secondclass citizens in their ancestral home. Consequently, ethnonationalist sentiments
contribute to identity construction in which the state is depicted as the enemy.
Discriminatory policies and the subsequent spread of ethnonationalism facilitate
mobilization by making it easier for the elites to recruit, and thus, increase the
likelihood of conflict onset. Statistical analysis in the MENA region between 1946
and 2018 at the group level indicates an association between educational
language policies and conflict onset. The Kurdish cases in Turkey and Iraq also
lend support to this claim.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Claiming to represent the Basques, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (the Basque National
Liberation Movement, or the ETA) was founded by a student group as a
movement committed to armed resistance in 1959. Positioning itself as a MarxistLeninist group, the ETA pushed for independence for the Basques. After
committing its first killings in 1968, the ETA fought the Spanish state for
decades. The literature on the influence of opportunity on conflict onset does not
explain this case. On the state side, Spain is an OECD country, i.e. a member of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, with a highincome economy. Governing a developed country, the Spanish government has
had capacity throughout the borders of Spain. On the minority side, the Basques
are the smallest of the four politically relevant ethnic groups with around 5
percent of the population. In other words, there is a relatively powerful state and
relatively weak ethnic group in this case.
Factors that influence the opportunity of armed organizations to fight are
essential in understanding conflict dynamics. As illustrated by the Basque case,
however, it is not always possible to reduce the causal mechanisms down to
strictly material factors that influence the capabilities of armed groups to fight.
An alternative set of theories to account for conflict onset is based on grievances.
Indeed, various case studies have depicted civil conflict as resulting from
aggrieved groups turning violent to push for a political change (Achudume 2017;
Bou Nassif 2015; Romano 2006). Yet, as the literature on conflict matured,
quantitative research failed to find support for the claim that factors related to
grievances lead to intrastate violence. A common argument was that rebel
motivations do not play a significant role in the civil war onset because the
manifestations of grievances in the forms of hate and hostility are quite common
around the world, but these hostilities rarely turn into violence (Cederman,
1

Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 19). Instead, the argument follows, conflict is more
likely to occur when rebellion is financially and militarily feasible (Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). This difference between large-n studies and case
studies led to a discrepancy in the literature regarding the causes of conflict
onset.
The quantitative literature struggled to incorporate grievances into the study of
civil conflict for around a decade. Subsequently, the notion of horizontal
inequalities provided a framework that facilitates studying the independent
impact of grievances (Stewart 2008). Horizontal inequalities refer to inequalities
that affect individuals based on their culturally defined identity group. For
example, horizontal inequalities that target an ethnic group put its members at a
disadvantage and/or subject them to discrimination in comparison to the
members of another group that is not targeted by such inequalities. This notion
allowed us to differentiate grievances that are at the group level from those at the
individual level. Whereas the former category is associated with ethnic conflict,
the latter, despite its common use in ethnic conflict studies, is not. The
framework of horizontal inequalities led to the creation of the Ethnic Power
Relations dataset (or the EPR) at the group level which was used to explore the
role of political and economic inequalities on the conflict dynamics (Cederman,
Wimmer, and Min 2010). While the literature on horizontal inequalities has
expanded our understanding of grievances, however, the connection of empirical
studies to the central component of the logic of horizontal inequalities, identity,
has been tangential. Whereas the influence of the factors that affect the
opportunity of opposing sides in a conflict, such as group size, state capacity,
population size, and mountainous territories, are well-established, there are still
questions around whether grievances play any role on the onset of civil conflict.
Civil conflict has been the most common form of violence since World War II.
Therefore, it is essential to study factors that contribute to intrastate violence. Yet
until recently, the literature on civil conflict has mainly focused on the
2

opportunity of rebels to fight at the expense of motivational factors, and the
recent attention given to the motivational factors has been insufficient.
Motivational factors are understudied because of the subjective nature of their
conceptualization. It is difficult to identify theoretical patterns and organize data
collection efforts around them. As a result, the conceptualization of horizontal
inequalities and early data collection efforts resulting from it took over a decade
after the field emerged in the late 1990s. On the contrary, early empiricallyoriented studies could employ opportunity-related factors in their analyses with
relative ease because the data needed for studying civil conflict was either already
available or its collection was, comparably, not particularly challenging. Given the
difficulties surrounding studying them, however, motivational factors need to be
paid more attention to carry our understanding of civil conflict forward. In
addition to scientific benefits, improved knowledge on motivational factors and
their influence on conflict can also inform our policies.
In this work, I attempt to incorporate identity as a facilitator for mobilization. I
argue that identity plays a central role, particularly when horizontal inequalities
are present because horizontal inequalities aggrieve individuals, not necessarily
for being discriminated against individually, but rather, for the reality or the
belief that inequalities target their coethnics, a large group of people with whom
they share the same identity and feel a familial connection. Therefore, an analysis
of horizontal inequalities essentially investigates the role of identity in the
process of developing grievances.
The role of identity is most visible in horizontal cultural inequalities, and thus
best captured by them. As a result, horizontal cultural inequalities are more
prone to exploitation by ideology entrepreneurs because of the close ties such
inequalities have to the culture and identity of the group. For instance,
individuals who suffer from horizontal political or economic inequalities may not
even notice these inequalities unless either these inequalities are politicized by
ideology entrepreneurs and the ethnic members find their framing convincing, or
3

they lead to other forms of discriminations that are quite visible in everyday life
and for which discriminated individuals are able to assign blame. The same
conditions apply also to horizontal cultural inequalities. However, different from
horizontal political and horizontal economic inequalities, it is nearly impossible
for individuals to not notice horizontal cultural inequalities that deprive them of
some of the essential aspects of their culture in their daily life. Consequently, the
presence of horizontal cultural inequalities makes it easier for ideology
entrepreneurs to reach and connect with the masses who are aggrieved. Put
differently, because of the central role that identity plays in horizontal
inequalities, how they lead to grievances and civil conflict is more explicitly
observed in their cultural forms. Therefore, capturing grievances that are more
directly connected to identity than to material factors would allow us to better
observe the role of identity. To clarify, that claim that is made here is not that
horizontal cultural inequalities are more successful than other forms of
horizontal inequalities in mobilizing people. Rather than making a comparison in
the effectiveness between forms, I only argue that the theoretical connection
between inequalities and conflict is more directly observed in horizontal cultural
inequalities, and thus, the empirical connection between the two concepts is
relatively more justified.
Horizontal cultural inequalities can manifest themselves in many different forms,
most of which can be categorized into two main groups: ones that target
ethnolinguistic cultural features and ones that target ethnoreligious cultural
features. Although various characteristics, such as language, religion, race,
territory, etc., can be a basis for ethnonationalist ideologies whose aim is to
transform an ethnic group into a nation, “language or religion or both together
are central to most ethnic and national identifications, and they frequently serve
as key emblems or symbols of such identifications” (Brubaker 2015, 5). Yet
ethnolinguistic cultural features are particularly important due to the direct
association between language and nationalism in forming imagined communities
since the dawn of nationalism in Europe. Language is at the core of identity as
4

culture and traditions are preserved and transmitted from generation to
generation using it as the medium. Unlike religion, issues around languages
become inevitable with modernity due to the political changes that come with it.
Religion and language differ in key ways that have major
implications for the political accommodation of cultural
difference. Language is an inescapable medium of public as well
as private life; religion is not. The state must privilege a
particular language or set of languages, but it need not privilege a
particular religion. The expansion of state employment, the
introduction of universal schooling, and the increasingly
“semantic” nature of work in an urban, mobile, and literate
society have made language a crucial form of cultural capital. For
all these reasons, language is chronically and pervasively
politicized in the modern world, while much of religion has
become privatized and depoliticized. (Brubaker 2015, 5)
When external factors, such as state policies, target the roles and the status of the
language of an ethnic group, they essentially target the ethnic identity that the
members of its speakers associate themselves with. As a result, attempts to
modify or eradicate a language spoken by an ethnic minority by state policies
aggrieves the speakers of this language.
This study focuses on educational language policies of modern states and claims
that excluding a language that is widely spoken by a minority group aggrieves the
members of the group for two reasons. The first reason is that educational
language policies create such powerful horizontal cultural inequalities that have
the power to assimilate minority populations. Receiving education in a different
language that is foreign to them causes the children from a discriminated
minority group to develop skills in this language throughout their education, as
opposed to their native language (Hinton 2016). Consequently, the native
language of the ethnic group is gradually replaced with the language of the
majority as the members of the group are assimilated (May 2012, 2). Therefore,
5

speakers of the minority language are aggrieved by policies that target their
language, and by extension, their culture, and identity. Secondly, in addition to
the damage they inflict on the culture of discriminated minorities, educational
language laws also create a hierarchy between ethnic groups. Public education
being offered in the language of the majority group but not in the language of a
minority group signals the members of the minority group that they are secondclass citizens (Horowitz 1985, 219–20). Being forced to accept conditions under
which they feel inferior creates resentment among the minority population
against the state. As the state refuses the demands for cultural rights,
ethnonationalist leaders capitalize on the resulting grievances, recruit their
coethnics, and start an armed struggle against the state.
The centrality of identity to mobilization through nationalism can be observed in
the Basque case. During the Franco era, the Basque population endured “harsh
and unprecedented measures against all public manifestations of Basque cultural
and political identity” (Woodworth 2001, 4). The Basque language, Euskera, was
banned from public use. The ban covered most aspects of public life to the extent
that parents were not allowed to use first names in Euskera even when
christening their children. As a result, the ETA claimed that there was an ongoing
cultural genocide in the Basque country (Encarnación 2008, 97). During an
interview, the father of an ETA prisoner told Woodworth that they were made
nationalist by Franco’s persecution (Woodworth 2001). As the nationalist ideas
became sufficiently spread among the Basque, they facilitated recruitment for the
ETA. The transition to a pluralistic democracy following Franco’s death in 1975
did not change much for the ETA. The Spanish government provided the Basques
a local government that “promotes the indigenous culture in state and private
schools and on its own television channels, exercises considerable economic
power, and even controls its own police force” (Woodworth 2001, 3). However,
despite gaining all these rights many minority groups around the world dream of
but cannot attain, the ETA remained distrustful of the Spanish democracy
6

because of its refusal to allow the Basques to determine their own future by giving
them the right to secede from Spain.
Despite having considerable support among the population, the ETA did not
appeal to the majority of the Basques. It was not even the largest political
organization representing the Basques. Instead, Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea (the
Basque Nationalist Party, or the EAJ-PNV) has received the most votes for the
Basque Parliament since the first regional election in 1980 and has defeated the
political wings of the ETA in the elections. While the EAJ-PNV remained
peaceful, the ETA aimed to gain public support through the use of violence. The
ETA’s strategy to recruit the masses for their cause can be summarized as the
“spiral of action-repression-action,” which operates as follows: “1) ETA carries
out a provocative violent action against the political system; 2) the system
responds with repression against ‘the masses’; 3) the masses respond with a
mixture of panic and rebellion, whereupon ETA embarks on a further action that
brings the masses a step further along the road to revolution” (Woodworth 2001,
5). This strategy worked particularly well under the security-conscious
authoritarian regime of Franco that responded to the ETA violence with
repression. As a result, the grievances resulting from the cultural discrimination
of the Basques led to the rise of a nationalist organization that used violence to
achieve its political goals and brought a substantial level of public support for this
organization among the Basques. In this case, the nationalist organization, the
ETA, would not be satisfied with any concessions short of the right to selfdetermination. Once the support for the ETA was sufficiently widespread, the
weakness of the organization and the strength of the state did not influence the
ETA’s resolve to fight. Because, after all, the government was quite powerful, but
it was still not able to completely end the activities of the ETA. Moreover, the
government addressing the grievances of the Basques did also not change the
ETA’s position on violence. Even if their opportunity to fight was low, their
resolve was high. Once nationalist organizations form, they become independent
actors that attempt to spread their nationalist ideas and shape public opinion. As
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a result, the cultural discrimination in the Basque country led to the onset of the
ETA violence and its persistence for decades.
Following this introductory chapter, I explore the theory as outlined and
illustrated in the previous paragraphs in the second, third, and fourth chapters.
There are various theoretical and empirical challenges raised against the theory I
propose by the existing literature on different grounds. I borrow from theoretical
and historical accounts from different branches of political science as I tackle
these challenges, provide my counter-arguments, and construct my theory.
The connection between grievances and armed conflict is a difficult one to
establish. This difficulty has been one of the main reasons for the pushback
against grievance-based theories. There has been an ongoing debate on this topic
ever since Gurr’s (1970) foundational grievance-based theory and Snyder and
Tilly’s (1972) criticisms against it. Grievance-based accounts are criticized mainly
on two grounds (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 19–20). First, whether
grievances vary sufficiently to observe their impact on conflict is questioned given
how widespread grievances are but how rarely they turn into conflict. Secondly,
even if the level of grievances vary to some extent, several scholars argued that
“this variation is not strongly associated with the outbreak of civil wars, because
once we control for the ‘root causes’ of conflict, it becomes clear that opportunist
leaders exaggerate or invent their frustrations in order to pursue other, usually
selfish and materialist ends” (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 20).
These criticisms show that the literature emphasizes the difficulty of establishing
a connection between an explanatory variable with conflict as a problem for
grievance-based accounts. However, I view this difficulty as a general problem in
the literature on intrastate violence. Let us see how explanations alternative to
grievances fare in this regard. The “greed” explanation of intrastate violence, as
put forth by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), does explain how self-interested leaders
rise against the state to loot primary commodities. However, rationalist accounts
do not offer satisfying explanations in terms of why individuals decide to join
8

armed movements and risk their lives. Explanations around material interests
can account for certain cases in this framework where prospects for looting
primary commodity attracts fighters. However, they certainly do not explain
ethnic mobilization. Opportunity-based theories show how some conditions that
are more favorable to rebels are more conducive to intrastate violence. Yet, even
with a higher chance of sustained armed rebellion, states are still quite powerful,
and thus, people still take a substantially high risk with their life when mobilizing
against the state. Consequently, beyond making simple arguments, rationalist
accounts have failed to offer theoretical mechanisms that justify why selfinterested individuals would mobilize against states. To clarify, I do not dispute
that their mechanisms have success in explaining certain types of cases. Yet,
theoretically, rationalist accounts do not make compelling arguments explaining
ethnic mobilization.
I argue that it is mainly ideologies rather than material interests that mobilize
people around political goals. In terms of ethnic conflict, I argue that it is
nationalist ideologies facilitate ethnic mobilization. In my review of theories in
Chapter 2, I note that theories of nationalism adopted by rationalist studies of
conflict are no longer relevant in the study of nationalism. Put differently,
theories of nationalism that rely on similar assumptions for mobilization as those
used in studies that emphasize the role of opportunity-related factors at the
expense of grievances are largely discredited. On the contrary, the discussion on
the origins of nationalism and on the constructivist and institutionalist theories
of nationalism depict a more complex picture as to how nationalist ideologies
have come to define the modern system of nation-states. Nationalist ideologies
inspired mobilization to capture political power and to build nation-states in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nation-building projects were not only about
economic development but also about producing conationals using state
institutions. A modern invention, mass schooling allowed nation-states to make
individuals into citizens who have an intellectual and emotional attachment to
9

the ethnic nation (Boser Hofmann 2016). Following the end of World War II, the
nation-state emerged as the most popular form of political organization.
A major implication of the transformation from empires to nation-states for the
domestic politics of states is that even “the very existence of the nation-state is
the manifestation of ethnonationalism accomplished and being maintained by
the majority nation” (Hennayake 1992). New arrangements within nation-states
have further frustrated many of their minority groups because of the resulting
discrimination they often have had to endure. The emergence of nation-states,
coupled with their bureaucratic expansion, led to the colonization of the domestic
periphery and imposed new restrictions on minority populations. Under the
management of the majority group, the institutionalization of ethnic differences
coupled with exclusionary policies make ethnicity politically salient. As a result,
ethnic minorities develop their own nationalism in reaction to the nationalism
and nation-building of the majority group.
In Chapter 3, I explore the theoretical connection between grievances and conflict
onset. The presence of an ethnonationalist movement claiming to represent an
ethnic group does not necessarily mean that the members of that group would
support the movement. There need to be widespread grievances for
ethnonationalist leaders to draw support from their coethnics, recruit more
fighters, and pool more resources. The literature on horizontal inequalities
suggests that it is these inequalities, as opposed to vertical inequalities, that
generate grievances that are associated with conflict. Building on this literature, I
argue that horizontal cultural inequalities have the power to create widespread
grievances, more so than the other types of horizontal inequalities, for their
connection to the culture and identity of the group. Once ethnic “groups are
created and perceived, individuals strive for a positive sense of social identity”
(Lieberman and Singh 2012). However, the demotion of a minority language to a
lower status signals that the status of its speakers is also lowered. By creating
cultural hierarchies, the state violates the dignity of its minority populations
10

(Kusý 1999). The assimilating power of educational language policies on the
culture and identity of entire ethnic groups can amplify the grievances against the
state. As a result, grievances resulting from horizontal cultural inequalities
created by the state lead to an increasing level of support for ethnonationalist
movements among minority populations and facilitate ethnic mobilization.
Even though I rely on a group-level analysis in this work, I also investigate the
underlying reasons for individual motivations to mobilize around
ethnonationalist goals. In this step, I turn to Taylor’s (1994) work on the politics
of recognition. Taylor argues that ethnonationalist movements rely on the
demand for recognition by minority groups and that the recognition is a part of
the identity itself because of the power its recognition has in shaping it.
Consequently, he notes that nonrecognition or misrecognition is a form of
oppression because it imprisons individuals into a “reduced mode of being”
(Taylor 1994, 25). Taylor argues that the modern ideal of authenticity influences
individuals at two levels. At the first level, it makes individuals feel the need to be
true to themselves, and at the group level, it demands ethnic groups to be true to
their original culture and preserve their way of being. These demands at both
levels, but particularly at the second level, help explain the appeal of
ethnonationalist ideas that advocates the protection of ethnic culture against
threats attempting to undermine it.
After exploring the role of both majority and minority nationalism, horizontal
inequalities, and individuals’ support for ethnonationalist ideologies, in Chapter
4, I turn to the specific mechanism I investigate in this work: government
assimilation of ethnolinguistic minorities and their reaction to it. I start by
claiming that some of the consequences of modernization, such as bureaucratic
expansion and industrialization, facilitated the nation-building projects of
majority groups around the world by providing them new tools. In the absence of
bureaucratic expansion and/or industrialization, nationalist elites often pursued
them as they saw their usefulness. As noted in Chapter 2, nations are constructed
11

mainly by nationalist elites using institutional means. The most important
component of this process is the indoctrination of the masses using public
education. In Chapter 4, I illustrate the process of assimilation using the French
case, which is the original case of nationalist assimilation. Using Weber’s (1976)
work, I note that, whereas half of the country did not speak French following the
revolution, ethnolinguistic minorities were converted into French citizens who
spoke French by World War I. Though there was still resistance to this
conversion, the French state had certain advantages that made its eventual
success easier. Lacking these advantages, nationalist elites around the world who
have attempted to convert their minorities during their nation-building have not
been as successful. Conditions favorable to the French state were simply not
available to the states since the early twentieth century which covers the temporal
range of this study. Whereas the states prefer to assimilate their minority
populations, minorities resent it. Individuals who are members of a
discriminated minority group turn to ethnonationalist leaders who offer them a
way to resist.
In addition to the theoretical contribution on the connection I establish between
horizontal cultural inequalities and conflict through ethnonationalism, I also
make an empirical contribution. In Chapter 5, I offer an empirical analysis using
new data on educational language policies. Collected as part of this project, the
data on educational language policies offers the first large-n measurement of
horizontal cultural inequalities. The large-n study using this data covers the
Middle East and North Africa regions between 1946 and 2018 and offers
empirical support for the theory. Even after controlling for various opportunityrelated factors, such as group size, state capacity, population size, and
mountainous territories, I find statistically significant evidence for the
association between educational language policies and the likelihood of conflict
onset. The results suggest that, all being equal, education not being offered in
their language increases the likelihood that the minority group initiates an armed
struggle against the state.
12

In addition to the primary quantitative test, this dissertation also includes
supplemental qualitative case studies that use a most similar case design to
process trace the influence of educational language policies on cultural grievance
formation and the turn to violence. In Chapter 6, I explore the Kurdish case
mainly in Turkey, but also in Iraq. I investigate the origins of Kurdish
nationalism to explore the underlying factors of the conflicts between the state
and organizations claiming to represent the Kurds at different stages. I, then,
make comparisons with the Kurdish case in Iraq. These two cases are comparable
for two reasons. First, they both involve the same ethnic group. In other words,
Kurds in Turkey and Iraq largely have similar customs and traditions that may
influence the decision-making of individuals. Second, both groups went through
similar experiences following the collapse of the Ottomans. The movements
claiming to represent both groups resisted the colonization of their respective
nation-state. Kurdish ethnonationalist movements in both countries were also
able to sustain a prolonged conflict during their resistance.
I show that the Kurdish nationalists, particularly those in Turkey, had an
opportunity to gain independence in the early twentieth century. However,
Kurdish nationalism lacked mass adoption due to a lack of state power under the
control of the Kurdish elites and a lack of cultural grievances against the state. As
a result, the nationalist movement failed to spread to the masses and remained
an elite project. A lack of mass adoption of nationalist ideas led to divisions
between the Kurdish tribes and the Kurdish nationalists eventually lost their
struggle for independence despite their best attempts. The Turkish nationalists
suppressed the Kurdish elites and the Kurdish nationalism entered into a period
of dormancy. However, despite its fall decades earlier, Kurdish nationalism
awakened in the 1960s in response to the cultural discrimination by the state.
The assimilation through public education following the government’s
colonization of the region created resentment and injustices the Kurdish
population faced in their daily lives led to the emergence of various new
nationalist movements. Even then, the state refused to address the grievances of
13

its Kurdish citizens and insisted on preserving the policies of assimilation.
Emerging as the dominant force of Kurdish nationalism since the late 1970s after
a regional internal struggle, Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê (the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party, or the PKK) started its armed struggle against the state in the
1980s.
The Kurdish case in Iraq also supports my theory. Having more favorable
conditions to fight the state, the Kurdish groups in Iraq resisted the attempts for
assimilation for decades, and violence between the state and the Kurdish groups
recurred until the intervention by the United States in the 1990s. The invasion of
Iraq by the United States-led coalition in 2004 ushered in a new era for the Iraqi
Kurds following the regime change. The Iraqi Kurds negotiated an arrangement
with the new Baghdad regime regarding their autonomy and cultural rights. Even
though it was not an ideal settlement, it addressed their grievances resulting from
decades of repression, and thus led to peace. In the 2010s, an external factor, the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or the ISIS) invasion, provided the Kurds an
opportunity for independence. Unsurprisingly, the Kurdish Regional
Government (or the KRG) in Iraq pursued this opportunity and held a
referendum for independence in 2017. Overwhelming support for independence
led to a conflict with the Iraqi government (Sumer and Joseph 2018). This
conflict occurred only because the KRG miscalculated the regime’s power and
resolve following its weakness against ISIS and the international reaction against
their prospects for independence (Kaplan 2019). It is no surprise that the Kurds
in Iraq want to expand into the bordering Kurdish provinces that are not a part of
the KRG and to gain their independence. Yet, lacking grievances against the Iraqi
state that did not threaten the existing rights and privileges of its Kurdish citizens
and that only wanted to return to a previous status quo that was agreed upon by
both sides, this minor conflict quickly ended within 5 days. This extremely short
duration, which was caused by an external factor that shifted regional power
dynamics, is in stark contrast with the intermittent periods of sustained conflicts
over decades between the Kurds and the regime in the twentieth century. These
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cases, thus, provide additional support for my claim that the profound impact of
educational language policies on ethnolinguistic minorities influence
mobilization of minority groups and the likelihood of conflict onset.
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CHAPTER TWO
NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

Introduction
I build on the literature that claims that grievances caused by horizontal
inequalities lead to mobilization and conflict onset. I note that horizontal
inequalities are connected to mobilization because of their direct ties to identity,
unlike vertical inequalities that are related to material interests. In line with this
reasoning, I claim that horizontal inequalities are connected to ethnic
mobilization through ideologies around identity rather than material interests.
This is not to say material interests are not important. My claim is rather that,
even if material interests around horizontal inequalities aggrieve people, they
motivate people mainly through ideologies. Let me illustrate this claim on a
different form of inequalities and ideologies formed around them: class-based
inequalities and communism. The exploitation of labor can cause frustrations,
but these frustrations find a systematic voice only within the framework of
communist ideologies that emerged following Marx’s ideas. The arguments made
by communist intellectuals regarding class consciousness and oppression spread
among the aggrieved workers or peasants and lead to their mobilization. This
example shows that even in cases of material inequalities between classes,
ideologies play a central role in motivating and mobilizing individuals.
We should view inequalities between ethnic groups and resulting mobilization in
a similar vein. There needs to be a framework of ideas that serve as blueprints for
translating frustrations around ethnicity into ethnic grievances. Even though we
take ethnic mobilization around ethnonationalist ideas as givens today, it has not
always been the case. Ethnonationalist mobilization is absent during most of the
history of human civilization and it emerged only with modernity because
nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon as discussed in more detail in the
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rest of this chapter. Therefore, when we talk about ethnic conflict in the periods
of history that we cover, we essentially have this debate in a context where
ethnonationalist ideas offer a blueprint for aggrieved groups. Similar to how
intellectuals espousing communist ideologies have provided a framework for
aggrieved workers and farmers to channel their frustrations and mobilize,
nationalist intellectuals have espoused nationalist ideologies in an attempt to
appeal to their coethnics and create a nation since the dawn of nationalism. For
this reason, we need to incorporate ethnonationalist ideologies into our
mechanisms through which certain frustrations that are associated with ethnic
grievances lead to mobilization. Before moving on to horizontal inequalities,
grievances, individual motivations, and the role of educational language policies
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the goal of this chapter is to achieve this task by
building strong theoretical foundations around nationalism that is necessary to
theorize ethnic mobilization that is used in the rest of this work.
In this chapter, I first start with a literature review of four sets of theories on
nationalism. This section constitutes the main bulk of this chapter. Each set of
theories is discussed to make a point regarding the existing literature on the
relationship between nationalism and conflict and position this work within the
broader literature. In this section, I first discuss primordialist theories of
nationalism to review our earliest understanding of the subject. The discussion of
these theories reveals that claims that take ethnicity as fixed were quickly
outdated following the introduction of alternative theories. The main implication
of this transition in the literature on nationalism is the finding that the ethnic
characteristics of a group at a certain point in time do not determine its future
characteristics. In other words, a measure that looks at the diversity of the
population and that is commonly used in the conflict literature, the ethnic
fractionalization index does not inform us regarding how ethnic groups are
expected to act simply because even the groups themselves are not fixed, let alone
their political leanings. Therefore, we need alternative measurements that get at
how groups are expected to behave. In the second subsection, I explore
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instrumentalist views on nationalism that are used in empirical conflict studies
but that have been undermined by criticisms from various fronts. Instrumentalist
theories fail to explain some essential questions around ethnic mobilization, such
as why individuals have nationalist preferences, why these preferences are more
common in modern times than in pre-modern times, and why they often act due
to their nationalist preferences in a way that can be labeled as irrational. The
discussion of these two sets of theories is essential because they illuminate how
this work is situated in comparison to prominent opportunity-centric works on
conflict and why the assumptions of these works around ethnicity and
nationalism have deep flaws. In doing so, this discussion provides a theoretical
depth for the assumptions made in this work on nationalism that is largely absent
in the conflict literature.
In the third subsection, I turn to constructivist theories that view the nation as an
imagined community and that highlights the constructed nature of national
identities. This section also contributes to this work through the discussion of
historical developments on the role of language and politics around language in
the origins, rise, and spread of the European model of the ethnic nation. In this
regard, educational language policies stand out due to their powerful influence
over ethnic minorities and due to the connection between linguistic cultural
features and nationalist ideologies, which is discussed in more detail in the
following chapters. The discussion on historical developments also explores the
European model of the nation which has been the most influential form of the
ethnic nation around the world, and as a result, which is taken as the basis in this
work. Finally, I consider institutionalist theories to explore the subsequent
stickiness of nationalist identities following their construction. Just as
constructivist theories on the fluid nature of ethnic identities challenge
primordialist theories that expect fixity of ethnic identification, the resilience of
nationalist identities, as put forth by the institutionalist theories, challenges the
instrumentalist views that expect a fluidity based on material interests. The main
implications of the institutionalist theories are that ethnic groups are
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transformed by government policies and that ethnic groups act in response to
government policies. These implications also suggest that ethnic tensions do not
arise from inherent ethnic differences, they rather result from the influence of
nationalist ideas, and in interaction with the state. By incorporating these
theories along with the historical processes around nationalism, I attempt to
justify my assumptions. Because failing to do so, as shown in this study, can lead
to theoretical gaps I note that exist in rationalist frameworks. In line with this
reasoning, second, I discuss the key concepts on nationalism that I use in this
work in the following section.
Third, often referring to the discussion in Varshney (2007), I offer an evaluation
on how the theories of nationalism that I cover in this work fare in explaining
ethnic conflict. The goal of this section is to review the state of the literature on
the connection between nationalism and ethnic conflict. I note that even those
theories that are successful in accounting for the origins of nationalism and
nation-building processes, i.e. constructivist and institutionalist theories, fail to
account for the ethnic mobilization of minorities against the state. I argue that it
is mainly because they either remain largely majority-centric, or they do not
discern the intricacies that accompany the minority groups in their path to
building nations of their own. Fourth, precisely for this reason, I evaluate the
differences between majority and minority nationalism. This distinction is
essential for this work because, just as nationalism is an anomaly, the system of
nation-states is also an anomaly in our history of civilization as they are very
recent developments. Earlier nationalisms that produced the majority nations
often operated in a different political environment than the minorities that have
pursued similar goals. Despite the relative similarity of the goals of both groups,
the differences in the political settings they have had to operate under have led to
different paths that they have needed to take to achieve their main political goal
of building a sovereign nation. By making the distinction between majority and
minority nationalism, I explore the relationship between states that represent the
majority nations and ethnic minorities that pursue nationalist goals in systems
19

defined by the majority nations. While the distinction of minority nationalism is
not new, though also not common, the connection between minority nationalism
and ethnic conflict in response to state policies, to the best of my knowledge, is
new. After establishing the majority-minority dichotomy in this chapter, I
readdress this topic in Chapter 4 as I construct the theory and discuss the
divergent paths majority and minority nationalist movements have taken during
the historical progression of their interactions.

Theories of Nationalism
A relatively recent phenomenon in the political history of the world, nationalism
has transformed the world since the late eighteenth century. Nationalism shook
up the balance of power in Europe and pushed for the disintegration of the
continental empires in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. After two
world wars, the success of anti-colonial nationalist independence movements led
to the collapse of Western colonial empires and the birth of new nation-states.
Even though expansionism was curbed following World War II, which led to a
decline in the number of interstate conflicts, nationalist ideas still motivated the
eruption of numerous intrastate conflicts. The end of the Cold War heralded the
decline of left-right politics and nationalism became the main source of conflict,
most commonly, in the form of rebellions by ethnonationalist movements.
The persistence of nationalism since the early nineteenth century suggests that
nationalist ideologies have a particular impact on ethnic mobilization. This
connection needs to be studied when theorizing ethnic mobilization. Yet
empirical works on conflict often fail to elaborate on the causal mechanisms
under which nationalism contributes to war. Instead, they tend to rather make
certain assumptions on the nature of nationalism without justifying them. These
assumptions can be mutually exclusive. For example, one would expect
completely different outcomes between nationalism working through values as
opposed to rational calculations. Given how much theories on nationalism vary,
making uninformed assumptions can lead to weaknesses in theories and
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misguided expectations. To that end, this section offers a review of theories on
nationalism to discuss them and adopt positions that are informed by their
discussion. The questions below offer a guideline on what to look for when
evaluating theories on nationalism:
•

What is the nation? How can we define it?

•

How and by whom is a national identity created?

•

How does an individual become a nationalist?

•

How does a nationalist ideology influence an individual who subscribes to
it? In other words, how does it influence their thinking and political
decision-making after a person adopts a national identity?

•

How and when does this national identity become a mass identity? In
other words, how do we get from a substantial portion of the members of a
group having no distinct and politicized national identity to having one?

These questions inform the discussion of some of the prominent theories on
nationalism in the rest of this section. I argue that none of the theories offer a
satisfactory answer to all of the questions above by themselves. However, each
theory offers an answer to some of the questions, and together, these answers
constitute a basis for an understanding of nationalism that I adopt and refer to in
the rest of the dissertation.
The academic curiosity on nationalism and investigating its origins gained
momentum in the 1970s and 1980s. The first systematic response to such
questions came from primordialism. Early primordialist works were challenged
by modernist theories which were split among several groups, such as
instrumentalist, constructivist, and institutionalist theories. I discuss
primordialism and these three modernist traditions in this section because of
their relevance for the association between nationalism and conflict, as
highlighted by Varshney (2007). Each of these four categories is discussed in
their respective subsections.
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Primordialism
Following World War II, many new states were founded as a result of the
decolonization process. Nation-building within many of these states did not go
very smoothly due to resistance from ethnic minorities that central governments
were trying to assimilate into the national identity (Varshney 2007, 280). This
resistance triggered a new wave of academic inquiry into nationalism.
Primordialism offered the first set of explanations for this phenomenon. Edward
Shils is the first academic to use the term “primordialism” (Özkırımlı 2000, 65).
Shils claims that how strongly people feel an attachment to their kin comes from
blood ties. In his words: “The attachment to another member of one’s kinship
group is not just a function of interaction … because a certain ineffable
significance is attributed to the tie of blood” (Shils 1957, 142). Shils describes this
type of attachment as primordial. Primordialist approaches can be analyzed in
three groups: naturalist, sociobiological, and culturalist approaches (Özkırımlı
2000, 66). In the rest of this subsection, I summarize naturalist and
sociobiological approaches, I address the criticisms these approaches have
received, and finally, I discuss Geertz’s account of culturalist primordialism.
The naturalist approach is, potentially, the most extreme version of
primordialism. The naturalist primordialist approach claims that “one is born
into a nation, in the same way, s/he is born into a family” (Özkırımlı 2000, 66).
Therefore, the nation of an individual is predetermined and fixed and such
division of humans into groups based on culture is part of the natural order.
Naturalist primordialism is very popular among the majority of nationalists and
is reflected in the works of nationalist historians and the rhetoric of nationalist
elites. Nationalists who are influenced by naturalist primordialism often use
themes such as the antiquity of their nation, the golden age in the past, the
superiority of their national culture, the periods of recess, and the national hero
who comes to awaken the nation and to end the “accidental” period of decline
(Özkırımlı 2000, 66–68).
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Sociobiological primordialism, on the other hand, applies the findings of
sociobiology to the study of ethnic ties (Özkırımlı 2000, 70–71). Pierre van den
Berghe (1978) investigates why animals are social creatures and why they
cooperate. He argues that it is mutually beneficial cooperation that makes
animals social. Animals reproduce with other animals that share a specific
portion of genes. Genetic relation, in other words, kin selection enhances
cooperative behavior between them. In his view, such behavior can be also
observed in humans. Kinship is sufficient to produce powerful sentiments such as
nationalism, tribalism, racism, and ethnocentrism. He argues, however, that how
humans determine their kin is less about physical attributes and more about
cultural criteria of a group membership. Because neighboring populations tend to
have similar genetic composition and their physical attributes are relatively
similar to each other. Cultural differences such as religion, language, accent, body
adornment, etc., however, are features that are easier to identify (Berghe 1978,
402–7).
Özkırımlı (2000) highlights several criticisms raised against basic assumptions of
the naturalist and sociobiologist primordialist approaches. The criticisms that are
relevant for this study are as follows. First, primordialist assertions on the nature
of ethnic and national ties are challenged. The “givenness” of ethnic and national
ties by nature suggests that these ties are fixed and they transmit between
generations without any changes in their essential characteristics. However,
Özkırımlı notes that a growing number of studies highlight the role that
individuals play in ethnic identity construction by their choices, efforts, and
investments. Observable changes in the content and boundaries of ethnic
identities and redefinition and reconstruction of these identities in each
generation suggest that ethnic identities are fluid, not fixed (Özkırımlı 2000, 74–
75). Brass (1991) points out cases that show people can adopt different identities
than the ones they are born into. Many people change the language they speak or
their religious practices. Such changes can also be observed across ethnic groups
(Brass 1991, 69–71).
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Secondly, primordialist assertions about the origins of ethnic and national ties
are questioned. Primordialists posit that “ethnic and national attachments are
‘underived’, hence prior to all social interaction. This automatically creates a
mystical aura around them: primordial sentiments are ineffable, that is
‘incapable of being expressed in words’, thus unanalyzable” (Özkırımlı 2000, 77).
Even though many modern nations have derived from a pre-modern ethnic
group, however, what the ethnic identity and ethnic culture meant for the
members of the group who lived before the emergence of nationalism and the
members who lived after nationalism took hold are very different. Before
nationalism, there is often little to no ethnic self-consciousness. Nationalism
reconstructs identities in a way that selectively chooses certain aspects of the
history and culture of an ethnic group and gives them new meanings. Another
reason that the transformation from an ethnic group to a nation does not happen
naturally is that this transformation is not a given, to begin with. For each ethnic
group that developed a successful nationalist movement, there are many ethnic
groups with unsuccessful nationalist movements, or with no nationalist
movements whatsoever (Özkırımlı 2000, 77–79). In other words, after
recognizing a distinct primordial group, it is not possible to predict its future
development into a nation (Brass 1991, 72). This possibility rules out the
existence of underived natural attachments that exist prior to social interaction.
Finally, primordialist assertions about emotions and affect are disputed.
Primordialists highlight their importance by using words such as attachment,
bond, tie, and sentiment which, they argue, makes primordial identities different
than other identity types, such as class-based identities. While the importance of
emotions in social life cannot be ignored, the primordialist mystification of
emotions removes the social elements from them. Primordialists claim that
emotional ties are not formed as a result of social interaction between ethnic
members, but rather, they are already present, implicit in the ethnic relationship.
Eller and Coughlan, however, find this claim to be a fallacy and argue that it is the
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rituals that induce (religious or ethnic) sentiments in people (Eller and Coughlan
1993, 187–92; Özkırımlı 2000, 79–80).
After addressing the criticisms raised against the naturalist and sociobiological
approaches, let us now turn our attention to cultural primordialism. The
following paragraph lays out the cultural primordialist views of Geertz (1973):
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the
"givens"-or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in
such matters, the assumed "givens"-of social existence:
immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond
them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular
religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a
dialect of a language, and following particular social practices.
These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen
to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in
and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's
neighbor, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not
merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common
interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue
of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie
itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the
types of them that are important, differ from person to person,
from society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually
every person, in every society, at almost all times, some
attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural-some
would say spiritual-affinity than from social interaction. (Geertz
1973, 259–60)
The criticisms on the naturalist and sociobiological approaches have also been,
according to Tilley (1997) unfairly, raised against Geertz. In Geertz’s views, it is
not that the givens of social existence are primordial, but that attachments that
bind people with their kin are the assumed givens of social existence; these
attachments are primordial, deep-rooted, and arguably inescapable to the
25

individuals who constitute the ethnic group (Kataria 2018). That is to say, Geertz
does not claim that the givens of social existence are primordial, yet people who
have attachments to their kin believe that they are. This assertion differentiates
cultural primordialism from the other two approaches. Tilley (1997) argues that,
because of this difference, Geertz’s theory can also be categorized as a
constructivist one given that attachments being primordial is a constructed belief
in his account.
Instrumentalism
Popular in the quantitative literature on intrastate conflict, instrumentalist
approaches explore the influence of the pursuit of rational interests on nationalist
movements. Instrumentalism suggests that there are no primordial bonds that
can be considered the givens of social existence. Brass (1991), a prominent
instrumentalist, finds the primordialist definitions of ethnicity based on a
common origin very flawed. He notes that there are very few groups in the world
today that can make such a claim. For him, having a common descent is not what
makes an ethnic group adopt a nationalist ideology, but rather, it is the belief in a
common descent by the group members. Accordingly, he admits that the beliefs
of ethnic group members play an important function to achieve group cohesion.
He also acknowledges the emotional significance of the attachments that are
developed in childhood or youth and that persist through life. He notes, however,
that “it is difficult … to travel much further than this with the primordialists”
(Brass 1991, 70). In stark opposition to primordialism, instrumentalist theories
view ethnic identities as instruments that are associated with interests.
Countering primordialist claims, Brass argues that identity-based attachments
can change and he offers various observable examples of such changes. Many
rural illiterate people do not even know the name of the language they speak, let
alone developing emotional attachment to it. It is not unusual to see people
adopting a different language than their own mother tongue and even educating
their children in this new language. In multilingual developing societies, many
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people speak multiple languages. Such changes are not restricted to language,
religion is also subject to change. It is not unusual to see changes in one’s
religious beliefs or practices. Such changes may also influence entire religious
communities and “shifts in religious practices brought about under the influence
of religious reformers are common occurrences in premodern, modernizing, and
even in postindustrial societies. Sometimes such shifts are clearly designed to
promote internal solidarity and external differentiation from other groups”
(Brass 1991, 71).
In the rest of this subsection, I explore two prominent traditions within
instrumentalism. First, I discuss the individualist school and bring up some of
the criticisms raised against it. Next, I discuss elite-based accounts of
instrumentalism, mainly of Brass (1991), and the challenges against this school.
The individualist school is often known as rational choice and is a prominent
tradition within instrumentalism. According to this school, an individual is
motivated by self-interest and utility maximization (Leoussi 2001, 151). In fact,
“one of the major claims of rational choice theory is that the peculiarities of racial
and ethnic relations can be accounted for by the adaptation and application of
general social science theories; they do not call for some special theory developed
with only them in mind” (Banton 1995, 495). Employing a rational choice model,
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) investigate the causes of civil war in a large-n study.
Their framing pits greed-based explanations against grievance-based
explanations. “They model rebellion as an industry in which looting generated
profits” and they test both sets of theories using proxies for each of them
(Varshney 2007, 284). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) claim that leaders of a rebel
group avoid ethnic and religious divisions when recruiting fighters. They do it to
increase the cohesiveness of the fighting force which is important for its success.
This increased cohesiveness, however, comes at a cost, as they have to work with
a more limited pool to recruit from. On the other hand, poor societies do not offer
many economic opportunities, and thus, poverty works in rebel leaders’ favor.
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When a lower cost of recruitment is accompanied by the availability of finance in
the form of a share from the loot, the likelihood of conflict onset increases. Collier
and Hoeffler (2004) argue that their findings contrast with the idea that
grievances play a role in conflict onset. In other words, they propose that it is the
greed for looting primary commodities, not grievances, that drives rebel leaders
to initiate conflict.
Leoussi (2001) recognizes the ingenuity of various rational choice accounts,
however, she asserts that they suffer from several recognized difficulties. First,
she suggests that rational choice may be able to explain individual nationalist
conduct given that individuals have nationalist preferences. However, it cannot
explain successfully why they have nationalist preferences in the first place. By
extension, it fails to explain why nationalist preferences are much more common
among people in modern times than in pre-modern agrarian times. Second, she
finds the reduction of identity to interests problematic. Rational choice theorists
claim that adopting an ethnic identity is a choice that must be influenced by
interests such as access to job opportunities, pensions, or welfare benefits. She
claims that historical experience should teach us that identities are not influenced
very much by incentives and that the overt responsiveness of people to incentives
differs by culture (Leoussi 2001, 151–52).
Third, she finds rational choice theorists pseudo-empirical and argues that they
tend to “provide rational accounts of why so-called ‘choices’ might have been
rational. Yet they very rarely probe deeply to see whether other accounts of the
phenomena they seek to explain might be better” (Leoussi 2001, 152). Indeed,
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do set up models that test for grievances as
alternative explanations measured by inequality, political rights, ethnic
polarization, and religious fractionalization. While the inclusion of these
variables may seem to cover various types of grievances, none of them adequately
address identity-related concerns that can fuel grievances. While admitting that
hatred cannot be quantified, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) still use ethnic
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polarization and religious fractionalization as proxies for hatred. They also
include ethnic dominance to account for minority grievances. Indeed,
ethnonationalist or ethnoreligious conflicts between different groups cannot
occur in homogenous societies. Yet, diversity in a society, by itself, is not a cause
of conflict. Simply put, their models do not test for ethnic grievances. Considering
all these issues, Leoussi argues that, perhaps the most important contribution of
the rational choice tradition is “to show the limits of rationality and choice when
it comes to the examination of nationalism” (2001, 152).
Elite-based explanations make up another prominent school in instrumentalism.
According to elite theorists, ethnic and national identities are tools used by
competing elite groups to manipulate and mobilize the masses for political or
economic gains (Bates 1974; Leoussi 2001, 149; Özkırımlı 2000, 109). Brass
argues that when there is a disadvantaged ethnic group, the elites claiming to
represent the group will compete with the elites who are in power for economic
and political opportunities (Brass 1991, 46). If the elites in power do not
compromise with the new elites of the disadvantaged group, then dissatisfied
members of this group are expected to turn to nationalism. Various factors can
facilitate the success of a nationalist movement. However, a couple of factors that
may inhibit the success of a movement, according to Brass, are of note here.
Brass argues that a potential nationalist movement may fade if the elites in power
satisfy the immediate demands of the new elite from the disadvantaged group.
According to Brass, not only the elites who claim to represent them, but the
members of their ethnic group also act based on their own interests. Ethnic
members consider whether their economic needs are satisfied within the existing
system or not. If, for example, rural peasants from the ethnic group find that
their leaders can be elected to positions of power, and as a result, agricultural
policies can be influenced to their benefit, they will be satisfied with the system
and ignore “the appeals of their urban intelligentsia for the protection of their
language and culture” (Brass 1991, 47).
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Another important part of the puzzle is how an ethnic group adopts a nationalist
ideology and transforms into a nation. Brass (1991) discusses the requirements
for the process of ethnic transformation in which an ethnic group gains ethnic
self-consciousness and their ethnonational identity gains political significance.
He claims that ethnic differences that separate groups and elite competition are
necessary factors for the transformation of an ethnic group. However, he notes
that neither of these factors is sufficient (Brass 1991, 63).
The sufficient conditions for successful communal mobilization
are the existence of the means to communicate the selected
symbols of identity to other social classes within the ethnic
group, the existence of a socially mobilized population to whom
the symbols may be communicated, and the absence of intense
class cleavage or other difficulties in communication between
elites and other social groups and classes. The means necessary
to promote such interclass communication are growth in literacy
rates, the development of media of mass communication,
particularly newspapers, the standardization of the local
language, the existence of texts and other books in the local
language, and the availability of schools or classes in which the
native language and culture can be taught. (Brass 1991, 63–64)
Varshney (2007) raises several criticisms against the elite-based accounts. First,
he argues that elite-based accounts do not adequately explain why leaders in
multiethnic often societies find ethnicity and not class or other factors as the
means to power and for resource extraction from the state. Brass’s discussion of
ethnic transformation does mention the relevance of ethnic symbols and cultural
markers, but it is unclear how they are relevant. He often cites the significance of
economic interests, which may be more about the factors that relate to class than
the ones that relate to ethnicity. Second, if we assume that elites, indeed, act in a
self-interested manner and use ethnic symbols to mobilize ethnicity, elite-based
accounts are not satisfactory in accounting for why masses should follow them. If
we assume that the masses are manipulated by the leadership, then it is only the
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elites who use ethnic identity instrumentally and not the masses. In this case,
there needs to be more inquiry into what motivates the masses to follow the
elites, and further, why the ethnonationalist appeals work on the masses
(Varshney 2007, 282). Brass (1991) does briefly address the importance of
emotional attachments, but he does not sufficiently elaborate.
Additional issues emerge if we assume the masses also use ethnicity
instrumentally. First, if we assume that both elites and masses act based on their
interests, then we expect ethnic mobilization to be curtailed by free-rider
problems (Varshney 2007, 282). It may be rational to join a movement when it is
not far from being successful. If, however, there is no success in sight,
instrumentally rational individuals may expect that the odds of failure are not low
and decide to not dedicate their resources to the movement. Therefore, it is
reasonable to question, from an instrumental standpoint, whether ethnic
mobilization can take place at all, given that the odds of success would often be
very low at the beginning. Furthermore, if ex-ante odds of the mobilization in
prompting violence against the group are high, then it is unreasonable for
instrumentally rational individuals to participate in a rebellion and risk facing
punitive action that may cause injury or even death. Second, Leoussi (2001) adds
that both elites and masses may be motivated by interests, but they are still
constrained by their ethnic identities. It is difficult for individuals to redevelop a
new linguistic or cultural identity even if it is in their interests to do so. Third, the
instrumentalist discounting of the role of ideas and doctrines independently of
interests is not warranted. People decide what is right based on the ideas and
doctrines that influence them, without which, they may not be able to identify
what their interests are (Leoussi 2001, 150–51).
An entirely instrumental framing to explain ethnic preferences seems
questionable; thus it may be necessary to incorporate psychological or cultural
explanations (Varshney 2007, 283). This is not to say that instrumental
approaches do not have their uses. In fact, instrumentalism is quite useful when
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interpreting the actions of the elites. However, given the theoretical issues
associated with instrumental approaches, scholars need to be careful about how
to incorporate instrumental claims into their work.
Constructivism
Similar to other modernist theories on nationalism, the claim that identities are
constructed came in reaction to primordialism. Benedict Anderson’s
constructivist theory argues that nations are neither natural nor primordial, they
did not exist before modernity and were constructed only in modern times.
Anderson’s theory on nationalism as a social construct shook the foundations of
primordialism and became “the conventional wisdom in the field of ethnicity and
nationalism” (Varshney 2007, 285). Before discussing the constructed nature of
identities, it is important to highlight the nature of identities before modernity.
Before modernity, “most human interactions were on a small scale. Only
ecclesiastical and dynastic communities spread beyond the local and the regional.
The implication was that religious or dynastic animosities could be said to be premodern, even primordial, but ethnic animosities had local or regional protocols.
By bringing far-flung people into the frame of human consciousness, it is
modernity that changed the meaning of ethnicity and also led to nationhood”
(Varshney 2007, 281). Various ethnic groups, such as Turks, Han Chinese, or
Scots existed before modernity, however, ethnic identities were largely restricted
to their local communities. Ethnic communities that we consider today to be a
part of the same group were not connected in a similar manner. The only identity
types that managed to break the geographical barrier were religious and dynastic
identities. As these types of identities declined in the eighteenth century,
nationalism was on the rise. Modernity transformed ethnic identities by
expanding them from separate local ethnic communities to larger and more
consolidated ethnic groups that exhibit similar characteristics (Varshney 2007,
285). These ethnic groups constituted the new nations. Anderson (2006) offers
the following definition for the nation:
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(I)t is an imagined political community – and imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign.
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of
their communion.
The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of
them . . . has finite . . . boundaries, beyond which lie other
nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind.
It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an
age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the
legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. .
. . (N)ations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so.
The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.
Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the
past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much
to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. (Anderson
2006, 6–7)
Anderson clarifies what he means by “imagined” community by contrasting his
views with Gellner’s. Gellner claims that “nationalism is not the awakening of
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner
1964, 168). Anderson questions the usefulness of this formulation because it
leads Gellner to depict nationalism as “fabrication” and “falsity” rather than
“imagining” and “creation.” Anderson claims that “all communities larger than
primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are
imagined” (2006, 6). According to Anderson, communities do not differ by their
degree of falsity or genuineness, but by in what way they are imagined.
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Anderson offers an extensive historical account of the development of national
identities around the world. He claims that the origins of national consciousness
are found in Europe. According to Anderson, print capitalism played a significant
role in the construction of national identities. Book publishers were some of the
earliest capitalist enterprises. Accompanied by a period of prosperity in Europe
between 1500 and 1550, publishers set up branches across the continent and the
publishing business boomed in its early years. At this point, the first market for
the publishers was the literate Europe which comprised of a small stratum of
Latin-readers who were spread across the continent. This elite market saturated
in around a hundred and fifty years, at which point, the publishers were forced to
publish cheap editions in the vernaculars to reach the masses so that they can
continue profiting (Anderson 2006, 36–38).
Anderson argues that there were additional factors that further supported the
revolutionary vernacularizing force of print capitalism. One of these factors was
the Reformation. Within 15 days of Martin Luther nailing his theses to a chapel
door in 1517, their German translations were spread across the country thanks to
the printing press. The number of books published in German between 1520 and
1540 was three times the number between 1500 and 1520. Luther’s works
represented at least one-third of all books sold in German between 1518 and 1525,
which made him the first best-selling author who reached a mass audience. As a
result, following the contributions of the printing press to the Reformation, the
Reformation contributed to the rise of vernaculars against Latin (Anderson 2006,
38–39). Another influential factor, according to Anderson, was the spread of
vernaculars’ use as administrative languages. This development predated both
the printing press and the Reformation, and therefore, was independent of them.
The adoption of vernaculars was “a gradual, unselfconscious, pragmatic, not to
say haphazard development” (Anderson 2006, 42). The elevation of the status of
vernaculars to languages-of-power to replace Latin contributed to the decline of
the imagined community of Christendom (Anderson 2006, 40–42).
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In Anderson’s words, “what, in a positive sense, made the new communities
imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of
production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of
communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity” (Anderson
2006, 42–43). The diversity of spoken languages was so immense before the
printing press that establishing a market for each potential oral vernacular would
leave publishers with small markets with little profits. However, “these varied
idiolects were capable of being assembled, within definite limits, into printlanguages far fewer in number” (Anderson 2006, 43). Print capitalism played a
critical role in this process. Indeed, “nothing served to 'assemble' related
vernaculars more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars
and syntaxes, created mechanically reproduced print-languages capable of
dissemination through the market” (Anderson 2006, 44).
Anderson proposes that print languages laid the foundations of national
consciousness in three ways. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, print
languages gradually created unified languages. Before print languages, speakers
of various spoken vernaculars, such as Englishes, Frenches, or Germans, would
have difficulties understanding each other. Print languages made it possible for
the speakers of different vernaculars to comprehend each other via printed
material. The speakers of each language, gradually, became aware of millions of
other fellow readers who belonged to their particular language field and who
formed the embryo of the nationally imagined community. Secondly, print
languages gradually stabilized in around three centuries as European languages
assumed their modern forms by the seventeenth century. This new fixity made
the texts from the seventeenth century accessible to the contemporary speakers
of European languages in a way that the texts from the fifteenth century are not.
As a result, the fixity in languages, in the long run, made it possible to build the
image of antiquity that is central to the subjective idea of the nation. Third,
languages of power, created by print capitalism, were different from
administrative vernaculars of the past. Standardized print languages were closer
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to certain dialects than others. The speakers of the dialects that were
unsuccessful to insist on their own print form were disadvantaged in this process.
For instance, “'Northwestern German' became Platt Deutsch, a largely spoken,
thus sub-standard German, because it was assimilable to print German in a way
that Bohemian spoken-Czech was not” (Anderson 2006, 45). As a result, dialects
such as High German and King’s English were elevated to a higher politicocultural status (Anderson 2006, 44–45).
Even though Anderson finds the origins of national consciousness in Europe
through the creation of language-based imagined communities, he notes different
mechanisms through which national consciousness developed. He first looks at
the development of national consciousness in Latin America between 1760-1830
which he argues took place well before most of Europe. He finds the development
of national consciousness in the new American states of the late eighteenth
century and early nineteenth century particularly interesting due to two reasons.
First, the language was not an issue in these cases. All of the American states,
including the US, were creole states. These states were founded by people who
shared a common language and common descent with those they fought against
for independence. Second, the roles that social classes played in the nationalist
movements in the Western hemisphere were different from the European cases.
Following Nairn’s thesis, nationalist movements tend to be populist movements
where intellectual leadership tries to channel popular class energies of the
middle-class into support for new states. However, the middle classes in South
and Central America were insignificant around the time that Latin American
states gained their independence. Instead, the independence movements were led
by substantial landowners who allied a small number of bourgeoisie and
professionals in the colonies in fields such as law, military, and functionary
(Anderson 2006, 47–50).
Given these two interesting developments, Anderson seeks to explain why “such
colonial provinces, usually containing large, oppressed, non-Spanish-speaking
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populations, produce creoles who consciously redefined these populations as
fellow-nationals” (Anderson 2006, 50). He starts by pointing out that South
American republics were previously administrative units under their imperial
overlords. These units were originally shaped somewhat arbitrarily, but
geographic, political, and economic factors influenced their eventual
development into separate units. Difficulties in communication and traveling
during pre-industrial times allowed these units to develop unique characters.
Madrid’s ban of trading between administrative units further contributed to these
units turning into separate economic zones (Anderson 2006, 52–53). He argues
that “to see how administrative units could, over time, come to be conceived as
fatherlands, not merely in the Americas but in other parts of the world, one has to
look at the ways in which administrative organizations create meaning”
(Anderson 2006, 53). Anderson argues that, in Spanish America, this process is
precipitated by travels, “administrative pilgrimages,” of creole functionaries
during which met their colleagues, “fellow pilgrims,” from other areas within
their administrative unit. During their travels, they ask themselves: “Why are we
… here … together?” (Özkırımlı 2000, 149).
Anderson uses Turner’s assertions on the function that religious pilgrimages
serve in unifying people from diverse ethnicities who have a common religion to
illustrate the function of “administrative pilgrimages” in Latin America
(Anderson 2006, 53–54). During a pilgrimage in sacred places, such as Mecca,
diverse groups of people stay together, such as Malays, Persians, Indians,
Berbers, and Turks. The Berber who encounters the Malay at the Kaaba must ask
themselves: “Why is this man doing what I am doing, uttering the same words
that I am uttering, even though we can not talk to one another?”; the answer is
clear: “Because we . . . are Muslims" (Anderson 2006, 54). Similarly, creoles in
Spanish America found traveling-companions in their fellow bureaucrats during
their travels, developed a consciousness of connectedness, and as a result,
developed a distinct collective identity. The development of collective identity
was further facilitated by sharing a single language of the state and the
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restrictions on both vertical and horizontal movements of the creole
functionaries. Vertically, it was nearly impossible for the creoles to serve in Spain.
Horizontally, creoles from a certain administrative unit typically served only in
the same unit (Anderson 2006, 56–57).
The arrival of print-capitalism in the Americas had a major influence on the
territorial stretch of the imagined communities as nations. While the printing
press did exist, “printing did not really develop in [North] America during the
eighteenth century until printers discovered a new source of income - the
newspaper” (Febvre and Martin 1976, 211 as cited in Anderson 2006, 61).
Providing a tool for communication and informing about community intellectual
life, printer-journalism was originally a North American phenomenon. The topics
covered in first American newspapers were about the colonial administration and
the market system, such as timetables for commercial ships’ arrival and
departure, colonial political appointments, and marriages in the upper class.
Although more slowly and intermittently, printer-journalism developed also in
Spanish America in the second half of the eighteenth century as local presses
were born. Readers of the newspapers in metropoles such as Mexico City, Buenos
Aires, and Bogota were aware of the existence of other metropoles, but they did
not read the newspapers from other metropoles. Even when they read about the
other metropoles months later due to the distance, it would still be through their
local newspapers. As a result, a newspaper published in a metropole created an
imagined community among its fellow readers who cared about the content of
these newspapers that was centered around their own administrative unit
(Anderson 2006, 62–63).
Compared to Spanish America, English-speaking creoles in North America were
better situated for creating a unified identity. The geographic size of the thirteen
colonies was smaller than Venezuela and was one-third of Argentina. Their
metropoles in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia were quite accessible to each
other. Newspapers and commerce connected different colonies. English-speaking
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North America was not entirely united, however, as Canada remained under the
British administration and the United States experienced a civil war nearly a
century after the Declaration of Independence. Yet an imagined community of
the United States was created in the original colonies, and following the
independence, it expanded to the West. This expansion may not have been
possible if there was a sizeable English-speaking community in the eighteenth
century in the territories that were separate from the original colonies, such as in
California. Nevertheless, the influence of political, economic, and geographic
factors facilitated an imagined community of the United States whereas there
were obstacles that prevented the imagining of a community of a unified Spanish
America. Various political, economic, and geographic factors in Spanish America
favored localism instead of Spanish-American nationalism (Anderson 2006, 63–
64).
After discussing American nationalisms between 1760-1830, Anderson turns to
European nationalisms between 1820-1920. Unlike American nationalisms,
national print languages “were of central ideological and political importance” in
European nationalisms (Anderson 2006, 67). In fact, “the nineteenth century
was, in Europe and its immediate peripheries, a golden age of vernacularizing
lexicographers, grammarians, philologists, and litterateurs” (Anderson 2006, 71).
Linguistic studies in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to
growing realizations about languages. Studies in Semitics, for example,
challenged the divine status of Hebrew. As a result of scientific inquiries into
languages, old sacred languages - Latin, Greek, and Hebrew – were demoted to
the status of their new vernacular rivals. Sharing an equal status, languages did
not belong to God, instead, they belonged to their native speakers and readers
(Anderson 2006, 70–71).
Anderson argues that intellectual activities in linguistic studies were central to
the nineteenth-century nationalist movements in Europe and offers several cases
in support of this thesis. His discussion of the Greek case highlights the impact of
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linguistic studies on the emergence of Greek nationalism. Philological and
lexicographic studies on ancient Greek and on the entire extant corpus of the
Greek classics by German, French, and English scholars recreated ancient
Hellenic civilization. This ancient past became more accessible to a small number
of young Greek-speaking intellectuals who studied outside of the Ottoman
Empire in the late eighteenth century. “Exalted by the philhellenism at the
centres of Western European civilization,” these young Greek-speaking
intellectuals “undertook the 'debarbarizing' of the modern Greeks, i.e., their
transformation into beings worthy of Pericles and Socrates” (Anderson 2006, 72).
Anderson cites an address by Adamantios Koraes to an audience in Paris in 1803:
“For the first time the nation surveys the hideous spectacle of its ignorance and
trembles in measuring with the eye the distance separating it from its ancestors'
glory. This painful discovery, however, does not precipitate the Greeks into
despair: We are the descendants of Greeks, they implicitly told themselves, we
must either try to become again worthy of this name, or we must not bear it”
(Kedourie 1970, 43-44 as quoted in Anderson 2006, 72). Similarly, Anderson
finds support for his claims about the role of linguistic studies on nationalism
across various cases, such as Romanian, Russian, Czech, Hungarian, Bulgarian,
Ukrainian, Finnish, Norwegian, Afrikaner, Arabic, and Turkish cases. New
grammar books and dictionaries facilitated developments of literature in
vernaculars. Books written on the history of a prospective nation in newly
standardizing languages laid the foundations of language-based imagined
communities (Anderson 2006, 72–75).
Despite its strengths and widespread appeal, Anderson’s theory also faces several
criticisms, some of which relating to this study are as follows. First, Anderson’s
theory is claimed to be culturally reductionist. According to this criticism,
Anderson underestimates the importance of the political dimension of
nationalism and exaggerates the importance of the cultural dimension in
nineteenth-century Europe. Breuilly states that Anderson’s plausible claims for
eighteenth-century America falter in Europe as Anderson fails to address the
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influence of political aspects. In America, Anderson’s assertions are more
successful because he addresses the political dimension by incorporating the role
of colonial administrative units in his theory. Breuilly claims that the cultural
dimension can explain why certain groups of people may be inclined to imagine
themselves as a nation and act based on this assumption. He argues, however,
that it does not explain why the elites or the masses should take nationalist
arguments seriously. Breuilly thinks that examination of the links between the
modern state and nationalism may address this issue. Second, Kellas notes that
Anderson’s claim of nationalism replacing religion does not seem to hold in
certain cases, such as Ireland, Poland, Armenia, Israel, and Iran. In these
countries, religious institutions have rather reinforced nationalism. Third,
Anderson’s claim that nationalist independence movements in America being the
earliest examples came under attack. Other scholars identified the earliest
examples of nationalism in England, France, and Germany. Even though
Anderson finds these claims Eurocentric, Hastings suggests that Anderson’s
counterarguments are not convincing. While asserting that the origins of national
consciousness go back to print capitalism in Europe in the sixteenth century,
Anderson does not explain why the developments following the printing press do
not constitute nationalism (Özkırımlı 2000, 152–54).
Institutionalism
Constructivism does make compelling arguments, yet, it is difficult to explain the
stickiness of ethnic/national identities based entirely on the framework of
imagined communities. At this point, institutionalism comes to aid. Along with
constructivism, institutionalist explanations have also held a central position in
theories of ethnicity and nationalism, as well as of ethnic conflict, in
contemporary literature (Varshney 2007, 289). The theories on constructivism
focus on the formation of ethnic identities and their constructed nature, whereas
the theories institutionalism investigate the stickiness of ethnic identities as a
consequence of their institutionalization. A notable institutionalist, Gellner
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defines nationalism as a political principle that argues for the political and the
national unit to be in harmony. He argues that this principle is a fundamental
feature of the modern world. In pre-modern times, the borders of city-states,
feudal states, or dynastic empires rarely matched the borders of ethnic groups.
Furthermore, the ethnic identity of the rulers was often not even relevant for the
subjects (Özkırımlı 2000, 129–30).
Gellner differentiates between agro-literate societies and industrial societies to
explain why nationalism started to become a necessity only in the modern world.
Gellner argues that agro-literate societies consist of a complex system of
ascriptive and stable statuses. The status of an individual in a society is the main
determinant for the rights and privileges of that individual. As a result, power
and culture are separated. The ruling class of warriors, priests, clerics,
administrators, and burghers uses culture to separate themselves from the
agricultural workers who consist of the majority of the society. This creates a
discrepancy between a high culture of the elites and a low culture of the masses.
Additionally, context-free communication between literate elites separates the
elites from the subjects who use contextual communication in which meanings
depend on local dialectical idiosyncrasies. In these societies, the ruling class
benefits from cultural diversity because it helps the elites preserve their higher
status. As a result, the elites avoid imposing cultural homogeneity on their
subjects. Gellner suggests that a lack of cultural homogenization in agro-literate
societies means that nations cannot exist in this type of society (Özkırımlı 2000,
130).
Gellner claims that the relationship between power and culture follows a different
trend in industrial societies. In industrial societies, a shared high culture
encompasses a society in its entirety. Unlike in agro-literate societies, social
status is not ascriptive in industrial societies. This difference has two implications
for the social order. First, the ease of communication becomes more desired, and
thus, industrial societies attempt to eliminate contextual communication. In
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doing so, industrial societies prefer attaining context-free communication and
cultural standardization. Second, social mobility becomes a necessity in
industrial societies because they rely on constant economic growth which cannot
be achieved in a society with ascribed social roles. Industrial labor requires a
higher level of technical skills than agricultural labor which means that
recruitment needs to be meritocratic, instead (Özkırımlı 2000, 131–32).
In relation to social mobility and the need for meritocracy, the education systems
of agro-literate and industrial societies are also quite different. While people are
raised entirely at home in agro-literate societies, industrial societies have a
structured education system that starts at an early age in nursery schools.
Literacy is not limited to the elites; it is open to everyone. The education of an
individual has a substantial influence on their employability, dignity, and selfrespect. Education serves another important function by conferring identity on
individuals. As a result, a modern person’s loyalty is to a culture, as opposed to
pre-modern loyalties such as to a monarch, or land, or a faith. Protecting the
culture and setting up an educational infrastructure that is large and expensive
becomes a necessity for industrial societies. These complex and expensive tasks
can only be served by the state. In other words, the needs of an industrial society
link state and culture together. Gellner uses an analogy on plants to illustrate the
influence of modern states on cultures. He argues that most cultures are not
influenced by nationalism and they remain as “wild” cultures. They are produced
and reproduced spontaneously without being designed by an authority. On the
other hand, modernized cultures are “garden” cultures that are sustained by
literacy and specialized personnel (Özkırımlı 2000, 132–33). Based on his
analysis of different societies, Gellner claims that “nationalism is a product of
industrial social organization” (Özkırımlı 2000, 132).
Özkırımlı highlights several criticisms raised against Gellner’s foundational
account of nationalism, some of which I now turn to. First, functionalism in
Gellner’s theory has been subject to various criticisms. Gellner establishes causal
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relationships based on functionalist reasoning. Functionalism, however, is
particularly difficult to invoke when explaining nationalism because nationalism
is claimed to serve several incompatible functions by different theorists.
According to Minogue, Gellner’s approach is patronizing in the sense that he
claims people are doing something different from what they believe they are
doing. Whereas nationalists may believe that they are doing what they are doing
to liberate their nation, as an outside observer, Gellner knows that what they are
doing, as a result, is going to facilitate transforming their society into an
industrial one. Gellner, then, asserts that his explanation is the cause of the
events, even though this causation may not have played a role in the reasoning of
the actors. This approach, therefore, ignores the agency of the actors that play a
role in the process. Gellner’s functionalist explanation of the emergence of mass
education based on a standardized educational system suffers from similar
issues. Gellner claims that education systems are built for the function it was
expected to play. Breuilly, however, asserts that this reasoning can be used as an
explanation only by showing a deliberate intention by the actors to achieve the
specified outcome. The education system may indeed have functioned that way,
but that does not mean it is why it was developed in the first place (Özkırımlı
2000, 137–38).
Second, a common criticism against Gellner’s theory is directed at his claims over
the relationship between industrialization and nationalism. Numerous cases
show that nationalism is not necessarily a product of the industrial social
organization, because many nationalist movements emerged in societies before
their industrialization. Smith, a prominent ethno-symbolist, argues that the
origins of national sentiments go back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in
several European states such as France, England, Spain, Sweden, and the
Netherlands. While there may be contention over Western European cases, the
nationalist movements in the Balkans under the Ottoman rule offer a more clear
set of cases where nationalist ideologies took hold before industrialization.
Breuilly claims that, national sentiments do not require an industrial society to
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spread to the masses, and that there are other means through which a national
culture can diffuse, such as commercial agriculture, mass education, and modern
systems of communication. For instance, Gandhi’s nationalism in India was
positioned against industrialism, while the Soviet regime was hostile to
nationalism despite pursuing an industrialization campaign. Although the rise
and spread of nationalist ideologies may have gained momentum following the
industrial revolution in many cases, historical evidence does not give us a clear
answer. Whereas nationalism was already present before industrialization in
many states, industrialization did not trigger nationalism in others and
nationalist movements emerged long after the industrialization (Özkırımlı 2000,
139–40).
Third, Gellner’s model is criticized for not being able to explain the passions that
nationalism generates. On the one hand, some scholars admit the difficulty of
theorizing the spell of nationalism. On the other hand, others, such as Gellner,
theorized nationalism without mentioning the spell. His theory on the political
motivations that generate nationalism is accused of cultural and material
reductionism and fails to do justice to how powerful force identity can be. In line
with the third set of criticisms, a prominent ethnosymbolist, Smith asks why
people would identify so strongly with a high culture invented by elites to the
extent that they are willing to sacrifice their lives for it, as millions have done for
their nations. Gellner’s response to this criticism is that it is the mass education
system that shapes people’s identity, and as a result, generates the emotions that
make it possible for them to make such big sacrifices. Smith does not find this
answer satisfactory given that the early nationalists who construct the nation
cannot be products of the mass education system of a nation that does not exist.
Instead, Smith calls for the incorporation of the elements from pre-existing
ethnic cultures, such as myths, symbols, and traditions, that have been
incorporated into the infant national cultures (Özkırımlı 2000, 141).
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As a general criticism against modernist theories, ethno-symbolists argue that
modernist theories cannot account for the importance of pre-modern ethnic
attachments. Modernist theories see nationalist appeals as manipulations of the
masses by using an invented past. However, ethno-symbolists argue that such
claims underestimate the importance of ethnic ties and that the modernist notion
of “invented traditions” should be viewed as “reconstruction” or “rediscovery” of
certain aspects of the ethnic past. There may indeed be different ways to interpret
the past. However, elites are still constricted to certain events from the past of a
particular community in their reconstructions of this past. The masses will only
accept it if it is convincingly shown to be a part of their past. It is not of a primary
concern whether nationalist ideas are genuine or artificial in their creation, it is
rather about whether or not they work; they successfully mobilize people and
make them willingly fight and die for their nation (Özkırımlı 2000, 122–23).
As Smith notes, Gellner’s account of the importance of mass education in
spreading nationalism does not account for early nationalists who construct the
nation. Therefore it cannot account for the origins of national consciousness. Yet
the impact of state institutions and mass education is still a major contribution
that helps us make sense of the spread of nationalism to the masses. Darden’s
contributions on this particular topic are essential.
Darden studies the impact of mass schooling in his quest to explain the stickiness
of national identities and why individuals voluntarily make extreme sacrifices for
their nation. Before he expands on his theory, Darden discusses some problems
that are present in the literature on ethnicity and nationalism. Darden argues
that “unless the population of a given territory is killed, exiled, or otherwise
removed, its national identity and loyalties remain highly stable over time” (2013,
5). He asserts that it is challenging to find historical cases of any community
residing on a territory of any size switching its national identity after it has
already adopted one. Darden suggests that this observable durability is what gave
rise to early primordialist claims in the literature that explains the durability of
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identity in terms of inherent and natural differences between people groups.
Volumes of research on nationalism, however, have shown that primordialism
has no empirical basis because it cannot account for the initial fluidity and
artificial nature of identity. We know that identity is not fixed as there are
numerous cases where indigenous communities are induced to adopt a national
identity with relative ease. However, we also know that this fluidity is not
instrumental and that people do not switch their identity to maximize personal
gain or improve life chances (Darden 2013, 5–9). Because, “if national identity
were so malleable and individual families simply chose what was demanded of
them socially or benefited them materially, assimilating subject populations
would be much easier than it has proven to be” (Darden 2013, 8). However, “in
the parts of Eurasia where borders have historically shifted and territories have
changed hands, there are many cases where communities have faced powerful
incentives to adopt a different national identity. More often than not, such
communities resist, often with extraordinary violence, rather than change their
national identity and the political loyalty it entails. Under a variety of very
adverse conditions, national loyalties have proven quite resilient” (Darden 2013,
5–6). Darden addresses a major puzzle in the literature of how to account for the
national identities both being relatively recent constructs, thus not primordial,
and durable, thus not instrumental. His theory accounts for the initial fluidity
and subsequent durability of national identities which, in his words, is “a theory
that accounts for what appears to be a powerful first-mover advantage in the
formation of national loyalties” (Darden 2013, 9).
Darden’s main claim is that the initial schooling of a community is when durable
loyalties are formed for its members. The introduction of mass schooling marks a
shift from an oral culture to literate mass culture. During this transition, national
loyalties that are instilled by schooling “are internalized by individuals and their
families through unique changes of status and culture to produce a powerful
affective tie” (Darden 2013, 10). After national identities are established through
the schools, “national identities are preserved and reproduced over time within
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families and reinforced by local communities in a way that makes these
constructed identities virtually impervious to significant change or elimination
over time” (Darden 2013, 10). Schooled communities preserve their initial
national identities even if the material or political incentives change or states try
to assimilate them to secure their loyalty. In addition, “they will vote, conceal,
kill, or die if need be, to insure that they and those like them are ruled by those
they perceive to be their own kind” (Darden 2013, 10). Hence, knowing the
national identity instilled during the initial schooling of a community is a strong
predictor of how that community will politically align later.
Darden argues that the connection between mass schooling and the development
of national loyalties has been recognized as early as 1806 in Gottlieb Fichte’s
Addresses to the German Nation. Standing against the ongoing French
occupation, Fichte argued for universal mass education being essential for
creating and preserving national loyalty. Having achieved mass education, he
claimed, can provide a nation the tools to resist alien occupation. He called for
the deliberate cultivation of a national-mindedness to attain solidarity. He argued
that individuals who lack the national culture pursue individual self-interest and
collaborate with the occupier. Fichte blamed Prussia’s limited resistance to the
French occupation for keeping the education available only for the few and not
extending it to the public. He proposed German national education be offered to
everyone to mold Germans into a corporate body. Indeed, Prussia established a
state-funded compulsory school system in 1808 which became a model for many
states, particularly following Prussia’s victory against France in 1870 (Darden
2013, 11–12).
The role that schooling plays in cultivating national loyalties was widely
discussed in writings on education during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. This discussion led to new compulsory education laws across European
and American states. Educational surveys by the American and British
governments in the nineteenth century highlighted the link between schooling
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and loyalty which was further confirmed by the surveys done by the League of
Nations. Some of the early works in Comparative Politics noted that, in all cases,
schooling is the chief instrument for developing civic interest and loyalty among
the public and that one of the main mechanisms for building loyalties is through
developing school curricula. The content of textbooks has been viewed as a
matter of high politics and has involved supervision from top government
officials in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Stalin personally spent a substantial
effort on the first school textbook on the history of the USSR. Contents of public
instruction were also a topic of contention in the events leading to World War I.
Following the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary demanded
Serbia to remove references to Austria-Hungary from public instruction that
depict it negatively and that amounts to unhealthy propaganda (Darden 2013,
12–13).
Darden argues that the importance of mass schooling in the cultivation of
nationalism is neglected by modernist literature on nationalism. Even though
modernist scholars include mass schooling in their theories as one of the key
factors, it is usually discussed in combination with other factors that together
constitute forces of modernization. Darden believes that the influence of
schooling on national loyalties has often been attributed to other components of
modernization. To overcome this problem, Darden sets out to explore the role
that schooling plays independently from “other modern processes such as
urbanization, factory labor, newspaper reading, commercial exchange, the
development of civil society, and the expansion of the state administration”
(Darden 2013, 14). He argues that causal mechanisms that link modernization to
nationalism are not nearly as clear as the one linking mass schooling to it. For
example, urbanization and industrialization can create societal changes, however,
the adoption of nationalism does not result from these changes. Similarly, a
factory working environment can cause workers from diverse backgrounds to
develop attachments towards one another and unionize, yet these attachments do
not extend to other conationals living far away. Such concerns about other
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processes of modernization lead Darden to conclude that the distinctness of
national attachments cannot be explained by modernization itself. He argues,
instead, that schooling plays an independent role in cultivating national loyalties,
and “the mechanism through which schools seem to generate nationalism is by
direct indoctrination rather through the development of linguistic commonalities
and social communication” (Darden 2013, 16). In support of this claim, he
proposes the cases of Alsace and Ukraine where groups share a common
language and a high level of social communication, yet the national loyalties
developed in these groups differ because of the differences in their initial
schooling. Once the national loyalties develop, he claims, efforts to change them
should either have no effect on the loyalties of the community or trigger
resistance from the community against the state (Darden 2013, 13–18).

Ethnicity, Nation, and Nationalism
After a review of the literature, it is useful to offer a definition for the main
concepts and establish an understanding of nationalism that is to be used in this
study. Following an inclusive conception of ethnicity proposed by Horowitz, an
ethnic group is defined as a group whose members are differentiated from other
people “by ascriptive differences, whether the indicium of group identity is color,
appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some
combination thereof” (1985, 17–18). A nation, however, is not necessarily based
on an ethnic group. As indicated by Smith’s criterion of distinctiveness, a nation
can also be based on a territory as in the Latin American cases of nationalism
(Smith 1983, 216). Regardless of whether it is ethnically or territorially based,
there are two additional conditions to determine whether the group of people
under question constitute a nation. First, there is a belief within a nation that the
only legitimate rule over the nation can be by a member of the imagined
community. Second, another belief requires that the nation has a right to
sovereignty over its territory. These beliefs that entail political claims
differentiate a nation from an ethnic group (Darden 2013, 4). Nationalism,
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therefore, is an ideology that incorporates two aforementioned beliefs into the
political agenda of the group. Varshney claims that having a territorial
concentration is essential for an ethnic group to make national demands and that
these demands may take the forms of federalism or sovereignty (Varshney 2007,
277). Though it seems necessary, an ethnic group having territorial concentration
does not necessarily pursue national demands. Another term that is commonly
used in the literature, ethnonationalism is often used synonymously with
nationalism for cases in which nationalism is based on ethnicity as it is a more
common type than the territorial form. It only highlights the ethnic nature of
nationalism, which is of central importance in this study.
In simple terms, nationalism is an ideology, but it has been a difficult one to
study. Ethnic groups may go as far back in history as we can look, yet nationalism
is a very recent phenomenon. The earliest claims on the origins of nationalism
take it to the middle ages, it is thought to be politically relevant following its
spread after the French Revolution. Nationalism is a complex puzzle. As
discussed in this chapter, no single theory on nationalism explains this complex
phenomenon entirely by itself and each theory has received its fair share of
criticisms. While alternative theories offer competing explanations on certain
aspects, and sometimes even on very fundamental matters, one does not
necessarily have to view the theories on nationalism as competing explanations in
their entirety. One way to look at them is rather that they offer satisfying
explanations for different parts of a complex puzzle.
The discussion in the first two subsections highlights that the formation of
national identities can be explained in neither purely primordial nor purely
instrumental terms. As Varshney notes, theories in these categories were knocked
over, and “no one seriously argues any more that ethnic identity is primordial,
nor that it is devoid of any intrinsic value and used only as a strategic tool” (2007,
291). It is not primordial because there are no primordial “givens” of social
existence that exist prior to social interaction. It is also not based only on rational
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calculations as values, emotions, and motivations do influence people’s decisions.
Given the empirical record, Varshney does not expect pure primordial or pure
instrumentalist theories to make a comeback. However, this is not to say that
primordialist and instrumental explanations do not have any value. Even though
primordialism is obsolete, cultural primordialist claims cannot be discarded
entirely. Attachments do play a role in binding people together around a common
identity, not because these attachments are actually primordial, but because
many people around the world believe that they are. Similarly, it is clear that not
all actors make decisions rationally at all times within nationalist movements.
Members of an ethnic group with ethnonationalist aspirations often make choices
that may not maximize their utility, or may even lower their utility. They make
such choices because they consider these choices to be the right ones for moral
reasons under the influence of nationalist sentiments. Even though
instrumentalist approaches have serious weaknesses, instrumentalism does
contribute to our understanding of the rational actions of elites of a given
nationalist movement.
Following Anderson’s conception, the third subsection argues that identities are
constructed as imagined communities. This claim is now the mainstream view in
the field. This view suggests that identities can change. People can adopt different
identities than they are born into and identities themselves can change in
reaction to external factors. Nevertheless, looking at the empirical record, it is
difficult to ignore that national identities are quite resilient. Even if one can
change their identity, one is not able to, nor prefers to, keep switching their
identity to another one. Once identities crystallize and take hold, they do not
disappear easily. Most people who are born into a national identity preserve it
throughout their lives. Constructivist theories are criticized for not sufficiently
accounting for the political dimension of nation-building. This weakness, which
plays a role in the weakness of the constructivist theories to account for the
resilience of national identities, can be complemented by the institutionalist
explanations that account for this resilience. Darden argues that it is the initial
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schooling of a community that spreads a national identity among the community
members in a way that sticks. His modernist account suggests that schooling
cultivates national loyalties through indoctrination. Whereas constructivism is
more successful in theorizing the origins of national consciousness, Darden’s
institutionalist account offers a more convincing argument as to why identities
stick.

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict
After evaluating four sets of theories of nationalism, in this section, I discuss how
these theories fare in explaining ethnic conflict. First, primordialist theories of
nationalism do not help much in making sense of ethnic conflicts. If we are to
take ethnic attachments as natural, then we may expect conflict to occur between
different groups on the grounds that they are different groups. In this case, we
would observe a constant state of conflict, which is obviously not the case.
Alternatively, we can adopt a Huntington-style argument and expect
contemporary ethnic conflicts to result from ancient hatreds caused by
oppression or violent interactions between groups at some point in history. Yet
claims around such “past grievances” fail to explain temporal and spatial
variations in conflict. Primordialist views that are associated with deep-rooted
ethnic antagonisms cannot illuminate why two ethnic groups that have
supposedly always hated each other fight at certain periods while remaining
largely peaceful the rest of the time. Similarly, they fail to explain why the same
groups that fight each other in one place can live peacefully in another (Varshney
2007, 280).
Secondly, instrumentalist theories cannot offer coherent and generalizable
theories on ethnic conflict, either. It is hard to deny the role of rational
calculations by the elites. Yet, instrumentalist theories fail to explain why the
masses would have nationalist preferences and why they would follow the elites
for nationalist causes. In rational terms, it is quite irrational for one to willingly
take part in a conflict and risk their life. Therefore, even though elites may be
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rational actors, it is the masses who fight the war and instrumentalism does not
help us understand why they do it.
Thirdly, constructed nature of identity does not explain conflict, it rather explains
how identities form and develop. It is not easy to come up with constructivist
theories that help us understand general patterns in ethnic conflicts beyond case
studies. Constructivist accounts of nationalism also fail to explain why emerging
national identities that are proposed by states are not adopted by everyone.
Resistance to national identities, most commonly, seems to emerge along the
ethnic lines. Whereas a national identity that is centered around the majority
group may be appealing to the individuals who are from this group, the members
of not every ethnic group within the state are open to adopting the national
identity advocated by the state. If identities are malleable, we can expect minority
populations to be open to adopting the national identity. For many minorities,
however, this is clearly not the case and they do not imagine themselves to be a
part of the nation. Nevertheless, constructivism can guide us in investigating why
minorities resist imagining themselves to be a part of the nation. Constructivism
can also help us identify certain types of identity construction processes that
contribute to mobilization, and as a result, that facilitate conflict.
Finally, institutional theories on the formation of national identities are not
sufficient in making sense of ethnic conflict, either. Institutionalism helps with
understanding the spread of nationalism to the masses in new nations through
indoctrination by government institutions. However, this mechanism mainly
explains the government indoctrination of the majority group whose members
are likely to find the nationalist content of government propaganda rather
appealing. if institutions are effective in turning nationalist ideas of intellectuals
into mass identities using state power, minorities who are being modernized by
the state should not be able to resist the power of their original schooling. Indeed,
government indoctrination does work on many minority groups that are
assimilated into the majority culture. However, there are many cases where the
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members of minority groups are not very receptive to government indoctrination
and this low receptiveness suggests that government indoctrination has its
limitations. Given the high level of influence institutions have on the everyday life
of the citizens of nation-states, however, institutional explanations still have
promise in studying conflict and we can identify arrangements under which
conflict is more likely to emerge. For instance, through studying the designs of
political institutions, we can evaluate “consociational or majoritarian polities,
proportional representation or first-past-the-post electoral systems, federal or
unitary governments - explain why some multiethnic societies have violence, and
others, peace” (Varshney 2007, 289).
Apart from indoctrination, institutional design can also influence the identity
choice of individuals in multiethnic societies in other ways, for example, by
increasing the salience of one type of identity over another. To give an example,
Varshney cites Posner’s (2005) study on identity in Zambia. Posner highlights
that Zambians have two types of identity: linguistic and tribal. Following its
independence, Zambia also has had two types of political systems: multiparty
rule and one-party rule. Under the multiparty system where people elected the
president, the political arena was national, and as a result, Zambians identified
themselves with a larger category based on their language. Under the one-party
system, however, they did not elect the president and they only elected their
constituency representative. In this system, the smaller category, tribe, became
more relevant. The colonial rule had institutionalized only two types of identity:
linguistic and tribal. Administrative policies, recruitment, and census practices of
the British regime had made these types of identities more salient in Zambian
politics. Posner highlights that other types of identities could have also been
adopted by Zambians under alternative institutional arrangements (Varshney
2007, 290–91). Given that certain types of identities may be more prone to
conflict in specific contexts, institutions can increase the likelihood of conflict by
changing the salience of identities.
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Ethnic Nationalism of Minorities
Most nation-states have diverse populations with multiple ethnic groups or
nations. By extension, there are several ethnic groups and nations without a state
of their own. Ethnic groups within a state form majority-minority relationships
with each other depending on their access to political power and relative
demographic size. Before starting the discussion on minority nationalism, I
would like to note that not all cases of nationalism fit into a majority-minority
dichotomy, such as the multiethnic nationalism in Switzerland. Alternatively,
instead of a majority, an ethnic plurality describes the ethnic distribution in some
cases, such as in many African states. Though in cases of a plurality, it is often
possible to talk about one ethnic group that is substantially larger than others in
size. It may also be the case that it may be an ethnic minority that possesses
political power and constitutes the political majority. In such cases, the regime
may still make arrangements to accommodate the majority, as in Syria, or the
regime may discriminate against the majority by excessive measures, as in South
Africa under the apartheid regime. In these cases, ethnic groups that possess
political power function as pseudo-majorities. Even though these cases do not fit
the majority-minority dichotomy, this dichotomy is still a useful one. Because
more often than not, the distribution of ethnic groups over a territory influences
ethnic dynamics, political power distribution, and government policies in the
state that covers the territory. For these reasons, I use the majority-minority
dichotomy in this work to illustrate my theory better.
As argued in the previous sections, primordialism and instrumentalism do not
explain ethnic mobilization. Constructivism does not claim to explain ethnic
mobilization, as constructivist theories avoid offering generalizable claims
beyond the constructed nature of national identities and the role that
intellectuals play in constructing them. These conditions in constructivism apply
to all ethnic groups, and therefore, do not allow us to differentiate between the
ethnic groups that mobilize and those that do not. This leaves us with
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institutionalism. Institutionalist theories that are covered in this work rather
focus on nation-building around an identity that is in power, that put differently,
the nation-building of majorities. Thus, they do not account for the mobilization
of ethnic minorities. That is not to say institutionalism is incapable of explaining
ethnic mobilization. It only suggests that we need a new framework that
incorporates ethnic minorities when studying the mobilization of ethnic
minorities against the state. Referring back to Posner (2005) as an example, we
can treat institutions as political entities that also influence minority group
identities in a way that is different from the way they influence the majority
identity.
Nationalist ideologies of ethnic minorities resemble that of majority groups in
some ways. To refer back to the discussion on nationalist ideologies, ascriptive
group differences defining group boundaries, the demand for the rule over the
nation by a group member, and the belief in the right to sovereignty for the
nation are the central tenets of nationalism. In simple terms, a nationalist
ideology influences the members of a group to resist foreign rule, regardless of
whether the group is a demographic majority or a minority group. Similar to
majority groups, the nationalism of minority groups are constructed by their
intellectual elites. As discussed in the subsection on instrumentalism, Brass
analyzes this process from an instrumentalist perspective and argues that elites of
ethnic minorities use ethnicity to challenge the existing elites of the state and to
access political power. In other words, they invoke ethnicity as an instrument for
their political goals. If the elites’ attempts of invoking ethnicity to mobilize their
coethnics prove successful, the members of an ethnic group gain ethnic selfconsciousness (Yun 1990). Though the presence of elites invoking ethnicity to
access political power does not explain ethnic mobilization, it is a necessary
condition and thus can be used as a starting point.
Smith’s framework nationalism is a useful one to move from majority
nationalism to minority nationalism (1983, 215–27). Smith defines two criteria in
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his framework of nationalism. The first one is the “distinctiveness” criterion
which evaluates the extent to which a group is differentiated by the other groups
by its sociological features. If the cultural distinctiveness of the members of a
group is high, Smith categorizes it as “ethnic nationalism.” On the other hand, if
it is low, he categorizes the type of nationalism as “territorial nationalism.” In
between the two, there is “mixed nationalism.” Smith’s second criterion is
“independence.” For this criterion, he argues that an ethnic group can be at one
of the four stages of politicization: ethnic group, nation, autonomy, and state. In
the first stage, an ethnic group manifests a low level of politicization. Therefore,
the political activities of such a group can be labeled as “ethnic politics” so long as
they do not include political demands that involve systemic changes. He argues
that ethnic politics show similarities to the political activities of interest groups.
Their main goal is to protect the interests of the members of an ethnic group
instead of, for example, business associations or trade unions. A group with low
levels of politicization does not demand autonomy or independence (Yun 1990).
An ethnic group becomes a nation once its members gain self-consciousness
under the influence of ethnic nationalism. Once an ethnic group transforms into
a nation, the degree of politicization also increases. Regardless of whether the
group achieves self-rule, the ethnic group is considered a nation once it demands
self-rule. At lower levels of politicization, autonomy may be sufficient to appease
the nationalist sentiments of the ethnic minority. As a result of further
politicization, however, the demand for self-rule turns into a struggle for
independence. If this struggle succeeds, the ethnic minority obtains sovereignty
and asserts itself as a nation on the global stage. While independence is the final
stage, it is not the endpoint for ethnic nationalism. Smith suggests that it only
marks the end of the pre-independence period. In the post-independence period,
ethnic nationalism persists and uses newly acquired state tools to infuse a new
spirit and moral purpose to the society and preserve the group’s collective will
and integrity (Yun 1990). In other words, independence allows a minority
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nationalism to become a majority nationalism and control its own state
apparatus.

Conclusion
Ethnicity is the most common source of armed mobilization. Therefore, the
“ethnic” dimension of ethnic mobilization needs to be explained. In this chapter,
I argue that what makes ethnicity different than other forms is the ideologies that
are built around it. Ethnonational identities may not be primordial, but they are
often treated as such and they still ignite intense emotions. Class is also
associated with ideologies, yet ethnicity is different because one may not be
aware of their class, but one most certainly is aware of the language they speak,
the religion they practice, and the culture and identity they consider themselves
to be a part of. The essential role that identity plays in the lives of people since
their childhood makes them susceptible to mobilizing around their ethnicity.
Despite this susceptibility, however, ethnic mobilization is neither natural nor
given. A transition from a point in time at which none of the ethnic members
subscribes to ethnonationalism to a point where a considerable portion of them
subscribes to it is induced by external factors, if it happens at all. This transition
requires the ethnonationalist ideology to be constructed by intellectuals, and
later, adopted by the masses. The adoption of this constructed identity is neither
primordial nor instrumental. The constructed nature of identity and its
malleability go against the primordialist claims. It is also not instrumental
because the debate on instrumentalism shows that rationality is very limited in
examining nationalism. Darden claims that the adoption of national identities
takes place through institutional means and that government indoctrination
creates national loyalties in a way that sticks. However, it is noted in this chapter
that some minorities resist the institutional means. At this point, I argue that
institutional attempts to transform the culture of the population and cultivate
national loyalties can create an opposite reaction and may make aggrieved
members of minority groups turn to ethnonationalist movements that claim to
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represent them. The connection between nationalism and mobilization requires
making certain assumptions about how nationalism operates as is done in this
chapter. In Chapter 3, I explore another component of this connection, which is,
how horizontal inequalities create grievances which then help ethnonationalist
leaders develop ethnic self-consciousness and mobilize their coethnics.
Additionally, this chapter notes that language is an essential feature of culture
and identity. It points out the importance of language, not only for
ethnonationalist ideologies but also for the very origins of nationalist ideas.
Anderson’s theory shows how linguistic standardization led to expanded
imagined communities that are larger than small localities. Linguistic
standardization in Europe created the basis on which European nations emerged.
Ethnolinguistic identities gained prominence in different parts of the world as the
European model of the nation spread. I explore issues around language as I
discuss educational language policies and assimilation in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER THREE
HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES, GRIEVANCES, AND
MOBILIZATION

Introduction
After investigating the connection between nationalism and ethnic mobilization
in Chapter 2, I explore another essential component of the conflict mechanism in
this chapter: grievances. First, I offer a glimpse into the literature on the
connection between grievances and conflict. This section helps to situate the role
of grievances as theorized in this work in the broader literature on the subject.
Secondly, in response to the criticisms of grievance-based accounts put forth in
the previous section, I follow the claim that inequalities between ethnic groups,
rather than individuals, generate grievances that are associated with ethnic
conflict. Building on the literature on horizontal inequalities, the discussion in
this section establishes the group-level focus adopted in this work. For grievances
to turn to violence, there are multiple conditions to be satisfied: group
identification, intergroup comparisons, evaluation of injustice, and framing and
blaming. In this work, I build on this framework, put forth by Cederman,
Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013), and argue that horizontal cultural inequalities are
better situated to theorize their connection to conflict than other forms and this is
mainly due to cognitive reasons. Because when a government discriminates
against a minority group based on its cultural features, such as its language, the
resulting inequalities are easier to identify by people whose culture is
discriminated against. In the case of linguistic discrimination, identifying
inequalities is particularly easy because language is an inescapable medium of
public and private life as noted throughout this work.
Finally, I explore individual motivations for mobilization around identity. This is
an important topic to address because, even though group-level features and the
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interactions between the state and its ethnic minorities are at the core of
intrastate conflicts, it is still individuals who mobilize and participate. Thus, it is
essential to understand why individuals who have agency over their decisions
willingly risk their lives for their group. Relying on Taylor’s (1994) work on the
politics of recognition, the arguments made in section helps to justify the grouplevel focus adopted in this work by connecting individual motivations for
pursuing political goals around their group. Building on the pursuit of grouplevel political goals, this section also highlights the value rational foundations of
ethnonationalist mobilization, as opposed to instrumentally rational actions.

Literature on Grievances and Conflict
Grievances manifest in emotional responses, such as anger or resentment, to
events, conditions, or treatments that are perceived to be unfair or morally
wrong. These emotions are aimed against an individual or an entity, such as a
political leader, an institution, or a government, who is thought to have caused
the perceived unfairness. To understand the connection between grievances and
conflict onset, I now explore the literature on grievances. This section covers the
literature on the role of grievances in political violence since the 1970s and pulls
from the literature review in Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013, 11–20).
Diverging from earlier sociological theories that see collective violence resulting
from social ills and being committed by mobs, Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970)
argue that collective violence is caused by dissatisfaction with economic wellbeing. Gurr’s foundational relative deprivation theory claims that when
individuals have less than they believe they are entitled to, they feel discontent
with their own situation in life. Such discontent triggers revolution when it is
sufficiently widespread in society. Following Gurr’s work, a series of studies
theorized that collective violence results from factors such as economic
inequality, wealth inequality, and inequality in land ownership (Cederman,
Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 12). Gurr’s grievance-based theory also received
some criticisms, most notably by Snyder and Tilly (1972). Snyder and Tilly argue
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that grievances are present in all societies and that grievances are not sufficient to
cause uprisings. Instead, it is the factors that provide an opportunity for a
rebellion that lead to conflicts and revolutions.
As opposed to grievances caused by one’s economic situation relative to their
expectations, Horowitz (1985) claims that grievances form in reaction to
inequalities between ethnic groups. Horowitz contends that power struggles
between ethnic groups are not motivated by material causes. Instead, they are
driven by the elites’ pursuit to increase their political influence, whether it is by
attaining inclusion for their excluded group or by maintaining the exclusion of
other groups. Certain areas of political inclusion or exclusion, such as in
language, religion, and culture, carry a substantial level of importance for group
members. Horowitz’s claims do not cite nationalism as a driving factor, yet they
are in line with the demands emanating from nationalist ideologies, as claimed in
this work. Horowitz uses case studies to identify conflict patterns, but he does not
systematically test his theories. The first of the data collection efforts were
undertaken by Gurr which resulted in the Minorities at Risk (or the MAR) dataset
(2009). Using the MAR data, Gurr (1993b, 1993a) found that frustrations of
group members about the status of their group generate grievances over time and
these grievances play an important role in conflict onset. Another factor that
contributes to the onset, he argued, is the pursuit of interests that follow the
framing put forth by the elites.
Since the late 1990s, grievance-based accounts of conflict have faced strong
criticisms from three fronts. First, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) challenge
grievance-based accounts as causes of conflict. Instead, they claim that greed for
the control of primary commodities motivates rebellion. Theoretical claims of
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) are briefly addressed in Chapter 2 under
instrumentalist approaches to nationalism. The second front originates from
Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) influential work titled Ethnicity, Insurgency, and
Civil War. They contend that civil wars break out when factors that impact the
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opportunity of rebels to fight are more favorable for a rebellion. Insurgency is
more likely with low state capacity, mountainous terrain, and a higher
population, as well as with factors that facilitate group coordination (Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Weidmann 2009).
The third front does not only question the viability of grievance-based accounts,
but also the aggregation of conflict studies at the country level. Studies that focus
on micro-level factors are skeptical of the influence of macro-level factors, such as
identities, master cleavages, decisions of rebel organizations, or ideologies on the
decisions of individuals. They claim that taking part in a rebellion is motivated by
individual-level factors, such as personal grudges or material incentives (Kalyvas
2006; Weinstein 2007). These explanations that are at the individual level
discredit group-level factors, such as identity or nationalist ideology, therefore,
suggest that ethnicity does not play a distinct role in conflicts.
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug highlight two patterns of thought in grievanceskepticism that are prevalent in the literature, including these three fronts
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 15–17). They call the first type the
“ubiquity-of-grievances” claim. Scholars who follow this line of thought assume
that grievances do not explain conflict onset simply because they are too
widespread around the world. Given that it is possible to find grievances for all
ethnic groups in all societies, but conflict is a rare event and most ethnic groups
live in peace, it is argued that grievances cannot independently account for onset
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Laitin 2007, 25). The second pattern is named
“irrelevance-of-grievances.” The ubiquity claim implies that grievances do not
display sufficient variation to be considered viable covariates. The irrelevance
claim, however, suggests that even if there is variation in the degree of
grievances, they do not explain the onset after controlling for the underlying
factors that cause conflict. One of the strengths of these claims is their systematic
empirical testing in large-n studies, as opposed to supposedly biased case studies
influenced by the narrative put forth by combatants (Laitin 2007, 23–25).
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An important issue in the three fronts that criticize grievance-based accounts is
their choice of the level of analysis. The studies on the first two fronts operate at
the country level. These studies claim to test for grievances and find no support
for them. However, grievances at the group level need to be tested at the group
level to account for group-level dynamics of conflict, and doing so is essential for
studying intrastate conflict. Even if they are tested at the country level, such
testing needs to be carefully justified. This is not the case, however, in these
studies, and contrary to their claims, group-level grievance-based accounts
remain untested in these works. For the last front, the assumption that the
grievances based on ethnicity and identity are not consequential makes it
possible to conduct studies at the individual level. Yet, as discussed, this
assumption is simply not sound. This is not to say that individual factors do not
have any influence on conflicts. As claimed in this work, however, ethnicity has
become the main factor facilitating political mobilization and thus group-level
dynamics offer the basis for ethnic mobilization that leads to conflict.

Horizontal Inequalities and Grievances
In response to theoretical issues around the conceptualization of grievances,
Stewart (2008) introduced the notion of horizontal inequalities between
culturally defined identity groups as opposed to vertical inequalities between
individuals. He starts by stating that the vast majority of multiethnic societies do
not experience violent conflict. He cites Fearon and Laitin’s (1996) estimations
that only 0.01 percent of all potential ethnic conflicts turned into conflict in
Africa between 1960 and 1979. This leads him to question why conflict erupts in
some societies while others remain peaceful. He argues that the answer lies in
horizontal inequalities which he defines as “inequalities in economic, social or
political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups”
(Stewart 2008, 4). This definition suggests that even though the majority of
conflicts are between ethnic groups and they rely on “group mobilization of
people with particular shared identities or goals to attack others in the name of
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the group,” cultural differences alone do not explain conflict occurrence (Stewart
2008, 11). The horizontal inequalities argument proposes that inequalities do not
affect all individuals or individuals at random, they rather affect individuals
based on their group identity (Stewart 2008, 13). Horizontal inequalities that
mainly affect members of an ethnic group produce grievances, and in doing so,
they enable ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize their coethnics. Investigating
grievances that result from the horizontal inequalities and that form at the group
level, as opposed to the ones that form at the individual level, therefore, is more
compatible with the studies on ethnic civil wars.
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) argue that there are four requirements
for horizontal inequalities to be politicized and developed into grievances. First,
there needs to be group identification around well-defined groups. Grievances
around horizontal inequalities cannot develop if the population affected by the
inequalities does not have ethnic self-consciousness even if they constitute an
ethnic group. Therefore, group identification is necessary for the group members
to be aware of the horizontal inequalities that target them. They also note that the
group identification process may not be easy to overcome if sharp boundary
markers are not present. Whereas ethnic groups have often clear boundaries, it
has proven to be difficult to construct cohesive group identities around
socioeconomic classes. Marxists refer to the failure to form groups around class
interests as “false consciousness” (Brass 1991, 259; Cederman, Gleditsch, and
Buhaug 2013, 38). Secondly, members of groups need to be able to compare their
own group with other groups in terms of status, wealth, or other differences.
Without being able to make such comparisons, they cannot take notice of
horizontal inequalities. Thirdly, people who are negatively affected by horizontal
inequalities should be able to evaluate the injustice. In other words, horizontal
inequalities do not cause grievances if those who are worse off do not believe that
their conditions are unjust. Finally, the evaluation of injustice may not be
sufficient if it is not clear who is responsible for it. For grievances against the
state to form, the members of discriminated groups must see the state to be the
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source of the injustice. The likelihood of satisfying these conditions and achieving
collective action is heavily influenced by the framing of the injustice by the
leadership. To reach a wider audience, political entrepreneurs should frame the
inequalities in a way that is relatable to people, that is persuasive, that has
internal consistency, and that appeals to people’s emotions (Cederman,
Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 37–44).
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) introduced the EPR dataset that made it
possible to test whether horizontal inequalities are associated with conflict onset.
They state that they “conceive of ethnic wars as the result of competing
ethnonationalist claims to state power” (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 87).
Using this new dataset, they find that ethnic groups that are excluded from
executive power and that experienced reversal of their political status, in other
words, ethnic groups that face horizontal political inequalities are more likely to
rise against the government. Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) claim
that income inequality not between individuals, but between ethnic groups
increases the likelihood of conflict onset. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug
(2013) confirm the findings of these two articles and assert that horizontal
political and economic inequalities create grievances. Widespread grievances
between the members of an ethnic group promote mobilization, and as a result,
increase the likelihood of the eruption of conflict.
I build on the works cited in this section claiming that horizontal inequalities
generate grievances that are associated with conflict onset. As an additional
claim, I posit that grievances resulting from horizontal cultural inequalities are
more suitable to study grievances that are connected to ethnic conflict because
these types of inequalities are related to identity more directly than horizontal
political or economic inequalities. Grievances associated with identity are more
likely to emerge because the requirements for horizontal inequalities to turn into
grievances have a better chance to materialize with cultural inequalities. Let me
illustrate this claim with an example. In a society with two ethnic groups, group
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A, the majority group, controls the state whereas group B, a minority group, is
excluded from central executive power. The members of group B also have a
lower level of income on average. A lack of access to executive power or a lower
level of income, by themselves, may not be very substantial. First, being excluded
from executive power can be harmful to the members of the group only if it is
accompanied by other forms of discrimination. This is not to say the grievances
resulting from a lack of access to power cannot lead to demands for autonomy or
independence. If the group identification and intergroup comparison steps are
overcome by other means, and consequently, if an ethnic group had gained ethnic
self-consciousness, then the demands for autonomy or independence can be
politicized by the elites and their framing may find support among the group
members. Yet, if being excluded from the executive power is the only form of
horizontal inequalities that are present, it may not constitute a problem for the
minority group. Because the members of the minority group may find this
arrangement natural, and consequently, they may not find it to be unjust, and
thus, would not blame the state. They may ignore the appeals of the leaders of
ethnonationalist movements who are trying to create a group identity and
mobilize them.
Second, different levels of income can often be explained by factors that are not
related to intergroup dynamics. In this case, even if group identification and
intergroup comparison steps are completed, there may not be injustice or
blaming resulting from the inequalities. On the other hand, similar to the
previous case, there may be other inequalities in place that lead to the group
identification, intergroup comparisons, and evaluation of injustice, and only after
these steps are achieved, horizontal economic inequalities would contribute to
the feeling of injustice around the horizontal economic inequalities. Economic
inequalities are often cited as a source of grievances regardless of whether it is a
problem in a society or not. In fact, Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann (2015)
show that grievances are associated with conflict not only with the poorer groups
but also with the groups that are richer than the state average. Therefore, after
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the members of the ethnic group are already upset, political entrepreneurs can
politicize disparities that are not necessarily supported by objective
measurements and they can blame the majority group or the state for these
politicized injustices.
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug note that the empirical connection in this
mechanism is between horizontal inequalities and conflict (2013, 35–36). There
is a theoretical assumption behind this empirical connection, which is that
horizontal inequalities create grievances that would then lead to conflict.
However, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug assert that their theory is
probabilistic and not deterministic. Therefore, even if there are horizontal
inequalities, they may not necessarily lead to conflict if the four requirements are
not satisfied. Moreover, even if they are satisfied, it may not be sufficient for
mobilization. Alternatively, grievances may emerge despite horizontal
inequalities being identified and framed inaccurately and the state may be
blamed unfairly. Being aware of these possibilities, Cederman, Gleditsch, and
Buhaug still expect that “grievances will be experienced roughly in proportion to
the degree of violation” (2013, 41). While I agree with this claim, I am skeptical
that income disparities between the groups can be observed by the members of
ethnic group B prior to group identification and that this observation alone would
lead to the crystallization of the group identity, and after that, would facilitate the
other steps.
I argue that the connection to identity is at the core of the connection between
horizontal inequalities and grievances and group identities are more likely to be
crystallized when the members of the minority ethnic group are discriminated
against based on their culture and identity. For instance, let us consider aspects
relating to the language or religion of an ethnic group. These aspects are essential
parts of culture and identity which individuals regularly observe and practice in
their daily lives. When the members of a group are discriminated against based
on their language or religion, they will be able to make comparisons about the
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different rights and privileges between groups, observe the discriminations they
face, and know that the state is responsible for the unjust laws and their
enforcement. Because these forms of discrimination are cognitively easy to
identify and form an opinion on even without them being politicized. Therefore,
because of their connection to culture and identity, horizontal cultural
inequalities are more likely to lead to group identification and they are also more
likely to be successfully politicized by political entrepreneurs.
In addition to the cognitive processes, ideological factors also contribute to the
success of horizontal cultural inequalities in mobilization. As discussed in
Chapter 2, nationalist ideologies have come to define modern political systems.
Ethnic groups that had gained ethnic self-consciousness and that had adopted
nationalist ideologies make political demands to prevent alien rule and to
preserve their culture and identity. The members of a group whose culture is
threatened and undermined by the state are more likely to turn to
ethnonationalist leaders who are successful in framing the discrimination in a
way that appeals to the ethnic members. Ideological factors work well also in the
presence of political inequalities, yet, as discussed, such inequalities are not
facilitated by cognitive processes to the same extent. In other words, the
theoretical connection between horizontal cultural inequalities and grievances is
justified with more success than between other forms of horizontal inequalities
and grievances due to both cognitive and ideological reasons that facilitate this
connection. This is not to say horizontal cultural inequalities are more successful
than other types of horizontal inequalities in mobilizing people. Though they may
well be, the claim is rather that, particularly for cognitive reasons, claims around
horizontal cultural inequalities regarding their association with conflict are more
theoretically sound due to their connection to culture and identity. As a result,
despite the case being made for the importance of horizontal cultural inequalities
in reference to other types, this work does not attempt to compare different types
of horizontal inequalities.
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Recognition of Identity and Mobilization
I argue that the inequalities at the group level, i.e. horizontal inequalities, create
grievances for the members of ethnic groups and group-level factors are more
appropriate for capturing group-level dynamics of ethnic conflict. Regardless of
the level at which factors operate, however, it is individuals who decide to join or
support a rebellion. This begs the question: How are horizontal inequalities able
to create grievances and promote the spread of ethnonationalist sentiments
among minority populations in a way that these sentiments facilitate
mobilization for armed struggle? Answering this question requires examining
whether and how these group-level factors can be connected to the individual
level to explain the mobilization of individuals. In Chapter 2, I adopt the position
that rationalist frameworks cannot explain ethnic mobilization. In this section,
which forms the main bulk of this chapter, I refer to Taylor’s (1994) brilliant work
on the politics of recognition to explain why grievances around identity have the
power to mobilize individuals from discriminated minorities around group-level
goals. Taylor’s complex account is laid out in this section step by step.
The demand for recognition has become an important topic in politics. This
demand, Taylor argues, is a driving force behind ethnonationalist movements
representing minority groups. The identity of an individual is about how they
define themselves. The recognition of the identity by the state is linked to the
identity itself because its recognition plays a significant role in shaping it. People
can suffer from the absence of recognition or misrecognition of their identity,
because “it is a vital human need” (Taylor 1994, 26). Therefore, “nonrecognition
or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning
someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (Taylor 1994, 25).
Taylor argues that the consequences of two historical transformations made
recognition particularly important for identity. The first transformation was the
collapse of social hierarchies. The premodern concept of honor was a feature of
aristocratic social hierarchies. What made honor valuable was that it was only
71

given to certain people, and not to everyone. The notion of honor collapsed with
modernity and was replaced by dignity. The main difference between dignity and
honor is that dignity is seen as an inherent part of humanity. It is possessed by all
human beings whereas honor could only be possessed by some people who were
from the upper classes. As a result, “this concept of dignity is the only one
compatible with a democratic society, and that it was inevitable that the old
concept of honor was superseded” (Taylor 1994, 27). Taylor highlights that, in
democracies such as the United States, all people are called by titles such as
“Mr.,” “Mrs.,” or “Miss.” (or “Ms.” after the collapse of the previous two titles for
women into one). This is in contrast with only some people being called “Lord” or
“Lady” and the rest being called by their names.
The second transformation Taylor notes is that “the importance of recognition
has been modified and intensified by the new understanding of individual ideality
that emerges at the end of the eighteenth century” (Taylor 1994, 28). An
individualized identity that is particular to each individual did not exist before
the late eighteenth century. Taylor argues that the notion of an individualized
identity came about along with the “ideal of authenticity” which is about an
individual being true to themselves and their particular way of being. This ideal
suggests that “human beings are endowed with a moral sense, an intuitive feeling
for what is right and wrong” (Taylor 1994, 28). This claim came in reaction to an
earlier understanding which suggested that “knowing right and wrong was a
matter of calculating consequences, in particular, those concerned with divine
reward and punishment” (Taylor 1994, 28). The ideal of authenticity, however,
suggests that understanding what is right and what is wrong is not based on dry
calculations, instead, it comes from within, from our feelings, and not from
external sources, such as God. We need to follow the guidance of our moral
feelings to act rightly. As a result of this transformation, “being in touch with our
feelings takes on independent and crucial moral significance. It comes to be
something we have to attain if we are to be true and full human beings” (Taylor
1994, 28).
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Taylor cites three philosophers who contributed to our understanding of the
process that led to these transformations: Rousseau, Herder, and Hegel. First,
Rousseau identified the change that was already taking place in the culture before
anyone else. He proposed that morality is “a voice of nature within us” and he
noted that “this voice is often drowned out by the passions that are induced by
our dependence on others, the main one being amour propre, or pride. Our
moral salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves”
(Taylor 1994, 29). Rousseau defines this contact as le sentiment de l’existence or
feeling of existence.
Following Rousseau, Herder’s contributions to the ideal of authenticity are
particularly important. Herder proposed that every human being has their own
way of being human that is particular to them. According to this claim, “there is a
certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this
way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s life” (Taylor 1994, 30). Following their
own way is the only way in which one can be true to themselves and fulfill the
purpose of their life. This powerful moral ideal attributes a particular moral
significance to be true to their inner nature that is unique to them. This
uniqueness is defined as the principle of originality. Failing to do it puts one in
danger of giving in to the pressures of conformity from external sources, and
consequently, of being lost. The fear of the danger of being lost makes us listen to
our unique inner voice. Rousseau’s feeling of existence and Herder’s principle of
originality help us understand the modern ideal of authenticity.
Herder makes another contribution by applying his originality concept at two
levels. The first level is the individual level that is between individuals. The
second level looks at culture-bearing people among other peoples. This second
level gets us closer to understanding why cultural identity is quite important for
an individual. Originality at the second level suggests that “just like individuals, a
Volk should be true to itself, that is, its own culture” (Taylor 1994, 31). Every
people group should be true to their culture and find their own path. This is “the
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seminal idea of modern nationalism, in both benign and malignant forms”
(Taylor 1994, 31).
Herder notes, similar to dignity, the ideal of authenticity is also a product of the
collapse of premodern social hierarchies. Before modernity, one’s identity was
tied to their social class. The identity that was based on one’s social class,
however, was undermined by the ideal of authenticity. The reason for this,
Herder argues, is that the ideal of authenticity requires one to discover their own
way of being that is original to them. It can only derive from within, it cannot be
determined by an external source, such as social roles (Taylor 1994, 31–32).
The ideal of authenticity is about one being true to oneself, listening to their inner
voice, and deriving their way of being from within. Their way of being, however,
cannot be generated from within in a monological manner. “We become full
human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our
identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression,” thus
human life is inherently dialogical (Taylor 1994, 32). Taylor notes that, here,
language refers to all modes of expressions through which we define ourselves,
not just the language we speak. “We learn these modes of expression through
exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages needed for selfdefinition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction
with others who matter to us,” or in George Herbert Mead’s words, our
significant others (Taylor 1994, 32). Even though we form our own opinions by
ourselves, for the most part, we do not make decisions independently of others on
important issues, such as our identity. Consequently, “we define our identity
always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant
others want to see in us” (Taylor 1994, 33). Even if our significant others are no
longer a part of our lives, our dialogue, consequently their influence on our
identity, persists until our death. Taylor argues that we can never be completely
free from the influence of our significant others who shaped us in the earlier
stages of our lives. Rather, we discover our identity in negotiation with other
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people, regardless of whether this negotiation takes place internally or overtly
(Taylor 1994, 34).
Taylor notes that our dependence on other people in terms of our identity
formation is not a new development. It existed before the emergence of the ideal
of authenticity, as well. The difference, however, is that, before modernity,
recognition of identity was not an issue. Under the hierarchical social structures,
“general recognition was built into the socially derived identity by virtue of the
very fact that it was based on social categories that everyone took for granted. Yet
inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn’t enjoy this recognition a
priori” (Taylor 1994, 34). The recognition has to be earned, yet attempts for
recognition may not succeed. In other words, the need for recognition did not
develop with the ideal of authenticity, it was already there. The main difference
that came about with the ideal of authenticity is the possibility that the attempts
for recognition can fail (Taylor 1994, 35).
Finally, Taylor turns to the third philosopher, Hegel, who argues that recognition
takes place on two planes: the intimate plane and the social plane. On an intimate
plane, as discussed, our interactions with our significant others influence our
identity, and “we can see how much an original identity needs and is vulnerable
to the recognition given or withheld by significant others” (Taylor 1994, 36). The
identity that is generated within us relies on self-discovery and self-affirmation
that comes from our relationships with our significant others. On the social
plane, the fact that identities form in dialogue “has made the politics of equal
recognition more central and stressful. It has, in fact, considerably raised the
stakes. Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy
democratic society. Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it” and
“the projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort
and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized” (Taylor 1994, 36).
Taylor notes that the politics of equal recognition has taken two forms. In the first
form, the transition from honor to dignity brought the universalist idea that all
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citizens deserve equal dignity and equal rights, and therefore, they cannot be
treated as “second-class” citizens. In the second form, the unique identities of all
individuals or groups are expected to be recognized. Failing to do so leads to
assimilation to “a dominant or majority identity. And this assimilation is the
cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity” (Taylor 1994, 38). Taylor calls these
forms the politics of dignity and the politics of difference, respectively.
The politics of difference defends the ability to form a unique identity for
individuals as well as culture-bearing groups. The politics of difference is critical
of the politics of dignity for attempting to homogenize people by assimilating
their identity. Because, in a society, there is no neutral identity to mold everyone
into. Instead, the politics of dignity represents the hegemony of a certain culture
and attempts to assimilate other cultures under the pretense of neutrality. As a
result, “only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien
form” (Taylor 1994, 43).
Taylor’s discussion of the Canadian case illustrates the importance of culture and
identity for cultural collectivities. The Canadian Charter of Rights that passed in
1982 provided a basis for judicial review on equal treatment of citizens to protect
them from discrimination and on the protection of individual rights that are
defined in the charter. French Canadians, as well as aboriginal peoples, put forth
claims that are not compatible with these egalitarian norms on the basis of their
distinctness as groups. They argued that their survival as peoples was at stake
and that they needed autonomy to have the ability to take precautions that are
necessary for the survival of their culture. Quebec has passed laws to achieve this
goal. For example, Quebec restricted the eligibility to go to schools that provide
education in English, not only for the francophones but also for immigrants.
Other examples of such laws include one that requires businesses that have more
than fifty employees to be run in French and one that bans the use of commercial
signs that are not in French (Taylor 1994, 52–53).
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Such laws that were adopted to protect collective goals, however, are against the
basic provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights. Because “the collective goals
may require restrictions on the behavior of individuals that may violate their
rights” and “even if overriding individual rights were not possible, espousing
collective goals on behalf of a national group can be thought to be inherently
discriminatory” (Taylor 1994, 55). Yet, this is also a question about the legitimacy
of cultural survival as a political goal. Demands for the protection of cultural
rights are central to ethnic movements even at lower levels of politicization of
their identity. Determining which type of goal has precedence over the other is a
philosophical issue, one without a clear answer. Because either choice works
against the other one and both choices are important. Yet, the particular
importance of culture and identity following their politicization and the needs of
individuals for the recognition of their culture and identity make the pursuit of
collective goals more preferable for ethnic groups (Taylor 1994, 63–64).
Demands for equal recognition have been central for ethnonationalist
movements. Consequently, “multinational societies can break up, in large part
because of a lack of (perceived) recognition of the equal worth of one group by
another” (Taylor 1994, 64). Oftentimes, nationalist actors deny that they are
motivated by a lack of recognition. Indeed, Taylor claims that very few admit,
among Quebec independentists, that the main reason that their political struggle
gained momentum is a lack of recognition by English Canada. Instead, they cite
other factors that motivate them, such as income inequality, exploitation, and
injustice. Subscribing to the view that Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013)
call the ubiquity of grievances, Laitin is critical of “listening too earnestly to the
accounts of combatants”; he follows:
When ethnic war breaks out, journalists congregate like ravens.
They inevitably ask combatants to tell narratives explaining the
killing. The combatants are trying to answer the same question
for themselves! … Linking an insurgency to a nationalist cause
helps to sustain that insurgency. This is not the same as causing
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the insurgency, as the historical grievances that are appealed to
by insurgents are ubiquitous, and not any greater in cases of
insurgency than in cases of peace. The images of brethren
tortured and killed are, of course, powerful, but again they are
the result of—used as proof of the need for autonomy—but not
the cause of the insurgency. (Laitin 2007, 23–24)
Various forms of injustice being invoked by the combatants as the source of
conflict, sometimes unconvincingly, makes Laitin conclude that the perceived
injustice cannot be the source of conflict. Even if we assume that he is right,
which he may well be, this claim does not offer sufficient grounds to dismiss the
role of grievances on conflict onset. Taylor notes that the idea that our identity is
partly formed by recognition has made the demand for recognition explicit. This
idea has meant, not only that recognition is essential, but also that
misrecognition is a source of harm (Taylor 1994, 64). Regardless of what factors
ethnonationalist groups cite as the causes of their struggle, nonrecognition or
misrecognition can cause identity-related grievances to accumulate among the
members of discriminated minorities. Following the politicization of ethnic
identities, it is these grievances that help ethnonationalist movements mobilize.
There is one final issue to address regarding mobilization. If it is the politics of
recognition that explains ethnic mobilization, and not rationalist frameworks,
that means individuals who mobilize are open to irrational acts. It does seem
complicated for the purposes of theory building. But nevertheless, how can it be
incorporated into my theory? I turn to Varshney (2003) to find an answer.
Varshney points out the duality in rationality, as conceptualized by Max Weber,
to account for this puzzle. Varshney argues that, in an ethnic conflict, there is a
combination of “instrumental rationality” and “value rationality” that motivates
the decisions of individuals. Instrumental rationality, as covered in Chapter 2,
indicates a strict cost-benefit analysis to determine goals. Necessary adjustments
in the goals need to be made as the costs and benefits change. If the cost of
achieving a goal is too high, then the goal would be abandoned. According to
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instrumental rationality, risking sacrificing their life for the group is irrational
due to the high potential cost without prospects for material gains that would
justify such a major sacrifice. Even if I refer back to Leoussi’s third criticism to
instrumentalism, as covered in Chapter 2, which highlights the subjective nature
of interests whose determination is influenced by ideas and doctrines, I can still
clearly evaluate self-sacrifice for the political goals for the collective group to be
instrumentally irrational. Yet many still have done it and continue to do it. The
second concept, value rationality, helps us make sense of why. Value rationality
arises from various types of beliefs, such as ethical, religious, or aesthetic ones.
Unlike instrumental rationality, one holds value rationality independently from
the likelihood of success. Consequently, “some spheres or goals of life are
considered so valuable that they would not normally be up for sale or
compromise, however costly the pursuit of their realization might be” and
“behavior, when driven by such values, can consciously embrace great personal
sacrifices” (Varshney 2003, 86).
Varshney contends that “most of the time and in most places, ethnic or national
mobilization cannot begin without value-rational microfoundations” (Varshney
2003, 86). Yet value-rational basis is not sufficient for ethnic mobilization on its
own. Ethnonationalist elites may need to devise strategies and form coalitions. It
is also the case that some ethnic members may join once the movement gains
some momentum and its chances of success increase, potentially, for
instrumental-rational reasons. Therefore, opportunity-related factors and
instrumental rationality may gain prominence for the movement as it evolves.
Yet, the importance of instrumental rationality does not detract from the
important role that value rationality plays in the early stages of mobilization and
in recruiting the aggrieved ethnic members during all stages.

Conclusion
The connection between grievances and conflict has been long debated. Whereas
early empirical studies in the literature on intrastate conflict discredited
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grievances as viable explanations, the notion of horizontal inequalities allowed us
to reconsider how grievances influence conflict dynamics. This notion suggests
that grievances that form at the group level are associated with conflict. Using
this notion, studies have found that horizontal political inequalities and
horizontal economic inequalities increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset.
I claim that the connection between horizontal inequalities and conflict onset is
mainly due to the tie of horizontal inequalities to identity. I argue that, as a result
of this tie, horizontal cultural inequalities have a more direct connection to
grievances, and thus to conflict onset. This tie is due to cognitive and ideological
reasons. The cognitive portion suggests that horizontal cultural inequalities are
easier to observe in the absence of other forms of inequalities. The ideological
portion suggests that, as a result of cognitive processes that make it easier to
identify horizontal cultural inequalities, ethnonationalist movements influenced
by modern nationalist ideologies facilitate the process of gaining ethnic selfconsciousness and capitalize on the horizontal inequalities to mobilize their
coethnics.
I also note that the modern ideal of authenticity and resulting politics of
recognition help make sense of individual motivations for supporting
ethnonationalist movements in the absence of recognition or due to the
misrecognition of their identity. People depend on their significant others for the
formation of their social group identity which takes place dialogically. Once their
social identity forms as they become full human agents capable of defining their
identity as members of a culture-bearing group, they demand preserving their
originality for their culture at the group level and they want their cultural group
to be true to itself. In chapter 4, I focus on forms of horizontal cultural
inequalities that have been particularly relevant since the emergence of modern
nation-states: educational language policies preventing minority groups to
receive education in their native language. The influence of exclusionary
educational language policies is very significant because these policies not only
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take away ethnic groups’ chances to be true to their own culture, but also they
have the capacity to assimilate ethnic minorities and wipe out their language.

81

CHAPTER FOUR
MODERNIZATION, ASSIMILATION, AND CONFLICT

Introduction
Nationalist ideologies have come to define the political landscape of the modern
world. As a result, it is impossible to theorize the political interactions of ethnic
groups without exploring the role nationalist ideas may play. The discussion in
Chapter 2 notes that nationalism is very much related to ethnic mobilization for
political demands. In fact, nationalist ideas are influential for mobilization
because they affect both majority groups and minority groups. On one hand,
majority groups use state tools in their pursuit of nation-building and they
employ nationalist policies including policies of assimilation. On the other hand,
ethnonationalist movements claiming to represent minority groups try to
preserve their culture and achieve self-rule in the forms of autonomy or
independence. To that end, they resist the domestic colonization of the state and
the forces of assimilation. These political strategies of both majority and minority
groups result from nationalist ideologies and developments related to
modernization.
Explaining the connection between horizontal inequalities and grievances,
Chapter 3 shows that ethnic mobilization against the state requires certain
conditions to materialize. For horizontal inequalities to turn to grievances, there
needs to be group identification, intragroup comparison regarding inequalities
between them, evaluation of injustice in these inequalities, and holding the state
responsible for the injustice. I argue that these conditions are satisfied more
easily in the presence of horizontal cultural inequalities than other types of
horizontal inequalities mainly for cognitive, but also for ideological reasons.
Cognitively, horizontal cultural inequalities are more likely to be identified by
people in their daily life due to their direct connection to identity. After they are
82

observed, ideologically, injustices targeting culture and identity are easier to be
politicized by ethnonationalist leaders.
After laying the foundations in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I discuss historical
processes that are related to the mechanism I explore in this dissertation and
offer my theory on the association between educational language policies and
conflict onset in this chapter. I do this in three sections. In the first section, I
discuss the historical progression of this mechanism. I first discuss the influence
of linguistic standardization and bureaucratic expansion on the gradual
transition from a premodern state to a modern state. Exploring this transition
helps with understanding why and how are modern states different from their
predecessors. Second, I illustrate this transition using the French case. More
specifically, I explore the state of the society in rural France before the mass
public education and the changes that came to their governance following the
French Revolution. Third, I discuss the process of the development of the public
school system for the conversion of the rural non-French population into French
citizens and for inculcating nationalism in all French citizens. Fourth, I note that
pursuing assimilation is not a strategy that is guaranteed to succeed, and in fact,
assimilationist policies are conducive to creating a feeling of resentment. Despite
its unique advantages to face minimum backlash, even in the French case, the
assimilation process did not go very smoothly. Various cases that are discussed
throughout this work denote that such resentments are not uncommon and
minority populations can develop their imagined communities in reaction to their
state despite the attempts of the state to undermine it. The process examined in
this section illustrates the claims and the theory offered in the rest of the chapter
well. This section is mainly centered around France because the French case is
illustrative of the process of modernization that led to the assimilation of its
ethnolinguistic minorities who consisted of a considerable portion of the
population and because it was the earliest case of nation-building and
assimilation driven by nationalist ideas which, in return, made it a model for
nationalists in other states.
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In the following section, I expand on the majority-minority dichotomy regarding
nationalism as introduced in Chapter 2. I note two differences that influence the
likelihood of success for both types. An ethnic group that is the largest group in a
given region has a better opportunity for success for possessing a higher capacity.
In addition, the global norm of juridical statehood provides an additional
advantage for majority groups by protecting their territorial integrity while
curbing the opportunity of minority groups to succeed. These are the structural
conditions that ethnonationalist groups formed around a minority ethnic group
operate under and that encompass the cases explored in this work. In the second
subsection, I discuss the process that precedes the formation of minority
nationalism. Here, my focus is on the politics of language in nation-states. I
highlight that language is central to ethnic groups and that the transition from
premodern to modern states led to attacks on minority languages. In doing so, I
also explain why governments pursue assimilationist policies against their
minorities at the risk of aggrieving them. Whereas the previous section explores
the historical progression of the topic, this section focuses on the structural
conditions that cover the cases studied in this work and that have influenced the
strategies of majority and minority groups regarding their political goals. Finally,
I summarize and bring together the arguments I make in Chapter 2, Chapter 3,
and the preceding sections of Chapter 4 as I offer my theory on the association
between educational language policies and conflict onset.

Modernization, Colonization, Assimilation, and Resistance
Modernization
The transition from a premodern state to a modern state was precipitated by two
notable processes: the standardization of the state language and the expansion of
bureaucracy. For the first process, four factors played a vital role. First, print
capitalism facilitated the creation of standardized print languages in Europe
based on vernaculars as discussed in Chapter 2 with Anderson’s constructivist
theory of nationalism. Whereas books were mainly published for the Latin
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market previously, this market was quickly saturated following the printing press
because Latin was used only by a small number of elites across the continent.
Thus, publishers had to expand to other markets in search of profit. Publishing in
vernaculars made it possible for the public literate in their vernaculars to access
and read books. The process of this expansion led to the standardization of print
languages by assimilating vernaculars that are similar to each other into one
form. In doing so, printing in vernaculars considerably expanded the markets for
books to wider geographies.
Secondly, state involvement contributed to the rise of the vernaculars into
prominence. Vernaculars were already gaining political power before the printing
press and reformation as their use as administrative languages gradually
increased. Vernaculars gradually replaced Latin to attain the status of languages
of power. This transition was for pragmatic reasons, though. Vernaculars were
adopted as administrative languages for the convenience of state officials rather
than as a part of a nationalist policy agenda (Anderson 2006, 41–42). Thirdly, as
Anderson notes, the philological-lexicographic revolution was one of the most
influential factors on the standardization of languages and the emergence of
linguistic imagined communities (Anderson 2006, 83). In fact, “the nineteenth
century was, in Europe and its immediate peripheries, a golden age of
vernacularizing lexicographers, grammarians, philologists, and litterateurs”
(Anderson 2006, 71). Professional intellectuals created monolingual dictionaries,
bilingual dictionaries, grammar books, and books on the history of languages and
the literary history of these languages. Literary works were published in minority
languages in the European empires by intellectuals to show that the ability to
produce complex works was not reserved for the majority languages and that
their languages were also capable of serving such functions (Anderson 2006, 71–
75).
Finally, the industrial revolution contributed to the standardization of print
languages by gradually expanding literacy and spreading print material from a
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small number of elites to society at large. While the products of the print market
reached the reading classes, these classes consisted of only around half of the
population in Britain and France around 1840. Reading classes were, “in addition
to the old ruling classes of nobilities and landed gentries, courtiers and
ecclesiastics, rising middle strata of plebeian lower officials, professionals, and
commercial and industrial bourgeoisies” (Anderson 2006, 76). This rising middle
stratum was born out of the economic development following the industrial
revolution. In a rural country like Russia, only around 2 percent of the population
was literate. The expansion of reading classes following the industrial revolution
contributed to the adoption of the standardized form by society.
The second notable development around the mid-nineteenth century was the
bureaucratic expansion seen across Europe. This development was also a
consequence of the industrial revolution, though a comparable increase in Russia
shows that Russia emulated its rivals in Western Europe. State bureaucracies
grew at a considerable rate even though there were not any major wars fought
around this time. Table 4.1 shows the per capita increase in state expenditures
between 1830 and 1850 (Hobsbawm 1996, 192).
A part of the increase in spending was due to the expansion in services that were
already offered. This type of increase resulted mainly from the growing needs for
governance following the growth of the cities, such as the need for a larger
judicial system and for a larger system of municipal administration. Another
reason for the increase in state spending was the adoption of new functions by
states, such as modern national police forces, a public education system, a public
railway service, a large postal service, etc. Each service, both old and new, was
provided usually by career officials who served under a single national institution
that was tied to the central government. Even the most basic functions of a
modern state, “such as the efficient assessment and collection of taxes by a body
of salaried officials or the maintenance of a regular nationally organized rural
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Table 4.1 - Per capita increase in state expenditures between 1830 and 1850

State

Growth (%)

Austria

70

Belgium

50

France

40

Netherlands

90

Russia

44

Spain

25

USA

75
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constabulary, would have seemed beyond the wildest dreams of most prerevolutionary absolutisms” (Hobsbawm 1996, 193).
With the expansion of bureaucracy came the colonization of the peripheral rural
regions of the state. To clarify, what is discussed here is not the expansion into
the overseas colonies, it is rather the expansion into the relatively close territories
that are mostly, though not always, contiguous to the capital. During the process
of domestic colonization, the periphery was incorporated into the national center
both physically and culturally. This expansion is illustrated very well in the
elaborate work of Weber (1976), Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization
of Rural France, 1870-1914, which investigates the expansion of Paris into rural
France to transform France into a modern nation-state and to create national
unity. Although this work covers a single case, this illustrative case illuminates
the modernization process that many states have gone through under which
diverse premodern societies are transformed into modern nation-states. The
process of modernization in France, which was probably the earliest case of
nation-building, was emulated by other modernizing states that closely followed
the French recipe for success in order to accomplish their political, social,
cultural, and economic goals. The following two sections discuss the French
colonization of the periphery and the assimilation of ethnic minorities into the
Parisian language and culture respectively.
The French Colony of France
France had a quite diverse population and was far from united before initiating
its top-down modernization process following the French Revolution. There was
a clear urban-rural divide in the country and many intellectuals labeled the rural
population in different parts of the country as “savages” and despised their
backwardness (Weber 1976, 3). At the time, the prevailing belief was “that areas
and groups of some importance were uncivilized, that is, unintegrated into,
unassimilated to French civilization: poor, backward, ignorant, savage,
barbarous, wild, living like beasts with their beasts” (Weber 1976, 5). Many
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pointed out the need to civilize these people; “they had to be taught manners,
morals, literacy, a knowledge of French, and of France, a sense of the legal and
institutional structure beyond their immediate community” (Weber 1976, 5).
This perception stems from the divide that existed between the urban and rural
populations resulting from different levels of access to the forces of
modernization. Departments and parishes in France lived under a system of
autarky. People in many rural towns lived in isolation, not just from the center,
but also from neighboring towns. Due to low accessibility from outside, therefore,
they developed largely, though not completely, self-sufficient local economies. As
a result, “peasants grew what they needed or learned to need only what they
could grow, kept what they could store, and sold what they could as best they
could” (Weber 1976, 42). The isolation was so strong that rural people who grew
their own grain were not even aware of the grain shortages in the hard winter of
1847 in France. Yet the self-sufficiency was more psychological than material.
Even someone from only ten or fifteen miles away was still considered a foreigner
as late as the 1930s. The rural people were still involved with the urban markets
near them, but they managed to preserve their cultural isolation (Weber 1976,
41–42, 49).
There was solidarity between locals which was quickly replaced by suspicion
when they encountered outsiders who are unfamiliar to them. Peasants were
unwilling to give information to anyone unfamiliar, especially to government
officials, and when they did, they often provided misleading information. The
main reason for peasants’ suspicion of government officials was “the devastating
intrusions of the alien law and its representatives” into their world (Weber 1976,
50). Whether it was the official tax collectors, the gendarmes, or the bailiff, the
experiences of the often-illiterate countryman with this alien law were mostly
negative. Any official affair, such as settling an inheritance, taking loans, land
sales, or court costs, was overwhelming to handle for peasants due to the
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complexity of official paperwork. In addition, it often cost them enormous
amounts relative to how little they had (Weber 1976, 44–45, 50).
The urban-rural divide was a major obstacle to the modernization of France,
though it was not the only one. Unlike the late twentieth century, a considerable
portion of the French people did not speak French according to official figures
from 1863. 8,381 out of 37,510 communes in France did not speak any French at
the time. According to the figures of the Ministry of Public Instruction, 448,328
school children who were between the ages of seven to thirteen out of a total
number of 4,018,427 did not speak any French. An additional 1,490,269 students
“spoke or understood it but could not write it, suggesting an indifferent grasp of
the tongue” (Weber 1976, 67). When figures for individual departments are
investigated, outside evidence shows that the number of non-French speakers in
several departments is more than what is claimed by these official figures.
Overall, “the Third Republic found a France in which French was a foreign
language for half the citizens” (Weber 1976, 67–70).
Perhaps the main reason for the persistence of this diversity was simply that the
Kingdom saw no substantial benefit in assimilating its population, and therefore,
assimilating ethnic groups who spoke different languages had no significance for
the French Crown. The Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts in 1539 established the use
of French in matters that are relevant for the King’s court, such as legal and
judicial processes. It also required that every public act of life, such as each
person’s baptism, marriage, and death, be recorded in French in every parish
within the King’s dominions. Consequently, the linguistic unity of the subjects
does not seem to had been a goal for the French Crown whose main focus was
centralizing the administration. In fact, in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659,
Louis XIV ensured his new subjects that they have the right to speak any
language they want (Weber 1976, 71).
Nevertheless, the use of the French language was spreading in the urban centers
that are rather accessible for Paris, such as in Champagne, Burgundy, Normandy,
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and the Loire valley. It spread not only among men of law, nobility, and clergy
who were required to know French for their role in the public administration
following the centralization policies, also among the middle and upper classes.
Because French had high prestige and “there was the increasing vogue and
availability of theaters and opera houses: an influence comparable to that of
twentieth-century cinema, with everyone eager to adopt the admired accents and
turns of phrase used on the stage” (Weber 1976, 71). The use of French was
widespread in literary and philosophical works as well as in newspapers and
journals. Fashion from Paris was followed closely by urban middle and upper
classes. Despite its spread in urban centers, the French language did not make
inroads into rural France where different languages are spoken, not only because
the state made little to no effort about assimilating non-French ethnolinguistic
groups, also because the process of Francization of the urban centers did not
make much of an influence on the rural population due to their isolation. The
difficulty of accessing isolated rural populations allowed them to preserve their
culture and way of life against the forces of assimilation by the center (Weber
1976, 41, 71).
Linguistic diversity started to be perceived as a problem following the French
revolution. The new regime sought ideological unity of the citizens and linguistic
diversity was viewed as a threat to it. Citizens needed to understand the
developments in the Republic and were expected to participate in the political
process. But it was difficult to integrate the population into the political process
through propaganda if they did not speak French. In 1792, Jacobins argued in the
National Convention that the unity of the republic called for the unity of speech
and viewed various other tongues as “remnants of the barbarism of past ages”
(Weber 1976, 72).
Two prominent and interrelated factors helped transform the population into
“proper” citizens who speak French and who internalize the ideals of the
Republic. The first one is an exogenous factor, the industrial revolution. The
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industrial revolution sped up the process in various ways, but most notably by
increasing social mobility. Job prospects in new factories attracted rural
populations into urban centers. The working force consisted of various ethnic
groups speaking different languages. Learning French, as a common language,
was necessary for workers to be able to communicate with each other (Weber
1976, 78). Also related to the industrial revolution, roads were built to connect
the isolated rural communities to the rest of the country. There were already
roads in place, but these earlier roads were built to serve the needs of the
government and of the cities, such as to move troops or to collect tax revenues, so
the layout of the road system did not correspond to the needs of the wider public.
Under the Third Republic, an extensive road network was built that covered the
entire country (Weber 1976, 195–97).
The second factor is government policies that were enacted to assimilate the
population and achieve national unity. This factor is also related to the first one
in the sense that the industrial revolution expedited bureaucratic expansion by
contributing to the increase in state capacity. Additionally, developments in
technology furthered the government’s efforts. The government employed
numerous policies, some of which are particularly of note. In 1792, the National
Convention acted to replace dialects with French by abolishing them. It decreed
that “children must learn ‘to speak, read and write in the French language’” and
that French should be the only language of instruction across the French
Republic (Weber 1976, 72). The policies of replacing inferior dialects with French
were seen as an important part of the mission to civilize their speakers and to
bring them into the modern world. To that end, the government used its power to
support French against other languages. The official affairs were not done
exclusively in French before 1870. But the Third Republic made having an official
certificate a requirement for every civil service position, even if it is a minor role.
In other words, becoming a public servant required one to have learned French
(Weber 1976, 85). The government was not hesitant to use its powers to eliminate
the use of languages in social life, either. For instance, a ministerial decree in
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1890 banned religious instructions in Flemish, though the ban was hard to
implement. There was a similar ban in Brittany on the use of Breton and many
priests in Brittany refused to comply with the government’s ban. In response, the
government suspended the salaries of 51 priests in Finistère. Such bans were
largely ineffective, but the impact of the forces of assimilation from multiple
fronts started to be visible in the early twentieth century, shortly before the First
World War (Weber 1976, 82, 88).
Creating Nation Through Public Education
A nation is not just a group of people who speak the same language. As discussed
in Chapter 2, it is a group of people who feel familial bonds with each other in
some capacity. In other words, assimilation is not only about converting one’s
language, it is also, or perhaps mainly about converting one’s feeling of
belonging. To create a nation, all members of the society, not just the minorities,
need to be converted to imagine a belonging outside of their locality. The French
government wanted to convert everyone within the borders of the Republic into
French citizens who consider themselves a part of the French nation.
The most effective tool for such a conversion, probably by far, was public
education. Because “adults were too deeply rooted in their backwardness”
whereas children are malleable (Weber 1976, 334). Any future planning,
therefore, starts with shaping the minds of future citizens. Be that as it may,
establishing a public education system that is capable of achieving this task was
not easy. Existing schools were in terrible conditions. Teachers were not trained
for the job, in fact, a teacher “could well have been a retired soldier, a rural
constable, the local barber, innkeeper, or grocer, or simply a half-educated
peasant's son” in the first half of the nineteenth century (Weber 1976, 305). In
addition to the bad conditions of schools and the inadequacy of teachers, the
education did not make any sense to students who did not speak or understand
French, so they mostly learned by rote (Weber 1976, 304–7).
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A law was passed in 1833 to remedy some of these issues and to improve the
quality of public education. This law introduced a requirement of an official
certificate to be able to operate a school. Each department was to set up schools
and teachers were to be trained by a normal school under government
supervision. From 1833 to 1847, the number of schools doubled, the total number
of students increased nearly threefold, and the number of normal schools
increased from 38 to 47. Another law in 1881 made public education free for all
by removing fees and tuition charges. More reforms were introduced shortly
after. Public education was made compulsory in 1882, every village that housed
more than 20 children at school age was required to maintain an elementary
school in 1883, the government allotted subsidies to build and maintain schools
and to pay the salaries of teachers in 1885, and an elementary teaching program
and elaborate provisions for the management of this program was set up in 1886.
The public education budget increased by around 150 percent between 1878 and
1885 to fund the reforms, from 53,640,714 francs to 133,671,671 (Weber 1976,
307–9).
Before public education was made compulsory, the state struggled to attract
children to schools, particularly in rural areas. An education law was introduced
in 1867 to increase the number of students who receive free education. Though it
helped, it was not sufficient. The labor of children was crucial for the family
budget. In addition, education did not seem to teach children valuable skills that
have practical applications in daily life, as far as parents could observe. Because
of this, families were reluctant to pay for educating their children. Even when the
education was free, there were other obstacles. It still costed money to buy
necessary books and school supplies and many families could not afford these
additional expenses (Weber 1976, 321–26).
Many obstacles notwithstanding, the public perception started to change as
people started to see benefits in schooling. Military law of 1872 threatened
illiterate conscripts to serve for an extra year in the military. Disadvantages for
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not having received public education did play a role in higher attendance
numbers, but the main factor behind the growth was the access that the school
certificate provided to public and private employment prospects. Public
education offered children of poor farmers opportunities for prestigious jobs
within the state bureaucracy which had been continuously expanding under the
Third Republic. Seeing the value of the diploma, families were more willing to
send their children to schools (Weber 1976, 326–28).
After public education became compulsory and the rural population understood
that education can lead to a better life, education became a more effective tool for
the government to convert peasants into Frenchmen. Peasants “spoke
ungrammatically, used characteristic locutions, mishandled the small vocabulary
at their command” and “the only escape from this was education, which taught
order, cleanliness, efficiency, success, and civilization” (Weber 1976, 329).
Education would soften one’s “savagery” and improve their behavior and
morality. Schooling helped students adopt the habits of cleanliness and taught
them manners. Schools enforced some rules to keep students’ hair, nails, and
ears clean. To teach the importance of schools and education, stories were
incorporated into classes where the characters would be embarrassed by their
ignorance as people laugh at their mistakes. The reason for the use of such
elements in education was to counter the education children had already received
in their social life. Students had to abandon their local culture and adopt the
superior national culture. The goal was to shape “individuals to fit into societies
and cultures broader than their own, and persuading them that these broader
realms are their own, as much as the pays they really know and more so” (Weber
1976, 331). National unity would be cultivated as students from diverse
backgrounds receive a similar education and are taught similar values by teachers
who were trained together by the central government (Weber 1976, 329–31).
As a great socializing agent, one of the most important functions of modern
schooling is teaching patriotism. The school must “teach children national and
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patriotic sentiments, explain what the state did for them and why it exacted taxes
and military service, and show them their true interest in the fatherland” (Weber
1976, 332). Students are taught that loving the fatherland is their first duty; the
fatherland is not one’s village, it is France in its entirety. It is a family that each
student is a part of and it is their duty to defend it as soldiers, and if needed, even
die for it. Children are taught songs that would stir up their emotions and
implant the love of their fatherland, such as La Marseillaise. History and
geography classes are taught as “instruments of indoctrination and patriotic
conditioning” (Weber 1976, 333). Nearly all schools were supplied maps to
inculcate the image of the nation’s borders in the minds of children. Tales of past
French glories were other powerful symbols used during the indoctrination
(Weber 1976, 332–34).
As a result of nationalist policies in schooling, “a Catholic God … was replaced by
a secular God: the fatherland and its living symbols, the army, and the flag. The
catechism was replaced by civics lessons. Biblical history, proscribed in secular
schools, was replaced by the sainted history of France. French became more than
a possession of the educated: it became a patrimony in which all could share,
with significant results for national cohesion, as the 1914 war would show”
(Weber 1976, 336). After the French revolution, revolutionaries complained that
the rural population does not possess patriotism. They noted that it was an urban
notion and that only enlightened people could understand the concept. The path
and the vision of the revolutionaries, however, changed this reality nearly a
century later: The French state successfully colonized the land and the minds and
created a sense of collective unity among the French people. After capturing the
political power, the nationalist elites created the French nation by assimilating
minorities into the French culture and language and by indoctrinating the masses
using public education (Weber 1976, 98).
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Nationalist Resistance to Linguistic Unification Policies
The introduction of mass schooling during the late eighteenth century in Europe
and its gradual spread to the world in the twentieth century (Ramirez and Boli
1987) had a substantial impact on the dynamics of cultural transmission. The
expansion of bureaucracy in modern nation-states enabled governments to
influence more aspects of the daily life of an average individual (Fairclough 2001,
176). An inevitable consequence of this expansion was the clashes between
different languages, as highlighted in the French case. Before modern nationstates, ethnic minorities enjoyed a substantial degree of autonomy (Mozaffar and
Scarritt 1999). Consequently, the language used by the state administration had
little relevance for them. Nation-states’ internal colonization efforts through the
gradual expansion of bureaucracy, mass education, and other government
services to every corner of states, however, made policies around language
planning directly relevant for their minority populations. The process of FrancheComte’s integration into modern France follows a common pattern in nationstates.
The strain must have been intense when the forces of orderarmy, gendarmes, judges (except justices of the peace), and
police-came from outside, and when the normal friction between
police and natives was rendered more acute by linguistic
differences. Order imposed by men of different code and speech,
somebody else's order, is not easily distinguished from foreign
conquest. In the southwest, wrote M. F. Pariset in 1867, union
with France “was suffered, not accepted. The fusion was
accomplished slowly and against the will.” Forty years later,
when Ernest Ferroul, the Socialist mayor of Narbonne, charged
that the barons of the north were invading the Midi as in the
olden days of the Albigeois, Le Figaro warned its readers: “Make
no mistake, this is a country to be reconquered, as in the days of
Simon de Montfort.” (Weber 1976, 487)
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Violent reactions to the internal colonization efforts on large scales were largely
missing in France in the nineteenth century. Even though it took longer in some
places than in others, however, the policies of assimilation successfully integrated
non-French minorities into the French nation for the most part. It is possible to
claim that France was uniquely positioned with certain advantages for
successfully assimilating its minorities with minimum backlash. Owing to its
political power, the majority group within a state usually claims that their
language and culture are superior to that of the minorities. In the French case,
though, this claim of “cultural superiority” was also supported externally. The
French culture and language were dominant, not only in France but also in the
entire continent as “the courts of Berlin, Hanover, Dresden, Kassel, Darmstadt,
Stuttgart, Munich and Vienna, the centres of political and intellectual life in the
German-speaking world, had all begun to adopt aspects of French culture and to
use French among themselves” in the seventeenth century (Wright 2016, 134–
35). French had become the lingua franca long before the revolution. Its
formidable economic and military power added to the prestige of the state and
the culture. French scientists and thinkers were influential throughout Europe
(Wright 2016, 137). As a result, French remained the most learned foreign
language in Europe for three centuries. Domestically, as discussed, the French
culture had already been converting the urban counterparts of the minority
populations. Prospective intellectual elites of minority ethnic groups, who would
be expected to lay the foundations of the imagined communities of their minority
nations, had already been switching to the French side. Weber’s work reveals that
what was left of the minorities, in other words, their rural population, was not
able to withstand the forces of assimilation by themselves.
Even though France had certain advantages that facilitated the assimilation of its
minorities, it is important to keep in mind that policies of assimilation are not
unlikely to produce unintended consequences. After a difficult and rough path,
these policies may work as planned, as they did in the French case. But the
success of France should not mislead us to think that it was bound to succeed
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without a conflict. Perhaps in the context of the nineteenth century “risings
capable of seriously threatening the state were a thing of the past” (Weber 1976,
491). But still, frustrations were not uncommon. People took up arms and
rebelled against the French administrators and police for crushing the locals in
the Pyrenees. Living separately from the mainland, Corsicans were not
enthusiastic about losing their autonomy. For French officials, serving in Savoy,
where the relationship between the government and the natives was tense, was
almost like serving in the colonies. Camille Le Mercier d’Erm depicted Bretons, a
Celtic ethnic group that is native to Brittany, as a nation that was oppressed in a
similar way to others in Ireland, Bohemia, Finland, and Poland (Weber 1976,
487–91).
These frustrations went a step further in the Breton case. Nationalist Breton
elites founded the Breton Nationalist Party in 1931. The main goal of the party
was to secede from France. Breton nationalists were aware that the high state
capacity of France made their success unlikely. Thus, they believed that only an
invasion of France by another state would make their independence possible. To
that end, they allied Nazi Germany, which proved to be a big miscalculation. Not
only that it turned out during World War II that the Nazis were not sympathetic
to the secessionist goals of the Breton nationalists, wartime actions of the party
made it easier for the French government to crucify the movement without facing
any backlash from the Bretons (Leach 2010).
Policies of linguistic unification were not restricted to France; “the general
growth in literacy, commerce, industry, communications and state machineries
that marked the nineteenth century created powerful new impulses for
vernacular linguistic unification within each dynastic realm” (Anderson 2006,
77–78). Austria-Hungary kept Latin, a rather neutral language, as the state
language until the early 1840s, though it had become clear by then that Latin was
in decline and its ability to remain a language to conduct business, science, or
literature was in question. In various states in Europe, the gap from Latin’s
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decline was quickly filled by the vernaculars that enjoyed political power and that
corresponded to the language widely spoken by the (political) majority ethnic
group. Attaining this convergence before the spread of nationalist ideas was the
main factor that prevented dramatic political effects as English expanded in
Ireland at the expanse of Gaelic, French to replace Breton in Brittany, and
Castilian against Catalan in Catalonia.
Yet attempts for linguistic unification worked differently in the dynastic empires
of Europe than in Western Europe. Dynasties “settled on certain printvernaculars as languages-of-state - with the 'choice' of language essentially a
matter of unselfconscious inheritance or convenience” (Anderson 2006, 84). The
Habsburgs chose to elevate German to the status of the language of the state in
Austria-Hungary. This move was not tied to any German nationalist agenda, nor
it was against the Hungarian language. It was simply because Latin was not
sufficient to serve the state functions that related to the masses. There was an
emerging need to identify a unifying language that could be used across the
empire. German was the obvious choice due to the presence of a considerable
German-speaking population that was spread across the empire and whose
language possessing a vast culture and literature under its belt. Yet, choosing
German, or any language for that matter, would provide advantages to its
speakers and show that the state was siding with its speakers at the expense of
the speakers of other languages. After ethnonationalist elites undertake a
philological-lexicographic revolution in their ethnic language, however, they can
reasonably be expected to react to such a decision that, in the long run, will hurt
their language. This is precisely what happened in the case at hand, Hungary.
Though there was no bourgeoisie class in Hungary, there was another class ready
to take on the fight. The defenders of print-Hungarian against the German
language were Hungarian aristocrats who consisted of one eight of the Hungarian
society, which was a considerable portion. Unlike the French minorities, rural
Hungarians were not alone in their struggle against their state and this gave them
a better chance to withstand (Anderson 2006, 78–79, 84).
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“By the second decade of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, a 'model' of 'the'
independent national state was available for pirating” and “the marginalized
vernacular-based coalitions of the educated” were up for the task of creating and
leading nationalist movements (Anderson 2006, 81). A similar reaction to the
Hungarian case can be observed across Central and Eastern Europe where
popular nationalist movements were born out of linguistic imagined communities
(Anderson 2006, 79). The spread of nationalist ideas posed challenges for
European dynasties as they had ruled over multiple ethnic groups and many of
them could claim nationhood. In response to popular nationalisms, the dynasties
devised what is called “official nationalisms” (Seton-Watson 1977, 148). It was
developed as an attempt to preserve their political power. Dynasts had hoped that
if they provided their ethnic minorities with an alternative identity, these
minorities would not pursue ethnonationalist ideas. Though this attempt was in
response to popular nationalisms, official nationalisms were adapted from
popular nationalisms at the same time (Anderson 2006, 86, 110).
Official nationalisms took the form of “Russification” in the Romanov Empire
and “Anglicization” in the British Empire (Anderson 2006, 86, 90). In doing so,
they revealed “a world-wide contradiction: Slovaks were to be Magyarized,
Indians Anglicized, and Koreans Japanified, but they would not be permitted to
join pilgrimages which would allow them to administer Magyars, Englishmen, or
Japanese” (Anderson 2006, 110). This restriction was not caused simply by
racism. Despite the attempts of the dynasts to create a common identity, new
nations were emerging also at their core that imagined their own community, as
the Magyars, the Englishmen, and the Japanese, that did not include the foreign
minorities. Indeed, dynastic empires fell one by one, failing to counter against
popular nationalisms, not only from their minorities or their colonies but also
from within their core. Consequently, popular nationalist movements led to the
emergence of new imagined communities, and the process of political
consolidation around the world through colonization was disrupted as empires
gave way to nation-states (Anderson 2006, 111).
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Minority Nationalism and Politics of Language
Minority Nationalism and Self-Rule
Despite their similarities, as noted in Chapter 2, cases of majority nationalism
and minority nationalism manifest a significant level of difference in their ability
to expel/oust their foreign ruler or enemy. In cases of majority nationalism, the
path to self-rule has proven to be relatively straightforward. Once nationalism
takes hold among the members of a group to mobilize sufficient forces, it is
relatively easy for them to defeat the enemy that attempts to keep them
subjugated, whether it is a monarch, a colonial administration, or agents of a
foreign invasion.
On the contrary, the path to self-rule has not been very simple for minority
groups for two main reasons. First, a majority group has an easier time claiming
sovereignty for having a better opportunity for success. A more populous group in
a given territory can simply muster a larger army. Second, the norm of juridical
statehood has disproportionately benefitted majority groups against the
minorities within the borders of a state (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Following
World War II, the juridical statehood norm brought stability to the borders of
states around the world. The sovereignty of nation-states and their territorial
integrity were recognized by their peers who considered them equals in status.
The strength of the norm of juridical statehood minimized foreign challenges,
and as a result, allowed majority groups to remain majorities within their
respective states. In other words, this relatively new post-World War II
development disproportionately benefitted majority groups at the expense of
minorities.
If a minority group was not able to sufficiently mobilize to seek independence at
the time of a transition during which new borders are drawn and nation-states
are established, it is severely disadvantaged to try it at a later point in time. Kurds
in Turkey and Iraq are good examples of this, which are discussed in more detail
in Chapter 6. Kurdish nationalism failed when new borders were being drawn
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after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It failed mainly because Kurdish
nationalism did not gain momentum among Kurdish peasants and thus remained
restricted to the intellectual elites, but also because of the weakness of those who
mobilized after the collapse of the Ottomans relative to Turkish nationalists.
Kurds constitute a large ethnic group in both countries and Kurdish
independence movements with nationalist elements have been present for
decades. However, they have to defeat their nation-states with powerful armies if
they are to achieve the level of self-rule that they desire. Given this disadvantage,
a minority group may need foreign support to succeed, as in the case of Kosovo
(Paquin 2010, 115–21), or may benefit from other factors and succeed without
foreign support, as in the case of Eritrea (Thomas and Falola 2020, 129). In any
scenario, the two factors that are discussed have made it quite difficult, if not
impossible, for nationalist minority movements to succeed in their quest for selfrule.
Assimilation and Politics of Language
Anderson makes a convincing case for the connection between language and
nationalism. To reiterate, this is not to say that a nation originates exclusively
from an ethnolinguistic group. A nation can also be formed around a religion, a
territory, a race, or another ethnic marker. But, Anderson’s work highlights that
the particular role language has played has been instrumental in the rise and
spread of nationalism. As arguably the most common form, linguistic imagined
communities came to replace premodern local loyalties and led to the rise of
nation-states around the world.
Dynastic empires may have been too large and overstretched to keep multiple
ethnic groups under their control in the age of nationalism. However, nationstates have not had as much difficulty achieving this task. Most nation-states
have controlled territories that are much smaller than empires. Additionally,
most nation-states have relied on their majority ethnic group that usually
consists of a large portion of their population whereas empires usually governed
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several large ethnic groups. The members of the majority ethnic group in a
nation-state were not just subjects anymore, instead, they became the collective
owners of the state. In the age of nationalism, even the new autocrats had to rely
on their core ethnic groups to preserve their power. These factors, along with
others that are discussed, such as bureaucratic expansion and the norm of
juridical statehood, made it easier for states to retain their monopoly of violence
over their territories.
The bureaucratic expansion following the industrial revolution brought about
another change in the nation-states. Taking advantage of their increased capacity,
states imposed considerable restrictions on minority populations that were
previously governed largely autonomously. In this sense, the expansion of central
governments into minority territories, with their administrators, police forces,
schools, courts, etc., was colonial. An inevitable clash occurs when the colonized
ethnic group speaks a different language from the majority group. Cleavages
around linguistic issues are likely to emerge in modern nation-states simply
because the language “is an inescapable medium of public discourse,
government, administration, law, courts, education, media and public signage”
(Brubaker 2015, 89). The pervasiveness of language in politics and everyday life
makes it nearly impossible for states to be neutral between languages (Bormann,
Cederman, and Vogt 2015).
Language holds a central position for ethnic identity. Culture and traditions are
preserved and transmitted from generation to generation through language.
Cleavages around linguistic issues are particularly important also because
language is a symbol of dignity for ethnic groups. The status of a language
indicates the status that the group and its members have in society (Horowitz
1985, 219–20). Demands for official language status, for example, result from a
desire to elevate the status of the group and increase the worth of its members in
society. Similarly, not having official recognition of the language denotes a lower
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status, and therefore, is perceived as an attack on the dignity of the members of a
group.
Educational language policies start affecting individuals very early in life in
public schools. If the government does not permit the use of a language spoken
by a minority group in public education, children who are members of that
minority group would have no other choice but to receive their education in a
language that is foreign to them. As children complete their education, their
adopted language takes up more space in their lives. In the meantime, they do
not develop their linguistic skills in their native language to a similar extent
(Hinton 2016). To give an example from the French case, “arithmetic, for
example, was taught in French. Thus, even those who normally spoke in some
other tongue could reckon sums only in French, the language in which they had
learned the skill” (Weber 1976, 84).
Schooling an ethnic group exclusively in a language that is foreign to them can
cause large-scale changes in the linguistic skills of members of an ethnic minority
which, in return, can create a drastic impact on their language and culture. In
other words, if government education is given exclusively in the majority
language, the status of a minority language as a medium of communication
among its community of speakers becomes endangered. In this case, it is an
uphill battle for the prospective minority intellectuals to counter the influence of
public education on the linguistic skills of minority children. To refer back to the
French case, as Ernest Renan noted in 1889, it was not possible to produce works
on science, philosophy, or political economy in patois. Even when peasants spoke
patois in their daily lives, they would switch to French if they discussed politics or
had any official business (Weber 1976, 85). Minority languages need their own
process of modernization to stay relevant in the modern world. But, this process
cannot take place if their speakers are modernized by majority groups. Because if
they are, their entire educated populations would become fluent only in the
majority language on topics for which they received an education. Even if some
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intellectuals do undertake the mission to modernize the minority language, it is
simply impossible to counter the political and material power of the state and
retrain the ethnic populations in their native language after they have already
received education from the government. Consequently, unless there are policies
in place to preserve them, minority languages are effectively replaced by the
majority language as the medium of communication by its native speakers only in
two or three generations (May 2012, 2).
If a majority group is dictating its language to the minorities, two potential
reasons come to mind. The first reason is that even if the majority may be
sympathetic to the damage it does to the minorities, it may simply not be worth
the cost and effort. Bureaucracies tend to be incredibly complex structures, thus
it is quite expensive for the bureaucracy to accommodate multiple languages. It is
also impractical for the government to add a language barrier to government
affairs (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2015). Additionally, it is difficult to decide
which languages to accommodate. Should a government recognize a language
spoken only by a few thousand people who live in a rural area that is losing its
young speakers to the urban areas within the domains of the majority language?
Even if one may normatively claim that it should, who decides it is worth the high
cost it entails? Can this minority language survive in the modern world even if the
state attempts to save it? If a few thousand speakers are not sufficient, where do
we draw the line? We can pose several questions that do not have clear answers.
But we do know that governments are often not very benign on such issues that
require accommodating minorities if there are no powerful incentives. This is an
inherently political problem and there has to be a demand that is powerful
enough to signal that the cost of not accommodating would be high. Even with
the signal, unless the state perceives that the cost of assimilation is higher than
the cost of accommodation, it may not act on the demand.
The second reason a government is imposing its language on its minorities is that
the outcome that I have discussed in this subsection is precisely the goal. In the
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age of modern nation-states, governments prefer a homogenous population. In
non-homogenous societies, governments, if they are able to, try to create a sense
of unity and harmony between citizens in the long-term by assimilating minority
groups into the culture and language of the majority group (Grotenhuis 2016,
90). National unity is desired also because it makes governance easier in the long
run. Recognizing and accommodating minority languages, however, go against
the nature of nation-building projects. Governments are conscious of the power
of language in creating imagined communities. Because governments are aware
that they themselves are the manifestations of the imagined community that they
represent. In other words, assimilationist policies are attempts to prevent the
creation of other imagined communities within their domains that may trigger
autonomist, or yet worse, secessionist demands in the future. As small as it may
be, when there is an ethnic group that speaks a language that is different from the
majority language, it is a potential future nation. Remember the Breton case.
Should the French not have assimilated its Breton population and incorporated
them into the French nation, it is quite likely that we would have seen the Breton
nation that has been pushing for independence for Brittany or may have even
gained it already. France was nearing the final phase of its assimilation project
when the elites of several new nation-states were just getting started with their
nation-building campaigns, and many contemporary nation-states did not even
exist yet. Following the French success, its model is pirated and emulated by
other nation-states who followed the French formula very closely, if not exactly.
In the ideal scenario for governments, public schools assimilate minority groups
into the majority language and the minority groups are indoctrinated to support
the nationalist project. This may prove successful as happened in the French case,
as well as in many others. It is very difficult to predict which ethnic groups would
assimilate and which ones would resist because every case has its own
idiosyncrasies. It may be possible to find generalizable patterns, but such an
attempt requires an in-depth historical analysis and extensive data collection
efforts that go back at least to the early nineteenth century. Needless to say, such
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data is not available, though it is not within the scope of this work to get a
satisfying answer to this question, either.
The particular type of state system that dominated global politics since the
Second World War, the system of nation-states, poses an unavoidable challenge
for the governments: the need to either accommodate ethnolinguistic minorities
or assimilate them. There is no neutral option. The centralization of political
power within states ensuing their modernization was certainly not the norm
before modernity. For instance, the Crimean Khanate, the Principality of
Wallachia, and the Principality of Moldavia had high degrees of autonomy in
their internal affairs, despite still being part of the Ottoman Empire (Panaite
2013, 12–25). Religious minorities also enjoyed a substantial level of nonterritorial autonomy that covered their communal affairs (Barkey and Gavrilis
2016). In the contemporary world, however, even states that try to preserve some
premodern elements in their political systems have increasingly adopted the
bureaucratic structures of modern nation-states. 165 states out of 193 members
of the United Nations have unitary and highly centralized state structures, though
some unitary states still allow for ethnic autonomy (Fisch 2018). Among the
small number of federal countries that remain, some federal arrangements are
rather territorial and not ethnically-based, as in the cases of Germany and the
United States. Though to be clear, it is not to say minorities within federal states
that have ethnically-based territorial autonomy are immune from the forces of
assimilation. Ethnically-based territorial autonomy does offer some of the highest
levels of autonomy ethnic groups can achieve within the confines of nation-states.
As the discussion of the French-speaking Quebecois minority in the Canadian
case in Chapter 3 indicates, however, it may not be sufficient to alleviate the
concerns of minorities in regards to assimilation.
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Modernization, Assimilation, and Conflict
Nation-States and Colonization
In this section, I refer back to several concepts and topics that are covered up to
this point as I develop a theory on the connection between horizontal cultural
inequalities, nationalism, and intrastate conflict. Before proposing the theory, I
would like to first reiterate that certain sociological changes that are associated
with the transition to modernity made this connection possible. After their
emergence, nationalist ideologies spread around the world and their success in
mobilizing people around political goals transformed the political landscape of
the world.
Nations are conceived by intellectual elites as imagined communities in which
members share a familial bond and develop solidarity with one another. The
elites then frame their conception of the nation in an ideology and set out to
spread it to the masses. Whether it is through revolution or secession, their main
goal is capturing political power because of their interests as well as to control the
state institutions. Because state institutions are the most effective tools for
converting the members of an ethnic group into the nation that they envision
building. Before achieving political power, the number of ethnic members a
nationalist ideology is able to convert is usually nowhere near to even a simple
majority. Yet nationalist elites tend to be quite resourceful and are usually able to
convert a sufficient number to start an armed struggle. When the speed of
conversion is not enough, nationalists may temporarily use other prominent premodern cultural markers that are important for their coethnics for mobilization,
such as religion as in the cases of both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism after
World War I, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Once they succeed,
nationalists use the power of the state institutions to rapidly increase the
conversion rate and build the nation through propaganda and indoctrination.
Two common beliefs separate nation from ethnicity as articulated in Chapter 2:
the only legitimate rule over a nation is by one of its members and a nation has a
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right to sovereignty. Following these beliefs, nations refuse alien rule. Rebellions
born out of this refusal are different from premodern rebellions by an ethnic
group against their sovereign overlords. In premodern rebellions, a local leader
who seeks more power uses his resources and alliances to mobilize his troops
against the state, such as Bedir Khan Beg’s rebellion against the Ottomans as
discussed in Chapter 6. This type of rebellion is more about the leader and is
relatively easy to suppress. It is, however, not as easy for states to handle
nationalist rebellions. Although nationalist rebellions also rely on their leaders
and losing their leaders can be a blow for nationalist movements, they are, in no
way, reliant on their leaders for the survival of the movement. Leaders can
continue to inspire people as symbols even after their deaths. Nationalist
movements rather rely on their burgeoning nation. The community that its
members imagine remains in their minds even in the absence of an active
movement or under heavy repression. Once the seeds of nationalism are sown, it
can outlast its leaders and continue to grow. Because of this, a nationalist
rebellion is hard to eradicate for a state.
The theory of intrastate conflict proposed in the next subsection is about what
happens after nationalists representing an ethnic group succeed in a given
territory for the first time, usually on behalf of the majority group, and establish a
modern nation-state. The establishment of a modern nation-state brings changes
to all people who live within its borders, regardless of their ethnicity. Nationstates invest in their bureaucracy and start colonizing areas that were previously
neglected by the state. As laid out in the case of post-revolutionary France, roads
are built and government institutions expand to its provinces. Colonial
representatives of the government, such as its police forces, courts, schools, etc.,
signal a type of intrusion that has never been experienced by the locals. Nationbuilding introduces ideas about nationhood based on nationalist principles
envisioned by the elites of the majority. When the government tries to force the
members of a minority ethnic group to learn and adopt the majority language and
imagine themselves as a part of the community of the majority, which is a very
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frequent consequence of nation-building, it may backfire. Led by a group of elites,
the minority group may resist such demands, pirate the ideas they were exposed
to, and instead, start imagining their own community that has been distinct from
the majority group. To clarify, this is not to say that only the ethnic groups that
end up in a nation-state can develop their own nationalism in response to the
intrusion of majority nationalism. In fact, a minority nationalism can develop
much earlier than the majority group in the state. To give an example, nationalist
movements of the ethnic groups in the Balkans developed before Turkish
nationalism in the nineteenth century because of their proximity to other
nationalist movements in Europe, and thus their earlier exposure to the
nationalist ideas than their eastern counterparts. Instead, the point that I am
rather making is that the establishment of a modern nation-state forces ethnic
minorities to take a position regarding their future because of a sharp
transformation of their local domain enforced by the state.
Regarding the culture and identity of the minorities, the outcomes from the
foundation of a nation-state and the subsequent interactions between the state
and its ethnolinguistic minorities can be categorized into three groups. First, an
ethnic minority may not resist government assimilation. As in the French case, an
ethnic minority may lack a class of intellectual elites who would mobilize their
coethnics and counter the colonization of the government. As a result, minorities
would gradually lose their distinct culture and identity, and their future
generations would adopt the majority identity. Second, the group may largely
assimilate, but may still retain its identity. For instance, Circassian groups in
Turkey are largely linguistically assimilated. As shown in a study published in
2017, Circassians who are older than 40 are bilinguals and they preserve their
ethnic language in some capacity (Demi̇r and Bolat 2017). However, virtually all
young members of Circassian groups below the age of 30 are monolingual
Turkish speakers and their knowledge of their heritage language is very limited.
Even though Circassians do not view themselves as a nation, their civil society
groups make efforts to preserve their distinct culture and identity. Considering
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Smith’s stages of politicization, however, the political activities of the Circassians
can be categorized as a low level of politicization and labeled as “ethnic politics”
that do not include protesting foreign rule or demands for sovereignty.
It is also important to keep in mind that the second category may also be a
transitioning state to the first category if the members of the group do not
embrace their ethnic identity, and instead, associate with the majority identity in
future generations. Yet, this may not be the case for all ethnic groups in this
category. Assimilation may eliminate ascriptive differences between the members
of a minority group and the members of the majority group within a state. In this
case, they would be considered a part of the majority group. However, not all
ascriptive features of an ethnic group can disappear by cultural changes, and
consequently, the ethnic group may not disappear even though its members fully
assimilate linguistically. For instance, the members of a racialized ethnic group
may not be allowed into the majority group or they may voluntarily prefer
preserving their distinct identity. In this case, cultural assimilation does not
necessarily achieve national unity, though linguistic unity can still contribute to
the creation and preservation of an imagined community that is one based on a
common language, territory, and a set of symbols. The third and final outcome is
an ethnic group becoming a nation. Regardless of whether its members are
assimilated or not, the members of the group not only would know they are a
distinct ethnic group but also would most likely make political demands,
including demanding autonomy or independence. The Kurdish cases in Turkey
and Iraq are examples of this type of outcome. It is worth reminding that there is
no option in which ethnic minorities that self-governed under pre-modern
political structures are allowed to preserve their status following the foundation
of a nation-state that covers the group’s territories. Even if the majority group
would be sympathetic to accepting their political demands, it would still force the
minority group to operate within the modern state structures which are, more
often than not, unfriendly towards minorities.
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Educational Language Policies and Conflict
The previous subsection, in general terms, explains the role that nationalism has
played in the emergence of modern states and its consequences as it relates to the
culture and identity of its minorities. This subsection is about how nationbuilding processes resulting in assimilation can increase the likelihood of conflict
onset.
A government can be considered assimilationist if it enacts policies that would
assimilate minorities and makes no accommodation about preserving the cultural
heritage of minority populations. As discussed in the previous section, one of the
goals governments try to achieve by employing assimilationist policies is
attaining unity and harmony among the population who shares the same
language, culture, and identity, as in the French case. Yet, this is not always the
goal. The state may not want the minority group to join the majority group, but it
may still choose to assimilate its minority to spread the “superior” culture of the
majority and to make it easier to govern the minority group. Thus, even if it is not
for national unity, assimilation still has its benefits for the state. As a result,
pursuing policies of assimilation is the norm for nation-states.
Groups are aggrieved as a result of horizontal cultural inequalities in the form of
unequal access to education in their language for two reasons. First, as illustrated
by the French case, educational language policies have a strong impact on the
assimilation of minorities, in fact, it is probably the single most effective tool for
their linguistic assimilation. Educational language policies that favor the majority
language give an unfair advantage to the majority language at the expense of
minority languages. It can cause the language of minority populations to be
restricted from public life and such restrictions deprive the language of the
opportunities for modernization along with the society to become a language of
science and literature or preserve its status as one if it already is. Consequently, a
language that cannot serve the evolving needs of a modern society faces a slow
death. In a couple of generations, its status even as a language of thought and
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expression may be endangered. Given the importance of language for the culture
and traditions of an ethnic group, such attacks to their language by the state may
aggrieve its speakers and get them to support ethnonationalist minority elites
who promise to fight this injustice.
Second, grievances form in reaction to a lack of access to education in their own
language for minorities because of the signaling impact of such policies regarding
the status of the group. To begin with, policies of assimilation facilitate the
creation of group identification where it does not exist. Once the group identities
are crystallized and politicized, the status of their language relative to the
language of the majority group reflects the status of its speakers relative to the
majority group and thus allows for the evaluation of injustice. As Taylor notes,
the need for recognition at the group level means that culture-bearing groups
expect equal political recognition and want their difference to be recognized by
the state. Because recognition is a vital human need and exclusionary policies
deny people of this vital need and create resentment. By politicizing ethnic
categories and by treating ethnic groups differently, the state creates a hierarchy
between the groups. The state signals its citizens that those from a certain ethnic
group are first-class citizens whereas those who are being assimilated and whose
rights are being denied are inferior to the privileged group. If exclusionary
linguistic policies result in a minority group being perceived as inferior or of
lower status, then grievances form in reaction to horizontal inequalities along the
linguistic lines.
Assimilation attempts without accommodations can create three different types
of outcomes, as laid out at the end of the previous subsection. The members of
one of its ethnolinguistic minority groups can completely assimilate as envisioned
by a state, which would be the best-case scenario for the state. Alternatively,
groups may assimilate but still preserve their identity, but not make nationalist
political demands, which is still preferable for the state. However, groups may
also mobilize around ethnonationalist movements and resists the policies of
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assimilation, as proposed in the third type of outcome. In this case, even if the
members of the group start to assimilate into the majority language simply
because it is not likely to counter the overwhelming influence of schooling on the
members of the minority group, it does not mean that they will start considering
themselves to be a part of the majority group as they are assimilated. They will
still know who they are as a collectivity. For instance, the Irish preserved their
identity despite losing their language. The introduction of English-only national
schools, which were depicted by a dejected clergyman as the graves of Gaelic,
contributed to the sharp decline in the number of Gaelic speakers in Ireland in
the nineteenth century (Cahill 119). Yet the Irish who were aggrieved by
exclusionary policies and various forms of discrimination developed Irish
nationalism in reaction to the British colonial rule, fought their colonizers, and
gained their independence despite speaking the language of their colonizers.
Horizontal cultural inequalities facilitate ethnonationalist elites to capitalize on
the grievances of their coethnics and mobilize them. As their ethnic identity
becomes politically salient, individuals are more likely to mobilize if they believe
that biased government policies target their group’s culture and/or perceive that
their group’s status faces a threat. In other words, “the state's use of categories
may facilitate the expression of grievances, recruitment, and mobilization. Those
recruited fighters may be more likely to make corporeal sacrifices due to a
perceived threat to the dignity and to demonstrate moral standing among coethnics” (Lieberman and Singh 2012). Therefore, assimilation attempts can
produce conflict because resulting horizontal cultural inequalities help minority
elites recruit aggrieved fighters for their ethnonationalist causes.
On the other hand, governments can also provide accommodations for their
ethnic minorities that are meant to recognize their differences and help them
preserve their culture and language. This is not to say minority groups that
receive sufficient accommodations are appeased and will not fight the
government for autonomy or independence. They certainly may, if different
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factors help ethnonationalist elites recruit their coethnics. When controlled by
other factors, however, we should observe assimilationist educational language
policies to increase the likelihood of conflict onset given their enormous influence
on minority populations and political accommodations that recognize minorities’
right to receive education in their language to decrease it. Accordingly, public
education not being offered in a minority language should increase the likelihood
of conflict onset. Additionally, given the importance of language as highlighted in
this chapter, I expect it to also increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war, i.e.
conflict with higher intensity. These claims are hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 1: When public education is not offered in the language spoken by
the members of an ethnic group prior to their modernization, the likelihood of
conflict onset between a rebel group representing the ethnic group and the
government increases.
Hypothesis 2: When public education is not offered in the language spoken by
the members of an ethnic group prior to their modernization, the likelihood of
civil war onset between a rebel group representing the ethnic group and the
government increases.
Several factors may mediate the relationship between educational language
policies and conflict onset. Some of these factors influence the opportunity
dynamic between the state and the rebels. First, organizational capacity is
essential for the success of mobilization. Following resource mobilization theory,
groups that are larger in size relative to the incumbent groups are more likely to
mobilize (Posner 2004) and rise against the government because they have a
larger pool to recruit their fighters from and because it provides them “a larger
potential resource pool to sustain an organizational infrastructure” (Cederman,
Wimmer, and Min 2010, 96). An increase in group size also indicates a higher
level of social learning and cultural transmission (Henrich 2004) which, in
return, may increase the likelihood of the spread of minority ethnonationalism.
Furthermore, larger groups may be more likely to get educational language rights
116

as an appeasement strategy, because they are more likely to mobilize. Second,
conventional wisdom suggests that states with a higher capacity have a lower
chance of facing conflict for two reasons. States with a higher capacity are better
able to address their citizen’ demands and thus lower the chance of rebels
overcoming the collective action problem. Additionally, a higher capacity
increases states’ ability to deter conflict more successfully “through the threat, or
actual use, of physical coercion, which essentially lowers the probability of rebel
success” (Sobek 2010, 267). However, the logic of nationalism used in this study
may entail a different type of impact. States pursuing policies of nation-building
under the influence of the majority group may use their increasing capacity to
favor their own culture and language and discriminate against that of ethnic
minorities. Resulting grievances may increase the likelihood of conflict onset.
Third, a large country population can make it more difficult for the state to
identify potential fighters (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Fourth, rough terrain, such
as mountainous territories, can facilitate a rebellion by offering conditions
favorable for the rebels (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Fifth, the presence of past
conflicts between a group and the state may make it more likely for them to
engage in a repeated conflict (Blomberg and Hess 2002). The recurrence of
conflict often signals that the underlying issues have not been resolved. In
addition, “such situations are likely to foster an increasingly deep sense of
resentment among the conflict parties, especially among those who have lost
family members, close friends, or property in previous conflict episodes”
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 64). Alternatively, past conflicts may
also result in adjustments in educational language policies as part of a settlement.
Sixth, the presence of an ongoing conflict can increase the likelihood of onset by
providing a better opportunity for challengers because potential rebels know that
the government fighting on multiple fronts would have to divide its resources
(Uzonyi and Demir 2020). Similarly, an increase in the number of groups can
increase the risk that governments may have to fight on multiple fronts after a
conflict onset and thus may provide a better opportunity for potential rebels.
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Other factors can influence conflict dynamics by aggrieving the members of
ethnic groups, supporting their recruitment as fighters, and increasing the
motivation of the fighters drawn from the group. First, groups that have a closer
relationship with the state, which are labeled as in-groups, are less likely to be
aggrieved to the level to fight the state than groups that are excluded from power,
out-groups. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug argue that “this type of political
inequality constitutes a direct violation of the principle of nationalism and selfdetermination” because it exposes the population to an alien rule (2013, 59).
Whereas I do not think it is necessarily the case that all excluded groups pursue a
nationalist agenda and demand access to executive power, out-groups are still
more likely to face various forms of discrimination by the state or to be
disadvantaged by government policies in comparison to in-groups. For example,
in-groups may be more likely to have the right to receive education in their
language than out-groups. Second, territorial autonomy provides a degree of selfgovernance to ethnic minorities, and in doing so, it may address the grievances of
group members and appease their ethnonationalist ambitions. Territorial
autonomy may facilitate ethnic minorities to use their language in education
within their autonomous territory. Alternatively, territorial autonomy can also be
beneficial for ethnonationalist movements because it provides them a space with
less government supervision which may allow them to mobilize for future
conflicts (Snyder 2000).
Third, autocratic regimes that restrict freedoms are more likely to aggrieve their
citizens and the grievances may be more pronounced for the minority groups. To
clarify, a state being a full democracy does not necessarily indicate that its ethnic
minorities enjoy equal rights as the majority group, nor does a state being an
autocracy mean that its ethnic minorities are discriminated against. For that
reason, identity politics and policies around ethnic groups should be analyzed
separately from the level of democracy within states. On the other hand, a state
that attempts to discriminate against its ethnic minorities would be more
repressive under authoritarian regimes and thus may limit the opportunity of
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potential rebels to mobilize and fight against the state. For these reasons, a
measure of the level of democracy should be included in the study. Fourth, other
minority languages being offered in education may increase the severity of the
horizontal inequality for a group whose language is not offered, and
consequently, may fuel their grievances further and increase the likelihood of
conflict. Keeping these alternative explanations and confounders in mind, the
hypotheses on the association between the educational language policies and
conflict onset are tested in Chapter 5.

Conclusion
Domestic politics was transformed by the forces of modernization, most
prominently, by the spread of nationalism and the growth of government
bureaucracy. These two forces were crucial components of nation-building
projects. Nationalist ideologies provided the ideological bases whereas the
expansion of state bureaucracies provided the tools to build societies envisioned
by nationalists. Additionally, developments in technology facilitated the majority
encroaching upon minority spaces. Thus, nation-building was a new
phenomenon that was not only about transforming the existing system of
governance, it was also about its expansion. From the perspectives of
ethnolinguistic minorities, however, it was not simply about the expansion of the
state as a neutral entity. Because, after all, the state represented an ethnic group
that was foreign to them regardless of whether they shared the same state
borders or not. As a result, the expansion of the state came at the expense of the
culture, identity, and perhaps most visibly, language of its minorities.
Consequently, nation-building projects essentially meant the colonization of the
periphery by the center. In this work, I refer to the French case extensively to
illustrate the process of colonization driven by nationalism and the resulting
assimilation of the ethnolinguistic minorities of France.
Yet, I argue that, though the French methods of assimilation have been popular
with the nationalists who pursued nation-building within their state, the success
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of the French has proven to be not as easy to emulate in modern times as
minorities are also able to adopt nationalist ideas. Being ethnic groups
themselves, just as the majority groups, many minority groups are aggrieved by
this kind of modernization process that creates horizontal cultural inequalities,
and as a result, that is hostile to their culture and identity. The exclusion of a
minority language from public education is perhaps the most important form of
horizontal cultural inequalities between the minority and the majority groups.
Because the exclusion of their language from education leads to a gradual decline
of their language and its eventual replacement by the majority language.
Additionally, this exclusion aggrieves the disadvantaged groups also because it
signals that the speakers of the excluded languages are of lower status and their
culture is inferior to the majority. Due to the need for recognition at the
individual and group levels, as Taylor notes, exclusionary and assimilatory
policies create resentment. The resulting grievances increase support for
ethnonationalist movements and facilitate mobilization around ethnonationalist
goals. Accordingly, I argue that educational language policies that exclude
minority languages from education increase the likelihood of conflict onset. In
the next two chapters, I test this claim empirically and using supplemental
qualitative case studies.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Introduction
After establishing the theory step by step in the preceding chapters and
considering potential confounders, this chapter is dedicated to the primary
quantitative tests for the hypotheses produced from the theory. The theory is
tested at the group level instead of the individual or country level. Although
grievances are felt by individuals, ethnic grievances can be studied at the group
level due to the importance of preserving originality against foreign intrusions for
individuals, as reflected in the modern ideal of authenticity discussed in Chapter
3. In the empirical analysis, several group-level variables that consider both
grievances and opportunities are included along with country-level variables that
are often used when studying civil conflict. Next, descriptive statistics on the
relationship between the dependent variable and the key independent variable
are analyzed. This relationship is explored using four datasets that are produced
based on two conditions. First, based on the level of conflict intensity, the
dependent variable is coded based on a lower threshold and a higher threshold in
terms of battle-related deaths. Second, two different sets of cases of conflict are
used based on the extent that ethnicity facilitated armed mobilization. Whereas
the first set includes all cases that are connected to ethnicity in some way, the
second set drops certain cases where this connection is relatively weak. Following
the descriptive analysis, the regression models that are run using each dataset
offer support for the claim that educational language policies are associated with
conflict onset. In other words, this finding holds when using a higher threshold
for onset and when using a looser definition of ethnic conflict.
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Variables
The unit of analysis in the large-n statistical analysis is the ethnic group-year for
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (or the MENA) from 1946 to 2018.
The temporal restriction is imposed by the availability of the data. In terms of the
regional focus, the Middle East and North Africa region is appropriate to test my
theory because the beginning of the nation-building in the countries in this
region is relatively recent. Therefore, the period of nation-building in this region
exhibits a high level of overlap with the empirical data for the control variables
which is available mainly for the post-World War II period. The EPR Core
Dataset 2021 (Vogt et al. 2015) offers a list of politically relevant ethnic groups
and makes it possible to study ethnic conflict at the group level. EPR 2021 defines
an ethnic group as “a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a
belief in common ancestry and shared culture” and this definition is compatible
with the definition adopted in this study. EPR considers an ethnic group
politically relevant if either a significant political organization claims to represent
the group or group members are systematically discriminated against. The
dependent variable under investigation is the Onset between a government and a
non-state actor that claims to represent an ethnic group in a given year. A dyadyear version of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (or the UCDP) Armed Conflict
Dataset v21.1 (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Pettersson et al. 2021)
is used to determine the onset. Two criteria are used for the onset based on the
intensity of violence. Conflict onset occurs in a year in which at least 25 battlerelated deaths occurred whereas civil war onset requires at least 1,000 battlerelated deaths in a given year. ACD2EPR 2021 dataset makes it possible to
connect non-state organizations in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v21.1 with
ethnic groups in the EPR 2021 dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).
Education in Language is the key independent variable that is used to test
hypotheses 1 and 2. This variable is a result of a data collection effort as a part of
this study. I assign the value 1 to the variable if a government provides education
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to an ethnic group in the language spoken by the members of the ethnic group
prior to their modernization as a medium of instruction; 0 otherwise. This
variable on institutional policy is coded at the group level to capture variation in
government policy on different ethnic groups. Additionally, Education in
Language (Subject) variable is used to test whether the inclusion of ethnic groups
whose language is taught as a subject in schools instead of a medium of
instruction has any influence on the onset. For the coding of this variable, I
determined the list of ethnic groups using the EPR dataset. In the collection of
information on what language is spoken by the members of ethnic groups prior to
nation-building and whether or not education is offered in the language of ethnic
groups, I mainly relied on Leclerc’s online information source on language
planning around the world (Leclerc 2020). For the pieces of information that are
missing, I did additional research on individual countries.
Of the variables that are mainly related to the opportunity of rebels to mobilize
and fight, first, the Relative Group Size variable is included to capture group
capacity. It is calculated based on the group size and the access to executive
political power data from the EPR 2021 dataset following the formula in
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013, 69–70). The size of the incumbent 𝑖 is
calculated by summing the group sizes of included groups. The group 𝐺 with a
group size 𝑠 can be an included group (𝐼) or an excluded group (𝐸) and the
relative group size 𝑟 ∈ [0,1) is calculated as follows:
𝑠
,
𝑟𝐺 = { 𝑠𝑖
,
𝑠+𝑖

𝐺∈𝐼
𝐺∈𝐸

I expect group size to increase the likelihood that a group would demand
education in language. In addition, a higher group capacity provides a better
opportunity for the group to fight, and thus, I expect it to be positively correlated
with the likelihood of onset. Second, a logged value of GDP per Capita is used as
a proxy for state capacity which, along with the Population data, is drawn from
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the Maddison Project Database 2020 (Bolt and van Zanden 2020). Conventional
wisdom suggests that state capacity is associated with a lower likelihood of onset
given that powerful states are better situated to suppress a rebellion. On the other
hand, based on the theory in this work, I expect a state with a higher capacity to
have more resources it can use to discriminate against its minorities by enforcing
its centralized governance model and disregarding local demands on culture and
identity, thus increase the likelihood of mobilization and onset. A higher
population provides more opportunity for the rebels and thus is expected to be
positively correlated with the onset. A higher population also means a higher
group size for the minorities in absolute terms and thus may increase the
likelihood that the group demands education. But this is not necessarily the case,
as it also leads to a bigger population for the majority that would be able to ignore
the demands.
Third, the logged value of the percentage of Mountainous Territory in states is
taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and used as a proxy for rough terrain. I
expect the mountainous territory to provide rebels a better opportunity to fight,
thus increase the likelihood of onset. Fourth, a count of past conflicts between an
ethnic group, more specifically any organization claiming to represent the ethnic
group, and the state the group resides in is included in the analysis. I expect past
conflict to increase the likelihood of onset because the experience gained from a
past mobilization makes it easier to remobilize. Additionally, it would also result
in grievances, not only from the pre-conflict period but also because of the losses
of life during conflicts. Fifth, a binary variable on whether there is an ongoing
conflict between the state and another actor is taken into account. I expect an
ongoing conflict to provide a better opportunity for the rebels, thus increase the
likelihood of onset. Sixth, the number of politically relevant ethnic groups is
calculated based on the EPR 2021 dataset. Similarly, I expect that an increasing
number of politically relevant groups provides a better opportunity for
organizations claiming to represent ethnic groups to challenge the state.
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There are four additional variables to control for factors that influence the level of
grievances harbored by the members of ethnic groups. First, a binary variable InGroup is used to control for groups’ access to power. In EPR 2021 dataset, groups
with a “Senior Partner” or a “Junior Partner” status are considered in-groups
whereas groups with a “Discriminated,” “Powerless,” “Self-Exclusion,” or
“Irrelevant” status are considered out-groups. However, while calculating the
relative group size, I included the “Irrelevant” status into the incumbent in cases,
such as Tunisia and Oman, where groups with this status constitute an
overwhelming majority and there are no other groups that can be considered to
be a part of the incumbent. Even though the ethnic characteristics of groups may
not be relevant for the politics of the state for the purposes of the EPR dataset,
the majority group’s language, culture, and identity are still the dominant ones in
these states. Though they are used as a part of the incumbent size, and therefore
in the calculation of the relative group size, ethnic groups that have “monopoly”
or “dominant” status are dropped from the analysis, as groups in power cannot
fight against themselves. In addition, ongoing conflict years between a
government and a non-state armed group representing an ethnic group are
dropped since the analysis is on the onset. I expect in-groups to be less likely to
initiate conflict against the state.
Second, a binary Territorial Autonomy variable is used which takes the value of 1
if the central government permits ethnically based territorial autonomy for the
ethnic group. The data on the territorial autonomy of an ethnic group is collected
as a part of this project. Whereas an ethnically-based territorial autonomy may
provide a better opportunity for the group to plan its future secession, it may also
address the grievances of the group members and thus state may avoid conflict by
appeasing its ethnic minorities. In terms of the key independent variable, I expect
territorial autonomy to increase the chances of having education in the language
spoken by the ethnic group. Third, the Polity variable, a measure of democracy
drawn from the Polity V dataset, is used to account for the level of political
openness and the competitiveness of political participation (Marshall 2020). I
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expect a higher level of democracy to appease minorities by providing them
political channels to voice their concerns, and thus lower the likelihood of
conflict. Fourth, the Other Languages in Education variable is created using the
data collected for this study. In addition to the majority group, if any other
minority group has the right to receive education in its language, I expect a
higher likelihood of onset because the group would be further aggrieved. In
addition to these explanatory variables, a count of the Years Since Last Conflict
between the government and the group, as well as its squared and cubed values,
are included to control for time dependence in the data (Beck, Katz, and Tucker
1998).

Descriptive Statistics
After dropping the years of ongoing conflict, I produced four separate datasets
depending on the two factors: the definition of conflict and the conditions to
establish a tie between an ethnic group and a non-state organization. For the first
factor, the onset variable is set up for two levels of conflict intensity, the lower
being a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths and the higher being a minimum of
1,000 battle-related deaths, as discussed already. For the second factor on the
connection between ethnic groups and non-state armed organizations, two sets of
non-state organization and ethnic group dyads are included in the analysis. In the
first set, all non-state organizations that have ties to an ethnic group for the
ACD2EPR 2021 dataset are included. In the second set, some of these
organizations were removed based on the coding for two variables in the
ACD2EPR 2021 dataset. Armed organizations that are explicitly coded as not
claiming to represent the ethnic group or not recruiting from the ethnic group
that it is connected to are removed from the analysis. In doing so, my purpose is
to follow a stricter definition of ethnic conflict by removing conflicts that may be
relying on different means for mobilization rather than ethnicity, even though
they are connected to ethnic groups. Based on these conditions, the datasets are
created as follows. For the first factor, Dataset A and Dataset B are created
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Comparisons

Dataset

Observation
Category

Group Years
Dataset A

Onset
Onset %

Education in
Language
(Only as Medium )

Dataset B

Onset
Onset %

No

Yes

No

1835

1452

1953

1334

3287

19

42

19

42

61

1.04%

2.89%

0.97%

3.15%

1.86%

1447

1975

1329

3304

0.003
1857

Dataset C

Onset
Onset %

11

45

11

45

56

3.11%

0.56%

3.39%

1.69%

1570

2049

1451

3500

0.000
1930

Dataset D

Onset
Onset %
p

0.000

8

24

8

24

32

0.41%

1.53%

0.39%

1.65%

0.91%

1935

1562

2054

1443

3497

7

26

7

26

33

0.36%

1.66%

0.34%

1.80%

0.94%

0.003

p
Group Years

0.001

0.59%

p
Group Years

Total
Observations
and Onset
Percentage

Yes

p
Group Years

Education in
Language
(As Medium or
Subject)

0.001

0.001
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0.000

following the definition of low intensity, whereas Dataset C and Dataset D are
created following the definition of high intensity. For the second factor, Dataset A
and Dataset C include a wider set of cases that constitute an ethnic conflict,
whereas Dataset B and Dataset D include a narrower set of cases after dropping
organizations that are coded as not claiming to represent or recruit from the
ethnic group they are tied to.
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of the dependent variable Onset based on the
variation in the key independent variables which looks at whether or not groups
have their language in education as the medium of instruction only or the
medium of instruction or a subject. Four simple conclusions can be drawn from
the descriptive results presented in the table. First, onset is a rare event both for
conflicts and civil wars that accounts for as high as 1.88% of ethnic group-years
for the Dataset A and as low as 0.97% for the Dataset B and, though slightly
higher in the decimals, for the Dataset D. Secondly, the ethnic groups whose
language is excluded from education have a higher instance and a higher
percentage of onset than those whose language is included. Thirdly, extending
the condition for the inclusion of language in education to subject classes
decreases the ratio of onset for the group with their language in education. Since
there is no change in the number of instances with onset between both versions
of the independent variable, the groups with only subject education for their
language seem to be appeased by it as none of the group years in this group is
associated with conflict or civil war onset. Yet, given that the number of group
years only change by 118 or 119 between both types of the key independent
variable, the ethnic groups with only subject education for their language is not a
large category. Finally, the relationship between the dependent Onset variable
and the independent variables shown in the columns is statistically significant at
the 1 percent significance level for all eight models. The ρ rows for each dataset
show the significance level for this relationship in a logit model with only the
dependent variable, the independent variable that is shown in the column above,
and the time polynomials.
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Research Design
In the empirical testing, I use three methods to conduct the analysis to make sure
it is robust to different estimation methods. Because my dependent variable is
binary, I use logit regression with robust standard errors clustered by ethnic
groups and country fixed-effects, linear probability model with robust standard
errors clustered by ethnic groups and country fixed-effects, and logistic
regression with country fixed-effects using penalized likelihood which is more
suitable to analyze rare events.1 Of the four datasets with two key independent
variables, each one is tested using three methods which resulted in twenty-four
models. In these models, all explanatory variables are lagged by one year except
for the time polynomials and the logged percentage of mountainous territory
coverage which is a fixed geographic variable.
Before interpreting the models, I would like to first note that each logit regression
result shows fewer observations than what is contained in the dataset. This is
because logistic regression tends to drop some observations when used with
fixed-effects on a binary outcome. For this reason, I test the model using linear
probability estimation because it does not drop observations when used with
fixed-effects, as well as using logistic regression with penalized likelihood because
it is more compatible for a rare event analysis such as conflict onset.

Results
After describing the variables and the datasets and explaining the research
design, I now turn to the regression results. I first focus on the models using a
lower threshold for the onset. As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, all twelve models
lend strong support to hypothesis 1 that not having their language in education
significantly increases the likelihood of conflict onset between a state and a nonstate organization claiming to represent an ethnic group. Only model A2, which is

1

I use the firthlogit package in Stata for the logistic regression using penalized likelihood.
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Table 5.2 – Educational Language and Conflict Onset Using Dataset A
Variables

Model A1

Model A2

Model A3

Education in Language

-1.927***

-0.016**

-1.801***

(0.449)

(0.007)

(0.553)

Education in Language
(Subject)
Relative Group Size
In-Group
Territorial Autonomy
Number of Past Conflicts
Other Languages in
Education
Polity
GDP per Capita, Logged
Population, Logged
Mountainous Territory,
Logged
Number of Groups, Logged
Ongoing Conflict (For State)
Years Since Last Conflict
Years Since Last Conflict,
Squared

Model A4

Model A5

Model A6

-2.458***

-0.023***

-2.293***

(0.515)

(0.007)

(0.584)

4.990***

0.042**

4.679***

5.386***

0.046***

5.050***

(1.127)

(0.016)

(1.283)

(1.255)

(0.017)

(1.292)

-1.029*

-0.014*

-0.959*

-1.130*

-0.014*

-1.051*

(0.612)

(0.008)

(0.524)

(0.600)

(0.008)

(0.546)

0.282

-0.011

0.398

0.202

-0.013

0.324

(0.676)

(0.043)

(0.739)

(0.807)

(0.044)

(0.761)

0.044

0.018

0.047

0.002

0.017

0.007

(0.162)

(0.012)

(0.121)

(0.170)

(0.012)

(0.122)

-0.292

0.002

-0.283

-0.833

-0.003

-0.783

(0.542)

(0.015)

(0.599)

(0.617)

(0.015)

(0.639)

-0.013

-0.001

-0.008

-0.004

-0.001

0.000

(0.038)

(0.001)

(0.038)

(0.038)

(0.001)

(0.038)

1.403***

0.016*

1.347***

1.500***

0.017*

1.440***

(0.540)

(0.009)

(0.451)

(0.575)

(0.010)

(0.460)

0.449

0.016

0.435

0.580

0.017

0.550

(0.610)

(0.016)

(0.487)

(0.646)

(0.016)

(0.498)

3.773***

-0.003

0.578

4.043***

-0.002

0.946

(1.220)

(0.017)

(1.009)

(1.259)

(0.017)

(1.026)

0.693

0.005

0.543

0.856

0.007

0.703

(0.880)

(0.023)

(1.125)

(0.880)

(0.024)

(1.122)

0.524

0.011

0.504

0.603

0.012

0.577*

(0.387)

(0.009)

(0.336)

(0.393)

(0.009)

(0.343)

-0.256***

-0.005***

-0.240***

-0.256***

-0.005***

-0.240***

(0.082)

(0.002)

(0.064)

(0.085)

(0.002)

(0.065)

0.010***

0.000***

0.009***

0.010**

0.000***

0.009***

(0.004)

(0.000)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.000)

(0.003)

-0.000**

-0.000***

-0.000***

-0.000**

-0.000***

-0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-31.575***

-0.259**

-23.284***

-34.194***

-0.270**

-25.343***

(6.040)

(0.114)

(5.050)

(6.181)

(0.115)

(5.250)

Observations

2745

3348

3348

2745

3348

3348

Country Fixed-Effects
Error Term Clustering by
Group

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

Years Since Last Conflict,
Cubed
constant

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5.3 – Educational Language and Conflict Onset Using Dataset B
Variables

Model B1

Model B2

Model B3

Education in Language

-2.077***

-0.020***

-1.917***

(0.478)

(0.007)

(0.559)

Education in Language
(Subject)
Relative Group Size
In-Group
Territorial Autonomy
Number of Past Conflicts
Other Languages in
Education
Polity
GDP per Capita, Logged
Population, Logged
Mountainous Territory,
Logged
Number of Groups, Logged
Ongoing Conflict (For State)
Years Since Last Conflict
Years Since Last Conflict,
Squared
Years Since Last Conflict,
Cubed
constant

Model B4

Model B5

Model B6

-2.703***

-0.027***

-2.478***

(0.506)

(0.007)

(0.636)

3.296***

0.031***

3.059**

3.746***

0.035***

3.465***

(1.184)

(0.011)

(1.195)

(1.320)

(0.011)

(1.245)

-1.762**

-0.017**

-1.603**

-1.586**

-0.017**

-1.440**

(0.847)

(0.007)

(0.653)

(0.719)

(0.007)

(0.639)

0.464

0.007

0.531

0.315

0.005

0.400

(0.679)

(0.041)

(0.721)

(0.795)

(0.042)

(0.745)

0.064

0.016

0.073

0.028

0.015

0.040

(0.111)

(0.014)

(0.131)

(0.121)

(0.014)

(0.133)

0.497

0.008

0.401

-0.128

0.002

-0.178

(0.413)

(0.012)

(0.743)

(0.536)

(0.012)

(0.786)

-0.029

-0.001

-0.023

-0.023

-0.001

-0.017

(0.045)

(0.001)

(0.042)

(0.044)

(0.001)

(0.042)

1.486**

0.015

1.424***

1.568**

0.015

1.501***

(0.726)

(0.010)

(0.474)

(0.770)

(0.010)

(0.479)

0.270

0.022

0.254

0.400

0.024*

0.366

(0.655)

(0.014)

(0.511)

(0.720)

(0.014)

(0.523)

1.049

-0.013

0.233

0.958

-0.011

0.561

(0.860)

(0.018)

(1.008)

(0.852)

(0.017)

(1.031)

0.924

0.005

0.773

1.027

0.008

0.878

(0.867)

(0.024)

(1.073)

(0.848)

(0.025)

(1.063)

0.792*

0.013

0.758**

0.869**

0.014*

0.832**

(0.413)

(0.009)

(0.358)

(0.410)

(0.009)

(0.366)

-0.161**

-0.004***

-0.147**

-0.157*

-0.004***

-0.144**

(0.078)

(0.001)

(0.068)

(0.081)

(0.001)

(0.069)

0.005

0.000**

0.005

0.005

0.000**

0.005

(0.004)

(0.000)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.000)

(0.003)

-0.000

-0.000**

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000**

-0.000

(0.000)
20.808***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.271**

-20.787***

(0.000)
22.086***

-0.286***

-22.541***

(4.207)

(0.103)

(5.217)

(4.144)

(0.104)

(5.389)

Observations

2485

3360

3360

2485

3360

3360

Country Fixed-Effects
Error Term Clustering by
Group

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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the linear probability model for the medium-only independent variable, is
significant at the 0.05 level whereas all the remaining models are significant at
the 0.01 level. In other words, the theory is supported by robust results which
hold under different methods of estimation, different versions of the key
independent variable, and different definitions of ethnic conflict which is
reflected in the datasets.
Of the remaining independent variables, the most influential one on the onset is
the group size relative to the incumbent, which is a proxy for group capacity. As
the group capacity increases, the likelihood of onset also increases. This variable is
significant at the 0.01 level in all models except for A2 and B3 models. Next,
findings are mixed as to whether or not groups that are considered in-groups are
less likely to engage in conflict against their state. While models A1 to A6 do not
lend strong support for this claim, models B1 to B6 that follow a stricter definition
of ethnic conflict are significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, in conflicts where ethnicity
is more salient, horizontal political inequalities and/or various forms of state
discrimination that entails aggrieve groups and make them seek change through
violence. These results confirm Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug’s (2013)
findings.
Fourth, higher state capacity, proxied by GDP per capita, is associated with a
higher likelihood of conflict onset in all models other than linear probability
models. The level of significance is at the 0.05 level for the logit regression
models B1 and B4 which may or may not be due to the observations dropped by
the fixed-effects. The models A1, A4, and all four rare event models show
significance at the 0.01 level. The results go against conventional wisdom and
lend additional support for the theory of this work. Because higher state capacity,
though lowers the opportunity for rebels to succeed, still increases governments’
abilities to aggrieve their ethnic minorities by their nation-building projects.
Fifth, ongoing conflicts (lower threshold) increase the likelihood of onset in some
of the models run on dataset B which is compiled following a stricter definition of
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ethnic conflict. The logit models of B4 and the rare events model of B3 and B6 are
significant at the 0.05 level. The results lend some support for the claim that a
state being already engaged in a conflict provides an opportunity for another
group to start an armed struggle against the state, but this opportunity may not
be very strong given that conflicts do not require governments to dedicate too
much resource. Finally, higher values of the log-transformed percentage of
mountainous territories are associated with a higher likelihood of conflict onset
only on models A1 and A4 at the 0.01 level. Whereas this support is significant,
the remaining ten models do not lend support to this finding. Given that A1 and
A4 are logit models, this finding may also result from some observations that
were dropped during the estimation.
These results show that neither grievances nor opportunities alone influence
conflict dynamics. Factors associated with both types of causes facilitate conflict
onset by motivating individuals to support and mobilize around armed groups
and by providing them the opportunity to fight against the state. All of these
findings are consistent with the claims made throughout the theory chapters. It is
also striking to see that some of the findings challenge existing claims on a lower
state capacity providing more opportunity for rebels. Rather than opportunities,
this factor seems to be more related to the government’s ability to fuel grievances.
The coefficient for the polity variable is negative, indicating a negative association
between polity score and onset which suggests that democracy appeases ethnic
minorities and provides them political channels to express their frustrations.
However, surprisingly, the results for none of the twelve models are significant
for this association. Additionally, the twelve models show that ethnically-based
territorial autonomy, the number of past conflicts between the state and the
ethnic group, the log-transformed value of the number of politically relevant
ethnic groups in the state, and a language other than the majority language and
the ethnic language being offered in education as the medium or as a subject are
not associated with conflict onset.
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After discussing hypothesis 1, I now turn to the results for the models that use
dataset C and dataset D and that test hypothesis 2. Six of the twelve models show
statistically significant support for the hypothesis that not having their language
in education significantly increases the likelihood of civil war onset between a
state and a non-state organization claiming to represent an ethnic group at the
0.01 level, whereas four of the remaining six models support this claim at the
0.05 level. Another interesting finding is that the level of significance improves
for two of three models when using the dataset D, which follows a stricter
definition of ethnic conflict, for testing the medium-only variable. Even though
the level of significance for the key independent variable is lower in these twelve
models than that of the models using datasets A or B, this is still a crucial finding
given that the threshold for battle-related deaths is substantially higher for civil
war than conflict and the findings hold even if we investigate civil wars.
Additionally, rare event models which are more reliable specifically for this
analysis that investigates a rare event, the level of significance for the models C3,
C6, D3, and D6 are quite high where the first one is at the 0.05 level of
significance whereas the remaining three are at the 0.01 level. As a result, the
findings of these models offer support for hypothesis 2.
The significance level drops also for the variables for the group capacity and the
state capacity. Having significance at the 0.01 level for ten of the twelve models
for the datasets A and B, the relative group size does not reach this level of
significance for any of the models using dataset C or D. The only models that are
significant at the 0.05 level are those of three of the four rare event models,
namely C3, C6, and D6. As a result, the association between the group capacity
and civil war onset is not strong. Unsurprisingly, civil wars are harder to initiate
than conflicts, and thus, a higher group size may not provide as much of an
opportunity to fight a civil war as it does for conflict. GDP per capita does not
even reach the 0.05 level of significance in any of the models. On the other hand,
the binary variable of ongoing civil war (higher threshold) between the state and
another actor is significant at the 0.01 level for all models except for the models
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Table 5.4 – Educational Language and Civil War Onset Using Dataset C
Variables

Model C1

Model C2

Model C3

Education in Language

-1.883*

-0.014**

-1.638**

(1.073)

(0.006)

(0.674)

Education in Language
(Subject)
Relative Group Size
In-Group
Territorial Autonomy
Number of Past Conflicts
Other Languages in
Education
Polity
GDP per Capita, Logged
Population, Logged
Mountainous Territory,
Logged
Number of Groups, Logged
Ongoing Conflict (For State)
Years Since Last Conflict
Years Since Last Conflict,
Squared

Model C4

Model C5

Model C6

-2.399**

-0.017***

-2.094***

(0.936)

(0.006)

(0.720)

3.555

0.024*

3.141**

4.173*

0.026*

3.712**

(2.374)

(0.013)

(1.495)

(2.216)

(0.013)

(1.561)

-1.664*

-0.011**

-1.388*

-1.642*

-0.011**

-1.388*

(0.918)

(0.005)

(0.790)

(0.904)

(0.005)

(0.809)

0.835

-0.009

1.119

0.855

-0.008

1.125

(1.220)

(0.050)

(1.145)

(1.240)

(0.049)

(1.161)

-0.175

0.003

-0.144

-0.239

0.002

-0.197

(0.224)

(0.005)

(0.244)

(0.223)

(0.005)

(0.251)

-0.664

-0.005

-0.495

-1.033

-0.008**

-0.834

(0.799)

(0.004)

(1.091)

(0.790)

(0.004)

(1.119)

-0.012

-0.000

-0.008

-0.010

-0.000

-0.006

(0.038)

(0.001)

(0.045)

(0.038)

(0.001)

(0.046)

0.952

0.011

0.881

1.095*

0.011

1.011*

(0.597)

(0.008)

(0.560)

(0.619)

(0.008)

(0.568)

-0.479

-0.005

-0.398

-0.511

-0.005

-0.448

(0.805)

(0.009)

(0.712)

(0.829)

(0.009)

(0.722)

0.125

0.019

1.079

0.525

0.021

1.362

(0.940)

(0.016)

(1.046)

(0.977)

(0.016)

(1.062)

0.490

-0.009

0.250

1.231

-0.006

0.944

(1.536)

(0.017)

(1.763)

(1.618)

(0.017)

(1.846)

1.769***

0.025**

1.696***

1.833***

0.025**

1.752***

(0.495)

(0.010)

(0.476)

(0.517)

(0.010)

(0.485)

-0.108

-0.001

-0.104

-0.113

-0.001

-0.110

(0.074)

(0.001)

(0.077)

(0.074)

(0.001)

(0.077)

0.003

0.000

0.003

0.003

0.000

0.003

(0.003)

(0.000)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.000)

(0.003)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-8.800*

-0.083

-11.769*

-10.781**

-0.086

-13.111**

(4.794)

(0.057)

(6.053)

(4.794)

(0.057)

(6.267)

Observations

2637

3532

3532

2637

3532

3532

Country Fixed-Effects
Error Term Clustering by
Group

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

Years Since Last Conflict,
Cubed
constant

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5.5 – Educational Language and Civil War Onset Using Dataset D

Variables

Model D1

Model
D2

Model
D3

Education in Language

-2.363*

-0.017***

-2.062***

(1.292)

(0.006)

(0.725)

Education in Language
(Subject)
Relative Group Size
In-Group
Territorial Autonomy
Number of Past Conflicts
Other Languages in
Education
Polity
GDP per Capita, Logged
Population, Logged
Mountainous Territory,
Logged
Number of Groups, Logged
Ongoing Conflict (For State)

Model
D4

Model
D5

Model
D6

-2.814**

-0.020***

-2.447***

(1.146)

(0.006)

(0.760)

3.454

0.022*

3.028*

3.989

0.024*

3.494**

(2.667)

(0.012)

(1.558)

(2.467)

(0.012)

(1.595)

-2.529*

-0.012**

-2.011**

-2.396*

-0.012**

-1.933*

(1.490)

(0.005)

(0.984)

(1.432)

(0.005)

(0.990)

1.133

-0.004

1.391

1.108

-0.003

1.352

(1.310)

(0.048)

(1.181)

(1.368)

(0.048)

(1.201)

-0.349

0.001

-0.308

-0.395*

0.000

-0.347

(0.234)

(0.005)

(0.240)

(0.224)

(0.005)

(0.242)

-0.152

-0.005

-0.149

-0.586

-0.009**

-0.539

(0.543)

(0.004)

(1.209)

(0.548)

(0.004)

(1.242)

-0.017

-0.000

-0.012

-0.015

-0.000

-0.011

(0.038)

(0.001)

(0.047)

(0.037)

(0.001)

(0.047)

0.742

0.008

0.682

0.879

0.009

0.801

(0.693)

(0.009)

(0.556)

(0.741)

(0.009)

(0.567)

-0.010

0.002

0.023

-0.044

0.002

-0.023

(0.854)

(0.012)

(0.660)

(0.900)

(0.012)

(0.673)

-0.470

0.013

0.611

-0.034

0.015

0.902

(1.125)

(0.018)

(1.022)

(1.178)

(0.018)

(1.033)

-0.072

-0.014

-0.273

0.673

-0.010

0.439

(1.445)

(0.017)

(1.683)

(1.535)

(0.017)

(1.797)

1.963***

0.028***

1.868***

2.028***

0.028***

1.922***

(0.448)

(0.009)

(0.478)

(0.462)

(0.009)

(0.487)

-0.160**

-0.002**

-0.152**

-0.162**

-0.003**

-0.155**

(0.074)

(0.001)

(0.075)

(0.073)

(0.001)

(0.075)

0.004

0.000**

0.004

0.005

0.000**

0.004

(0.003)

(0.000)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.000)

(0.003)

-0.000

-0.000*

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000**

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-8.508*

-0.094*

-11.651**

-10.490**

-0.098*

-12.895**

(4.609)

(0.049)

(5.940)

(4.602)

(0.049)

(6.213)

Observations

2635

3530

3530

2635

3530

3530

Country Fixed-Effects
Error Term Clustering by
Group

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

Years Since Last Conflict
Years Since Last Conflict,
Squared
Years Since Last Conflict,
Cubed
constant

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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C2 and C5 which use the dataset C that follows a wider definition of ethnic war.
Given that an ongoing civil war is likely to force the government to use its
resources more extensively than it would in a conflict, the presence of a civil war
invites challengers against the state by offering other groups a better opportunity
to fight a civil war.
The change in the in-group variable from the first twelve models to the second
twelve models is ambiguous. Five of the twelve models lend support for the
association between this variable and civil war onset at the 0.05 level, as opposed
to six in the previous models at the same level. Even though there is potentially
some decline in the level of significance, it is understandable given that civil wars
are more difficult to initiate even though the members of an ethnic minority may
be aggrieved. The findings for this variable are consistent with the previous
discussion on the conflict onset given that the grievances associated with
educational language policies are more strongly associated with the civil war
onset than those that result from a lack of access to the executive power. The
remaining variables, namely ethnically-based territorial autonomy, number of
past conflicts, the number of past conflicts between the state and the ethnic
group, level of democracy, population, the log-transformed value of the number
of politically relevant ethnic groups in the state, and a language other than the
majority language and the ethnic language being offered in education as the
medium or as a subject, and the log-transformed percentage of mountainous
territories are not strongly linked with civil war onset.
These results show that civil wars follow a different pattern than conflicts. Both
grievances and opportunities influence the likelihood of civil war onset, though at
a lower level. It is important to note that despite the decline of the influence of
various factors related to grievances or opportunities, having education in their
language remains important for ethnic groups. Horizontal cultural inequalities
can help armed groups overcome collective action problems by providing the
members of discriminated minorities powerful motivational incentives to fight
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for their culture and identity, not just for themselves, but for their entire group
with its present and future members, including their children and grandchildren.
Interpreting the results from the previous paragraph also offers interesting
insights. In civil wars, governments are often the strong side whereas non-state
organizations are substantially weaker compared to them. The results show that
what matters most to organizations planning to start their large-scale armed
rebellion is the distraction of the government with the presence of an ongoing
civil war. Because governments are the stronger party in these dyadic relations,
any division in their resources and troops offers significant advantages to nonstate armed organizations that are substantially weaker against the state.
Table 5.6 shows the minimum and maximum values for all variables to calculate
the first differences. Based on the logit models using the Dataset A, B, C, and D,
Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 shows the changes in the probability based on the
changes in the independent variables. Variables are moved from their minimum
to their maximum while keeping the other variables at their means. These results
show that not having education in their language causes a substantial level of
shift in the probability of conflict onset. The results also reflect that educational
language policy variables perform better than most of the variables that are
included in the models and that are also some of the most common explanations
for conflict. The variables that perform better than the “Education in Language”
variables in any model are denoted in bold. Two variables that perform better
than the key variable of interest are investigated further to look at changes at
lowered maximums. Because, unlike the binary variables, the data range in these
variables is considerably large and it can provide additional insight into the
influence of these variables relative to the key independent variable.
First, the group size relative to the incumbent is the proxy for group capacity.
Given that the values greater than 0.5 effectively mean the group is not a minority
by population, I recalculate the result using 0.5 as the maximum value. A
minimum of nearly 0 and a maximum of 0.5 in the variable of size relative to the
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Table 5.6 – Lower and Higher Values Used for the Calculation of First Differences in Table 5.7
and Table 5.8

Row

Variables

From

From
(Raw
Values)

To

To
(Raw
Values)

0

-

1

-

1

Education in Language

2

Relative Group Size I

0.0001

-

1

-

3

Relative Group Size II

0.0001

-

0.5

-

4

In-Group

0

-

1

-

5

Territorial Autonomy

0

-

1

-

6

Number of Past Conflicts

0

-

8

-

7

Other Languages in Education

0

-

1

-

8

Polity

-10

-

10

-

9

GDP per Capita, Logged I

6.4953

$662

10.85

$51,681

10

GDP per Capita, Logged II

6.4953

$662

9.44

$12,535

11

Population, Logged

6.3302

561,000

11.51

94,745,000

12

Mountainous Territory, Logged

0

1

4.27

71.30%

13

Number of Groups, Logged

0

1

2.77

16

14

Ongoing Conflict (For State)

0

-

1

-
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Table 5.7 – First Differences of Variables in the Logit Models Using Dataset A and B
Conflict Models
Row

Variables

Model
A1

Model
A4

Model
B1

Model
B4

1

Education in Language

-0.011

-0.016

-0.009

-0.014

2

Relative Group Size I

0.131

0.162

0.067

0.088

3

Relative Group Size II

0.015

0.015

0.009

0.009

4

In-Group

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

5

Territorial Autonomy

0.006

0.005

0.006

0.005

6

Number of Past Conflicts

0.017

0.010

0.010

0.006

7

Other Languages in Education

-0.002

-0.003

-0.001

-0.002

8

Polity

0.004

0.005

0.002

0.002

9

GDP per Capita, Logged I

0.049

0.073

0.032

0.053

10

GDP per Capita, Logged II

0.012

0.013

0.008

0.009

11

0.007

0.008

0.015

0.015

12

Population, Logged
Mountainous Territory,
Logged

0.001

0.003

-0.008

-0.004

13

Number of Groups, Logged

0.019

0.016

0.008

0.006

14

Ongoing Conflict (For State)

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005
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Table 5.8 – First Differences of Variables in the Logit Models Using Dataset C and D
Civil War Models
Row

Variables

Model
C1

Model
C4

Model
D1

Model
D4

1

Education in Language

-0.009

-0.012

-0.009

-0.012

2

Relative Group Size I

0.076

0.088

0.054

0.065

3

Relative Group Size II

0.008

0.008

0.006

0.007

4

In-Group

-0.004

-0.003

-0.004

-0.003

5

Territorial Autonomy

0.019

0.018

0.017

0.015

6

Number of Past Conflicts

7

Other Languages in Education

8

0.004

0.002

0.001

0.000

-0.003

-0.003

-0.002

-0.003

Polity

0.003

0.003

0.002

0.002

9

GDP per Capita, Logged I

0.025

0.027

0.024

0.025

10

GDP per Capita, Logged II

0.006

0.006

0.006

0.006

11

0.003

0.003

0.000

0.001

12

Population, Logged
Mountainous Territory,
Logged

0.000

0.000

-0.002

-0.002

13

Number of Groups, Logged

0.004

0.003

0.002

0.002

14

Ongoing Conflict (For State)

0.016

0.015

0.016

0.014
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incumbent covers around 83 percent of all observations in each of four datasets.
The resulting probability with the maximum value of 1 is substantially higher
than the one with the maximum value of 0.5, more specifically as low as 7.4 times
and as high as 11 times high. In other words, the higher values for the relative
group size may be distorting the probability change, thus looking at a lowered
maximum for the minority groups may help observe the change that covers most
cases. Second, GDP per capita accounts for the capacity of the state to
discriminate against minority culture and identity. Moving from $662 to $51,681
is effectively moving from very low levels of development to very high levels of
development. Similarly, I recalculate the results at the maximum of $12,535,
which is the upper limit for the middle-income countries according to the World
Bank. These low and middle-income cases account for around 80 percent of all
observations in each of four datasets. Although high levels of GDP per capita
seem to be distorting the results, the probability change in the full range is
between 4 and 5.9 times as high as the range using a lower maximum, which are
lower than the changes in the ratios for the relative group size variable.

Conclusion
This chapter offers empirical testing for the hypotheses created based on the
theory developed in the previous chapters. First, I offer variables that proxy the
alternative explanations and confounding factors discussed in Chapter 4
following the hypotheses. Second, I present a descriptive analysis of the
association between the independent variable of interest and the dependent
variable. This analysis provides preliminary support for the hypotheses. Table 5.1
shows that exclusionary language policies are associated with higher numbers of
instances of both civil conflict and civil war onset. Next, I lay out the remaining
elements of the research design not already offered in the section on the
variables. Fourth, I explain the results and discuss their relevance to the
hypotheses. I note that the results lend strong support to hypotheses 1 and 2.
Fifth, I discuss the substantive influence of the variables using the first
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differences. Having found empirical support for my claims, I now turn to the case
study portion of this work to investigate the cultural rights and ethnonationalism
around the Kurdish population in Turkey and Iraq and their influence on the
conflict dynamics between armed groups claiming to represent the Kurdish
population and their respective states.
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CHAPTER SIX
KURDISH NATIONALISM IN TURKEY AND IRAQ

Introduction
This chapter discusses supplemental qualitative case studies that use a most
similar case design to process trace the influence of educational language policies
on cultural grievance formation and the turn to civil conflict. Although the
emphasis is on the grievances of the Kurdish population in Turkey, the Iraqi case
is also discussed to make comparisons between the two cases. The discussion of
these cases is essential for this work because the quantitative studies suffer from
temporal restrictions on publicly available data which usually only cover the postWorld War II period, at best. As shown in this chapter, however, the post-World
War II period is insufficient to study the relationship between minority
nationalism and civil conflict. The origins of the most recent large-scale uprisings
both in Turkey and in Iraq go back to the early twentieth century. Despite the
seeming detachment between the mobilization against the government in the
Turkish case during the Sheik Said uprising and the armed struggle of the PKK,
they are connected to each other through the actions of the government. The
government’s nation-building policies caused a large-scale rebellion, then the
government took an even harsher stance in response to the Sheik Said rebellion.
The persistence of the policies of assimilation and repression fueled grievances,
culminated in the birth of a new generation of Kurdish nationalists, and
eventually led to the conflict onset with the PKK. We are often forced to limit our
empirical analyses to the post-World War II period. But this limitation may
undermine our conclusions because, for many states, modernization efforts and
nation-building strategies started well before 1945. To overcome this problem, I
extend the temporal scope of my analysis of the Kurdish cases to the earlier
stages of their minority nationalism to observe their connection to the
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government policies towards their minorities during their early nation-building
efforts.
In this work, I first discuss the origins of Kurdish nationalism in the nineteenth
century. Second, I explore the political developments following the Young Turk
Revolution in 1908 that marked the beginning of the developments that led to
armed struggles. The descendants of the exiled Kurdish leaders started to create
an intellectual basis for their nationalist movement and organize around
nationalist goals. Next, I investigate the attempts of the Kurdish nationalists to
secede following World War I. Fourth, I cover the developments following the
Treaty of Lausanne. This treaty marked the international recognition of the
victory of the Turkish nationalists in their war of independence, and as a result,
significantly decreased the opportunity of the Kurdish nationalists to secede. I
claim that one of the major impeding factors during this period was that
nationalist ideas were not widespread among the Kurdish public. Because the
tribal social structure prevented the nationalists to reach the Kurds, a lack of the
ability to indoctrinate the Kurdish people prevented the Kurdish nationalists to
undermine the influence of the tribal leaders and recruit the Kurds, and a low
level of grievances against the state that was just getting started with its
modernization did not facilitate the connection between the Kurdish nationalists
and people. For these reasons, I argue that mobilization around Kurdish
nationalism in the 1920s failed to create a substantial challenge against the
emerging Turkish state. Fifth, I show that Kurdish nationalism resurged in the
1960s, this time in response to the cultural discrimination and repression by the
state. These conditions not only created a new and independent group of
intellectuals but also facilitated the connection between these new intellectuals
and the Kurdish public. Sixth, I show that whereas the aggrieved Kurds fought
the Iraqi state for decades, the regime change and the new constitutional
structure that recognized their cultural and political rights brought peace. Finally,
I evaluate these cases based on my theory and discuss the influence of cultural
rights on peace.
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The Origins of Kurdish Nationalism
Kurds are a large and diverse group of people who speak Kurdish languages that
are categorized under the Iranian branch of the Indo-European languages. A
large majority of the Kurdish population had lived under Ottoman rule for
centuries within semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities. The succession of
Bedir Khan Beg as a prince in the principality of Botan coincided with a period of
reforms in the Ottomans. Sultan Mahmud II’s (1808-1839) reforms involved the
centralization of political power, and thus, the suppression of this autonomy in
the first half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, a power vacuum in the
Kurdish territories in the southeastern part of Turkey and the northeastern part
of Iraq facilitated his rise and Bedir Khan Beg emerged as a powerful leader after
consolidating his power. In the meantime, he also established good relations with
the Ottoman government (Jwaideh 1960, 176–80).
The origins of Kurdish nationalism go back to the events surrounding his
consolidation of power. Bedir Khan was not considered to be a nationalist leader,
but his alliances with Kurdish chieftains made him a leader of a Kurdish
confederation. Bedir Khan sought increased autonomy. He built a powerful army
that was well-trained and well-equipped. The estimations put the size of his army
between 70,000 and 100,000. Bedir Khan used this power against Nestorian
Christians, invading their territories and massacring them in 1843 and 1846.
These massacres led to strong protests by England and France, who demanded
the end of the massacres and the removal of Bedir Khan, and if needed, they
offered assistance to fight against him. The Porte had already been considering
this option as it wanted to centralize the power following Sultan Mahmud II’s
reforms. Upon the support and blessing of the Great Powers, the Porte finally
decided to act. Bedir Khan defeated the first army that the Ottomans sent, and
consequently, declared independence from the Ottomans. The Ottomans, then,
sent a large army and put Bedir Khan’s unrest to an end. He was forced to sue for
peace and he was exiled to Crete (Jwaideh 1960, 204–9).
146

The removal of Bedir Khan in the late 1840s was significant because it defined
the future of regional power dynamics in the Kurdish territories for nearly eighty
years. The Porte was unable to fill the power vacuum that was created by the
removal of the emirs as it had already been dealing with widespread problems
across the empire. Thus, their removal created unintended consequences in the
region, including an increased level of lawlessness. Consequently, Kurdish tribes
sought stability, thus they welcomed the sheiks who filled the power vacuum. In
other words, the division of the Kurdish emirates into smaller tribes between
1847 and 1880 contributed to the rise of sheiks. In addition, grievances against
the secularizing direction that the Ottoman government had taken was another
factor that facilitated the development of a type of nationalism that was led by
sheiks. Except for the reign of Abdulhamid II, this secular orientation was
present during most of the nineteenth century, and after the collapse of the
Ottomans, was pursued also by Turkey in the twentieth century (Olson 1991).
Following the period of the power vacuum, Sheik Ubeydullah’s “rise to
prominence marks the first stage of a greater consciousness of Kurdish
nationalism” (Olson 1991, 391). Ubeydullah’s rule was different from Bedir Khan
Beg in two critical ways. Whereas Bedir Khan was an emir (prince) "or
paramount chieftain of a confederation of tribes,” Ubeydullah of Nehri was a
sheik, which is a title given to the head of a religious order (Olson 1991, 391–92).
He was a powerful sheik as the head of the Naqshbandi order. His religious title
gave him influence over territories that are outside of his direct control. His title
also allowed him “to infuse religious phraseology with millenarian” and
“messianic symbols into his nationalist objectives in a way that Bedir Khan Beg as
a non-religious leader was unable to do” (Olson 1991, 391). In addition,
Ubeydullah had explicitly nationalist goals, unlike Bedir Khan. Ubeydullah was
the first of the religious-secular Kurdish leaders (Jwaideh 1960, 215). His letter to
British Vice-Consul in Başkale contains the following:
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The Kurdish nation is a people apart. Their religion is different
(to that of others), and their laws and customs are distinct. They
are known among all nations as mischievous and corrupt ... The
chiefs and rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian
subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan (the Christians) one
and all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on
this way with the two governments, and necessarily something
must be done so that the European governments having
understood the matter shall enquire into our state ... We want
our affairs to be in our hands... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan
will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to
put up with these continued evil deeds, and the oppression which
they suffer at the hands of the two governments of impure
intentions. (as cited in Olson 1991, 392)
As a servant of God, Ubeydullah’s religious title provided him a high level of
prestige in society. Sheiks at the time were respected for their piety and morality.
Ubeydullah was seen as a holy person and a savior by many of his illiterate
followers. In addition to their religious roles, sheiks served other functions. They
had the abilities of a modern politician. They handled arbitration and conciliation
in disputes while avoiding making any aggrieved parties feel shortchanged.
Sheiks were thought to be able to perform miracles, even after their death. Sheiks
also provided medicinal services. Sheik Ubeydullah “gained great power because
many tribal chiefs either through marriage, as followers (murids) or for services
rendered, owed him allegiance” (Olson 1991, 393).
Sheik Ubeydullah’s rise in the 1870s coincided with a period of social and
economic struggles. The hardship was made worse following the devastation
caused by the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 which led to social and economic
dislocation, violence and insecurity, and famine and pestilence (Jwaideh 1960,
215–16). These difficulties reinforced people’s search for a savior who would
bring justice and improve their lives (Olson 1991). In this context, Ubeydullah set
out to unify Kurds, and to that end, created the first Kurdish alliance which was
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called the Kurdish League. The Ottomans were initially supportive of Ubeydullah
and the Kurdish League because Ubeydullah’s troops had significant
contributions in the war against the Russian Empire. But this support was
replaced with suspicion as Ubeydullah sought to increase his power further. In
1880, Ubeydullah invaded the Qajar dynasty to expand his control into the
Kurdish territories in Iran, however, he faced a decisive defeat. Upon his return,
the Ottomans took action and captured him to appease the Europeans who were
outraged by Ubeydullah’s actions against Christian Nestorians, but also, because
of the threat that he had become to the Porte as his nationalist goals could easily
get out of control (Olson 1989, 6–7).
Olson notes that the creation of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments marks the
beginning of the second stage of Kurdish Nationalism. The creation of the
Kurdish regiments was in line with Abdulhamid II’s pan-Islamist ideas as a
solution to stop the decline of the empire. It was essential to have a powerful
defensive force in the east against the increasingly assertive Russian Empire and
the Armenians after 1878. A Kurdish defensive force would help counter the
independence attempts of Armenians who were backed by the British. The
Russian Empire came to be amenable to this policy after 1883 due to their
opposition to an independent Armenia. By establishing Hamidiye Regiments,
Abdulhamid II also wanted to establish closer ties between the central authority
and the Kurdish tribes following the fall of Ubeydullah.
The Porte took precautions to prevent the Hamidiye Regiments to turn into a
threat. The regiments were not allowed to join together. They could unify only
during wars and only at the order of the commanding general. The officers who
served in these regiments were trained in special military schools in Istanbul. A
trained Kurd could become a colonel, but a regular Ottoman soldier still had to be
his assistant. Taking part in Hamidiye Regiments was a tribe’s proof of loyalty to
the state. Therefore, tribes that created a regiment or provided a company of men
to serve there enjoyed certain benefits, such as increased prestige among the
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Kurdish tribes and weapon provision by the state. On the contrary, tribes could
be excluded from the regiments if they lost favor with the government. Not only
did being excluded put tribes at a disadvantage, but the members of these tribes
were also subject to conscription and were required to serve in the regular army.
Although one of the goals of these regiments was to bring the Kurds closer to the
state, their creation influenced Kurdish nationalism in the opposite direction.
The regiments represented the highest level of concentration of Kurdish power
since 1847. It is estimated that the number of Kurdish troops who served in the
regiments was around 50,000. These men contributed to the war efforts of the
empire between 1895 and 1914 in the Balkans. Consequently, the Kurdish officers
and soldiers were exposed to not only the burgeoning Turkish nationalism but
also the nationalist ideas of the new Balkan states. Along with nationalism, these
experiences exposed tens of thousands of Kurds also to global politics concerning
the Balkan wars. This exposure made the Hamidiye Regiments an important step
in the development and spread of Kurdish nationalism and paved the way for its
next stage.
After covering the important developments for Kurdish nationalism during this
period, I would like to briefly explain how it relates to my theory regarding the
relationship between the state and the Kurdish population and the influence of
nationalist ideas on political developments. The policies of centralization by the
Ottomans were frustrating for local Kurdish leaders, not for nationalist reasons,
but simply because they did not want an increasing level of intrusion into their
affairs. The policies of centralization were nowhere near the level of
centralization experienced under nation-states. In other words, they would not
contribute to the spread of nationalist ideas to the masses. Unsurprisingly,
Kurdish nationalism was not present among the Kurdish population as they were
isolated from nationalist ideas prevalent in Europe. The Hamidiye Regiments
made it possible for the Kurds who served in the Balkans to observe the politics
outside of their region. Yet, their exposure to nationalist ideas had not
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contributed significantly to the spread of Kurdish nationalism among the masses
during this period, either. Among the elites, we know that Ubeydullah was a
nationalist and he pursued nationalist goals. But it does not necessarily mean
that nationalism was widespread among the Kurdish elites. In fact, we know from
the discussion in the next sections that Kurdish tribal chiefs, who had a
significant influence over the mobilization of troops, were not often nationalists,
even decades later. Therefore, without their involvement, it is difficult to talk
about nationalist mobilization during this early period.

Kurdish Nationalism Following the Young Turk Revolution
Inspired by Montesquieu and Rousseau, the French philosophers whose ideas
laid the basis of French nationalism, a new group of intellectuals who called
themselves the “New Ottomans” demanded constitutionalism and parliamentary
government. Despite their success in 1876, Abdulhamid II closed the parliament
in 1878 and introduced his autocratic rule that lasted for three decades. What
brought it to an end was the revolution in 1908 by a group of nationalist young
intellectuals and military officers called the “Young Turks” who dominated
Ottoman politics for the next ten years until 1918 (Ahmad 2019, 3–4). The Young
Turk revolution marked the end of Abdulhamid II’s autocratic rule and revived
the Ottoman Constitution which paved the way for a new era in politics that
involved elections, parties, and campaigns. The revolution allowed the new elites
to pursue their nationalist ideas using their newfound political power, but
consequently, it also caused the minority elites to abandon their Ottomanist and
pan-Islamist sentiments which were replaced by nationalist or regional loyalties
(Klein 2007).
The regime change made it possible for Kurdish intellectuals to establish political
clubs in Istanbul, the capital of the empire, and provincial centers. The most
prominent of these was Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Kurdish Society
for Cooperation and Progress, or KTTC) which included members of prominent
Kurdish families, including sons of former emirs and other important figures,
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such as Emin Ali Bedir Khan, son of Bedir Khan Beg, and Sayyid Abdulkadir of
Nehri, son of Sheik Ubeydullah of Nehri. Many of them were living in exile in the
capital. This society founded a cultural affiliate called Kürt Neşr-i Maarif
Cemiyeti (Society for the Propagation of Kurdish Education) that established a
school for the Kurdish children in Istanbul (Olson 1991).
The KTTC also published a newspaper that covered several topics that related to
the Kurds, the empire, and the position of the Kurds in the empire. As reflected in
the journal, the KTTC’s goals included “defending the Constitution; raising the
levels of education in Kurdish society and fulfilling other ‘modern needs’ of the
Kurds; preserving the territorial integrity of the state; and promoting friendship
among all Ottoman groups, particularly among Kurds and Armenians” (Klein
2007, 139). Articles that they wrote also discussed the development of the
Kurdish language as a medium of instruction. They also noted the importance of
the education, modernization, unity of Kurds, and the protection of their
freedoms in the Ottoman context, rather than in a separate state (Klein 2007).
After the foundation of the KTTC in Istanbul, several provincial branches were
opened in the eastern provinces with a Kurdish population. Although these
branches were affiliated with their parent club in Istanbul, their members did not
necessarily espouse similar nationalist views as those in the capital. The opening
ceremony of the Diyarbakır branch included some religious elements, and during
this ceremony, the Kurdish tribal chiefs expressed their dissatisfaction with the
new constitutional regime, and “at the end of the ceremony, a document
protesting against the Constitution and favouring the application of Islamic law
was reported to have been signed by some 3,000 of those in attendance” (Klein
2007, 140). The British consul reported his impression that the interest in the
KTTC club in Diyarbakır was much higher than the interest for İttihat ve Terakki
Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress, or the ITC) branch in the town
that represented the Young Turks who led the new regime (Klein 2007).

152

The KTTC elites “were quite divorced from their people in eastern Anatolia who
were still traditional and religious and whose idea of nationalism was still tied up
with the Caliphate, especially as that office had been exercised by Abdulhamid II”
(Olson 1991, 398). Yet, the opposition of the Kurdish tribal chiefs to the new
regime was not only for religious or ideological reasons, it was also for material
reasons. They enjoyed growth in their power and influence under the reign of
Abdulhamid II, whose regime had created patronage networks that rewarded
loyalty to the sultan. The Kurdish tribes that took part in the Hamidiye Light
Cavalry Regiments were beneficiaries of Abdulhamid II’s Hamidian rule. On the
other hand, Armenian peasants, Kurdish peasants, and the Kurdish tribes that
were outside of this arrangement were resentful of the Kurdish tribes that were
benefitting from it. This resentment was well justified, given that the chiefs of
Hamidiye tribes used their power for criminal activities, such as “murder, raids
and land-grabbing” and some of their actions were “regarded as exemplifying the
worst kinds of abuses committed by the Hamidian regime” (Klein 2007, 141).
Even though the government did not order such activities, it was still responsible
for turning a blind eye to their crimes (Klein 2007).
The change of regime, however, meant that they could lose their power. Indeed,
the Young Turks regime quickly took action against this arrangement following
the revolution. The government dismissed the commander of the Hamidiye
Regiments, started to investigate the activities of the Hamidian chiefs, arrested
many powerful chiefs, and discussed plans to completely disband the Hamidian
Regiments. Additionally, the government decided to confiscate the weapons of
Hamidian tribes and asked them to return the lands they usurped from Armenian
peasants. These changes were some of the main reasons for the spread of the
KKTC’s branches in Kurdish cities. Disgruntled tribal chiefs expressed their
resentment in these social clubs. Despite their protests, however, they were also
declaring their allegiance to the new regime and denying their guilt for the crimes
they were accused of in hopes of avoiding prosecution (Klein 2007).
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The Young Turks shut down the society in 1909, around a year after it was
founded, potentially for having negative attitudes towards the ITC and/or for
being a Kurdish organization (van Bruinessen 1978, 370). Nevertheless, the
provincial branches continued to operate in secret even after the ban, and a
Kurdish movement in the east continued to grow. Indeed, the nationalist Kurdish
elites in Istanbul who advocated education and modernization were not a threat
to the empire, as their views were marginal for the Kurdish population in the
east. The ITC regime was rather worried about the provincial Kurds. The regime
came to agree with its predecessor, the Hamidian regime, that the Kurdish
population in the east was too important to ignore for both domestic and foreign
threats. The regime first attempted to gain their support by sending prominent
Kurdish individuals as emissaries, such as Sayyid Abdulkadir and Said-i Kurdî,
and this strategy earned some success. The regime also eased its pressure on the
tribal chiefs for their crimes and decided not to force them to leave the lands they
usurped to their original owners, Armenian and Kurdish peasants. In response to
the attempts of appeasement, “Kurdish chiefs remained ambivalent about” the
ITC “during the years preceding World War I” (Klein 2007, 146).
During the period following the overthrow of Abdulhamid II, nationalist elites
found freedom to express their ideas and to organize. The Kurdish elites were
split in this regard. The KTTC members in Istanbul, including the children and
grandchildren of exiled Kurdish leaders, espoused nationalist views. Seeking the
modernization of the Kurdish people within the Ottoman Empire, they were
autonomists. Yet, they were still nationalists in the European sense. Some of their
first acts involved opening a school for the Kurdish children in Istanbul and
advocating the development of the Kurdish language to serve as a medium of
instruction. However, the Ottoman Empire quickly turned into a Turkish state
following the revolution and lost its unifying appeal. The Young Turks viewed the
Kurdish nationalists as a rival and shut down the KTTC after a year of its
opening. In the Kurdish provinces, nationalism still appears to be weak during
this period. The influence of tribal chiefs over people within their tribes was still
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too powerful and neither group espoused nationalist views. The frustrations of
the tribal chiefs against the regime stemmed from material grievances caused by
the actions of the Young Turks who viewed them as a threat, and unlike the elites
in Istanbul, the tribal chiefs did not ponder about the development of the Kurdish
language and the modernization of the Kurdish territories. They rather
represented the feudal status quo who benefitted from the existing arrangement.
Nationalist ideas were not popular among the masses, either. Because there were
neither elites trying to spread nationalism among them nor grievances caused by
government discrimination against their group.

Kurdish Nationalism Following World War I
A growing number of Kurdish people started to support a form of Kurdish
nationalism in response to the events during the war, but nationalism was still far
from popular among the masses. In the meantime, the Kurdish nationalists in the
capital and those in the provinces increased their cooperation. As the empire was
crumbling by the end of World War I, its disintegration seemed imminent.
Following the Armistice of Mudros on October 31, 1918, Kurdish elites started to
explore their options (Olson 1991). They established Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti
(the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, or the KTC). The leader of this new Kurdish
society was Sayyid Abdulkadir who also was the president of the KTTC a decade
earlier. Sayyid Abdulkadir supported autonomy, for which he faced a backlash
from pro-independence Kurdish elites. Led by Emin Bedir Khan, those who
wanted to secede from the Ottomans established a rival organization called Kürt
Teşkilat-i İçtimaiye Cemiyeti (the Society for Kurdish Social Organization). The
KTC appointed General Mehmed Şerif Paşa to participate in the negotiations at
Versailles as the head of the Kurdish side (Bajalan 2019).
Mehmet Şerif Paşa negotiated with the Armenian delegation over the future
Armenian-Kurdish border. The results of the negotiations for the borders were
not favorable for the Kurdish side. Major Kurdish settlements in the north were
assigned to the Armenian side. The Euphrates River marked the western border
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while the southern districts within the Ottoman vilayet of Mosul were left to the
Great Powers. Nevertheless, it was a path that achieved international recognition
and the Treaty of Sèvres included two articles that outlined the path for
independence for the Kurds. The treaty could not be implemented, however, due
to the efforts of the Turkish nationalists who mobilized to challenge the Armistice
of Mudros and the occupation and partitioning of Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal, the
leader of the Turkish nationalists, was successful in gaining the support of the
Kurdish tribal leaders who feared the prospects of ending up in the borders of
Armenia. These fears were confirmed after Şerif Paşa’s negotiations were
published by the Ottoman press which revealed that the Kurdish delegate would
cede a part of the Kurdish territories for the recognition of its independence
(Bajalan 2019).
The military accomplishments of the Turkish nationalists made the Treaty of
Sèvres a dead treaty and the Government of the Grand National Assembly was
recognized as the legitimate representative of the Turkish side. The Treaty of
Lausanne was signed in April 1923 which superseded the Treaty of Sèvres. The
Turkish nationalists largely achieved their goals. This also meant that the Kurdish
nationalist movements failed to achieve neither autonomy nor independence.
Some attribute this to the weakness of the Kurdish movement because of the
divisions among the Kurdish elites (Olson 1991). Indeed, it is possible to claim
that the elites failed to mobilize the Kurds following World War I. Yet, another
look at the events reveals that the power balances in the region were not
favorable for Kurdish independence, and even if Kurdish elites were united, the
prospects for independence were not high. Britain was not interested in the
Kurdish regions north of the vilayet of Mosul and “Britain possessed neither the
diplomatic nor, more importantly, the military power to intervene into Kurdish
Anatolia in order to enforce the terms of Sèvres” (Bajalan 2019, 21). Whereas the
Tsarist regime noticed that an alliance with Kurdish nationalism could be useful
for undermining the Ottoman power in the east, the prospects for this alliance
collapsed along with the Tsarist regime during World War I. It was a
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disappointing development for the Kurdish nationalists not only because they
lost an ally, but also that the Bolshevik regime decided to support their rival, the
Turkish nationalist movement. A lack of meaningful international support for the
Kurdish cause, despite the lobbying efforts by the Kurdish elites, coupled with the
swift rise of the Turkish nationalist movement made an independent Kurdish
state very unlikely (Bajalan 2019).
Despite a lack of international support, the Kurdish nationalists did try to start a
rebellion during the Turkish war of independence, and “the main reason for the
rebellion seems to have been that the Kurds wanted to use the stipulations of
articles 62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sèvres to increase their autonomy within
Anatolia” (Olson 1989, 33). In spring 1921, the ongoing battles in the west
between the Turkish nationalists and the Greeks limited Mustafa Kemal’s ability
to move troops to the east, and therefore, offered a great opportunity for the
Kurds to start an uprising. Yet the Koçgiri rebellion that only saw around 10,000
mobilized troops in each side was suppressed by the Kemalists with relative ease,
even though they launched an offensive against the Greeks in the west at the
same time. In addition to the lack of international support, other factors
contributed to the failure of the rebellion. First, the Kurdish population lacked a
middle class. The leading elites mainly consisted of Kurdish nationalists who had
come from Istanbul. Lacking a middle class, the leadership from Istanbul had to
rely on tribal chiefs to undertake a nationalist rebellion. Yet, many of them were
co-opted by the Turkish side by jobs, appointments, land, etc. There were also
Kurdish ağas who knew Mustafa Kemal in person from his service at the army in
Diyarbakır when his leadership played a role in the Russian retreat in 1916.
Mustafa Kemal gained support from some Kurdish leaders during the Erzurum
Congress and Sivas congress in 1919 upon promising equal rights to Kurds as
Turks. It is further claimed that “the relations of the Kemalist forces—and
Mustafa Kemal in particular—with the Kurdish chiefs and large landowners were
better than those of the Kurdish nationalist organizations” (Olson 1989, 37).
157

Secondly, Kurds were fragmented by religious and sectarian differences and it
created mistrust between different groups. Lacking strong nationalist sentiments
that would overcome such fragmentations, the mistrust between Kurds from
different religious groups was resilient. It is claimed that many Sunni Kurds saw
the Koçgiri rebellion as an Alevi rebellion and thus were not inclined to support
it. In the meantime, the Turkish nationalists were highlighting Mustafa Kemal’s
resistance to defend the homeland against foreign and infidel invaders and were
successfully appealing to Muslim solidarity between Turks and Kurds. Finally,
logistical disadvantages undermined the Koçgiri rebellion. The rebellion took
place in an area that was closer to Ankara than to other Kurdish regions, and
therefore, was more accessible for the Turkish nationalists, even though it was
still a difficult terrain. Consequently, the rebellion was also away from most of the
tribes that consisted of the Hamidiye Regiments who lived further east and south.
Although it is not clear “whether any of the participating tribes had also been part
of the Hamidiye Regiments or the tribal regiments created during World War I,”
this distance “deprived the Koçgiri rebellion of much military experience” (Olson
1989, 34). Additionally, a particularly severe winter season in 1920 prevented
help from outside even if it was available (Olson 1989, 33–37).
The period following World War I was also not bright for the Kurdish nationalists
in Istanbul. They finally had an opportunity to act following the fall of the empire,
yet this opportunity was undercut by several factors. First, international actors
were not supportive of their goals. They only promised to recognize a Kurdish
state if the Kurds were to succeed. Second, the nationalist ideas of the Kurdish
elites from Istanbul were still marginal for the provincial Kurds. It was
impossible to talk about a nationalist mobilization of the Kurds as they were
divided along tribal and sectarian lines and some of these groups rather
supported the Turkish nationalists who were fighting to defend their homeland
against Christian invaders. Finally, the Turkish nationalists quickly filled the
power vacuum. Therefore, the time window was not very wide to overcome the
issues that curtailed the mobilization of the Kurds.
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Kurdish Nationalism Following the Treaty of Lausanne
The Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) marked the victory of the Turkish side. It
was, however, bad news for the Kurdish nationalists. Unlike the Treaty of Sèvres,
the Treaty of Lausanne did not include any provisions for the independence or
autonomy of the Kurds. Internationally, the Kurdish problem was reduced down
to a border issue between Turkey and Iraq (Olson 1989, 82). Apart from this
border dispute, the Kurdish issue became a domestic matter for Turkey from this
point forward after the international recognition of the Turkish borders.
Nevertheless, the Kurdish nationalists had already started preparing for the next
stage even before the Treaty of Lausanne. The onset of the process that led to the
rebellion was probably the creation of a secretive nationalist organization called
Ciwata Kweseriya Kurd (the Society for Kurdish Independence), also known as
the Azadi. According to the reports from the British intelligence, it was founded
in 1921 by a former commander of the garrison at Erzurum, Colonel Halil Beg
Cibran. Twenty-three branches were opened across Kurdish provinces as well as
in Istanbul. The organization supplied the tribes with weapons.
Based on British intelligence reports, The Kurdish officers provided eleven
reasons for their increased activities in preparation for a rebellion. Several of
these reasons are related to cultural grievances and the desire the protect the
Kurdish people, culture, and identity, some of which are as follows. First, the
Kurds feared demographic changes resulting from colonization by the state. They
argued that the Turkish government planned to dislocate the Kurdish population
to Western Anatolia and gradually establish a Turkish majority in the region.
Second, the Kurds were upset about the abolition of the Caliphate (March 3,
1924) and argued that this move broke “one of the few remaining bonds between
the Turks and Kurds” (Olson 1989, 44). The Kurds were also frustrated with the
National Law Court Organization Regulation (April 8, 1924) that abolished the
Sharia courts. The regulation retired the judges of Sharia courts and transferred
their jurisdiction to the new secular courts (Olson 1989, 91). Third, the Kurds
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objected to the new laws on the use of languages that allowed only Turkish to be
used in the courts and schools and prohibited the use of Kurdish being taught in
schools. It was a very significant change because excluding the language they
speak would effectively prevent the Kurdish population from participating in
public life. Furthermore, religious institutions were closed down following new
measures. This was a problem particularly affecting the Kurds because religious
institutions functioned as the only remaining educational facilities available for
them. Fourth, the state was replacing the original names of places with Turkish
ones which was an act of colonization and a direct attack on the Kurdish culture.
Even the word “Kurdistan” was excluded from educational materials. Fifth, all
senior government officials in the region were Turkish without any exception.
Although Kurds were appointed to lower levels, these Kurds were carefully
selected to make sure they were not suspected of being a Kurdish nationalist.
Additionally, other sources of grievances for Kurds included corruption,
undemocratic electoral processes, divide and conquer tactics of the government,
military raids on Kurdish villages, ill-treatment of Kurds in the army, and the
exploitation of Kurdish mineral wealth (Olson 1989, 42–45).
One of the reasons for the oppression was that the government was “very much
aware of the Azadi and its activities,” was “doing everything in their power to
suppress it,” and was “severely punishing any Kurds who were thought to be
members of Azadi” (Olson 1989, 45). In November 1924, the Azadi officers
expressed three main goals. These were to save the Kurds from oppression, to
allow the Kurds to develop their country, and to secure assistance from Britain
because the members of the Azadi were aware that the Kurds were unlikely to
achieve these goals by themselves. In addition to the Azadi threat, Turkey was
also concerned about the Mosul question. The Turkish government tried to
convince the Kurds in a congress in Diyarbakır (August 1, 1924) by offering to
consider and to rectify some of the Kurdish demands, such as, a special form of
administration for majority-Kurdish areas, a loan, a general amnesty for
imprisoned Kurds, suspending conscription for 5 years for Kurds, restoring
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Sharia courts, returning confiscated weapons, and removing unliked Turkish
military officers. In return, the Turkish government asked the Kurds to support
the Turkish arguments and tactics on the Mosul question (Olson 1989, 45–48). It
appears though that the relations between the Turkish government and the Kurds
were plagued by commitment problems. The Kurds did not know whether the
government would follow up on its promises given that the government had given
promises before as a stalling tactic during the war of independence and had not
taken any steps to follow through later. The government also was suspicious of
the Azadi activities and was preparing to counter a potential Kurdish rebellion.
In the weeks following the congress in Diyarbakır, another rebellion erupted
among the Koçgiri tribes and the government gave the army full authority to
suppress it. Even if there were any hopes of compromise, it probably ended with
the rebellion and the government’s response to it, though it is also possible that
the commitment problems had merit. A month after the Diyarbakır congress, 500
Kurdish officers and soldiers at the military organized a strategic rebellion at
Beytüşşebap, a small border town near Iraq (September 3-4, 1924). Yet, the
mutiny was carried out too early and thus the Azadi leadership was not able to
coordinate with the tribes. As soon as the Turkish commanding officer of the
garrison at the town had found out about it, he started to arrest everyone
suspected of being involved. Consequently, five hundred officers and soldiers
deserted the Turkish army, fled to Iraq, and took thirteen automatic rifles with
them. The Azadi had come to decide that they have to make their move quickly
before the government attempts to suppress the organization because the
government now not only knew more about the extent of the nationalist
movement but also suspected that there may be more to come. Given that
garrison sizes were small in September and October, and thus having expected a
stronger reaction at a later date, the Azadi decided to start the rebellion before
the government would receive reinforcements (Olson 1989, 48–50).
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The Kurdish nationalist had learned some important lessons from the failure in
the Koçgiri rebellion in 1921. One lesson that had come to define the next stage
for the movement was that the leadership from Istanbul had found that the
sheiks were more reliable than the tribal chiefs as leaders of an uprising. The
supratribal connections of the sheiks were essential in creating a Kurdish
movement. Sheiks were not co-opted by the government as easily as tribal chiefs.
Although the spread of nationalist ideas may have challenged the role of religion
in many societies, and as a result, they were met with suspicion by the clergy, the
sheiks were more nationalistic in comparison to the tribal chiefs in the Kurdish
case (Olson 1989, 35). The Azadi took notice of this and decided to appeal to the
sheiks. Turkey becoming a republic and the subsequent abolition of the caliphate
and the Sharia courts helped the Azadi to recruit the sheiks, and along with them,
the tribal chiefs. In their first congress, the Azadi decided that the rebellion would
have a religious appearance, not only to attract the sheiks, and therefore bring
wider support from the Kurdish population, but also to play into the religious
opposition to Mustafa Kemal and his reforms in the entire country. The arrest of
many individuals in the Azadi leadership after the Beytüşşebap mutiny meant
that the sheiks would become even more important for the rebellion. Upon the
arrest of Halil Beg Cibran and Yusuf Ziya, Sheik Said started to plan the rebellion.
Whereas religious leadership had its benefits, there were also some disadvantages
for unifying the Kurds. Sheik Said reached out to the Hormek and Lolan Alevi
tribes to get them to participate in the rebellion against Ankara for the
government’s anti-religion stance. Yet, the tribes stated that they not only would
not join the Kurdish side, they would also fight against them with the government
forces. These Alevi tribes that fought against the government themselves in the
Koçgiri rebellion did not like the prospects of a Sunni-led Kurdish state. This
rejection restricted the area that a rebellion could cover and deprived the
rebellion of the experience the Alevi tribes gained fighting the Kemalist forces
(Olson 1989, 91–99).
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In early January 1925, Sheik Said started a tour to visit different Kurdish tribes to
get them to join the rebellion, to mobilize the Kurds, and to choose local leaders
of the rebellion. Whether it is religious or tribal, any support from local leaders
was essential because the Kurds who followed a chief or a sheik would join the
rebellion if their leader asked. To get more tribes involved, Sheik Said issued
fetvas (fatwa, a nonbinding legal opinion on a point of Islamic law) against the
secular government in Ankara and promised to restore religion. Even though
Sheik Said was able to bring several Kurdish tribes together, many others fought
on the government’s side. Almost all of the tribes who participated in the
rebellion were Zaza-speaking Kurds. Whereas, of the other two major Kurdish
tribal confederations in Anatolia, the Babakurdi tribes did not participate and the
participation from the Kurmanci tribes was limited. The tribes between Van and
Şırnak preferred peace and stability and thus did not participate which severely
hurt the prospects of a sustained rebellion. The non-tribal Kurds from
Diyarbakır, such as peasants who were controlled by landowners or other lowerclass Kurds, did not participate, either. It is argued that Sheik Said did not even
invite them because he believed they would not make good fighters. The Azadi
found that “inculcating nationalism in uneducated, poverty-stricken peasants or
the lower classes” is a time-consuming task (Olson 1989, 99). But they did not
have time for such a massive task. As for the notables of Diyarbakır, a town with a
Kurdish population by a large majority, none of them supported the rebellion
(Olson 1989, 95–99).
Sheik Said became the commander of the rebellion because he was the most
trusted and respected of the nationalists. He had extended his influence through
arranging marriages for his daughters, as well as his brothers’ daughters, with
sheiks and tribal chiefs who could contribute to his power. He had become a
wealthy man as a sheik who owned large herds of sheep, large enough that he
employed around 120 shepherds to take care of them. He had personally met
everyone who had any power and status in the area and he knew the terrain very
well. Unlike others in his Naqshbandi order who did not like the Kurdish
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nationalists, Sheik Said’s nationalist views helped the nationalists from Istanbul
to extend their influence into the provincial Kurds. In the first Azadi congress, he
stood out as an outspoken nationalist, unlike many others who were more
cautious. He was influential in convincing others about the need to rebel against
the government. Following this first congress, he became a dominant figure in
the movement in the other congresses and the arrest of the Azadi leaders made
him the natural leader of the rebellion (Olson 1989, 100–102).
The rebellion started a little prematurely on February 8, 1925. After a local
incident, the events escalated into a rebellion. Sheik Said issued a fetva stating
that he is the leader, emir al-mujahidin, of the rebellion. He declared that “he
was the representative of the caliph and of Islam. He stated that he wanted
everyone to join the holy crusade and become a holy fighter (mujahidin)” (Olson
1989, 108). The rebels quickly defeated the small number of forces that the
government had stationed in the region and captured their military equipment.
Taking advantage of their superiority in size early on, Sheik Said’s forces attacked
many towns and coerced several tribes into joining the rebellion. His forces
attacked and sieged the walls of Diyarbakır but were forced to leave the siege as
the government reinforcements approached the town. The rebels planned to
capture Bitlis and free Halil Beg Cibran and Yusuf Ziya Beg who were in prison.
Freeing these key names in the Azadi leadership, they thought, would get more
tribes to join the rebellion. Yet, they lost against small government forces and
local militia in the region, and the two men were subsequently hanged in Bitlis.
The rebels fought several major battles before April, but their goal of extending
the rebellion to Erzurum was not successful. The government forces were closing
in and their escape options were narrowing. On April 15, Sheik Said was captured
by an ambush. By this time, most major battles were fought and the rebellion was
in decline, even though the forces of the government had not yet completely
mobilized. The estimates put the rebel forces to around 15,000 men against the
government forces of around 25,000 men. After the capture of Sheik Said, the
government moved to disarm all Kurds by extreme measures, such as burning
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some houses and villages and deporting some tribes to western Anatolia, which
caused the resistance to extend through early 1926 (Olson 1989, 107–20).
It was a significant uprising and “Sheikh Said had led the largest armed and most
sustained Kurdish nationalist rebellion of the twentieth century” (Olson 1989,
127). It influenced the government to devise additional strategies to prevent a
future rebellion at such a large scale, a few of which are as follows. First, Mustafa
Kemal adopted İnönü’s hardliner approach to handling the rebellion. This
hardliner approach was used also to justify suppressing the opposition to the
government’s policies. İnönü labeled the rebellion as a counterrevolutionary
movement that tried to topple the government. The parliament passed a law that
granted dictatorial powers to the government to convict, imprison, and execute
the rebels. Before their temporary two-year activity period ended, the
independence tribunals arrested 7,440 people and executed 660 of them,
including Sheik Said. Second, the government noticed the usefulness of air forces
and used them more extensively in the future. Turkey used its small air forces,
consisting only of 6 serviceable planes out of a total of 11, to suppress the
rebellion. Upon witnessing the effectiveness of the British Royal Air Force in Iraq,
the government decided to expand its air forces. Turkey had 80 serviceable
planes in its air forces out of 106 planes by the end of 1926. Finally, the British
reports claimed that the rebels hid 90 percent of their weapons and there would
be new rebellions if the government was to remove its large military presence. To
prevent this scenario and to increase its control in the region, the government
invested in its gendarmerie forces in the east in the following years (Olson 1989,
120–25).
In the final episode of this early stage Kurdish nationalism, the elites in Istanbul
proved themselves to be quite resourceful. They were aware that their influence
over the tribal leaders was not very strong and they did not have enough time to
instill nationalism into the Kurdish population. In fact, overall, the Kurds in the
region still did not have much reason to be very upset with the government. The
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power struggle between the state and the rebels was not unusual. In addition, the
government intrusion into the region had just started, and thus not enough time
had passed to create large-scale grievances. As a result, the conditions were still
not ripe for nationalist ideas to spread. Learning from the past experiences, they
decided to cooperate with the sheiks to overcome the issues preventing
mobilization. Indeed, ever since the fall of the emirs in 1847, the sheiks were the
only people who were able to overcome the divisions among Kurds, even if
temporarily, and increase participation in an armed struggle. Sheik Said was the
perfect fit for such a task, yet his efforts were not enough. Many factors
undermined mobilization, such as tribal and non-tribal divisions, feuds between
tribes, Sunni and Alevi divisions, class divisions, etc. The troops he was able to
mobilize, which was not insignificant, were simply no match to the Turkish army.

The Resurgence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Conflict
Onset during the Cold War
Following the repression of the rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s, Kurdish
nationalism was not visible in public life for a few decades. But it resurfaced
during the Cold War in the 1960s, this time not by sheiks or tribal chiefs, but
rather by a younger generation of Kurds who were more educated. The Kurdish
youth participated in several left-leaning organizations at the time, such as
Türkiye İşçi Partisi (the Workers’ Party of Turkey). They founded an umbrella
organization in 1969 called Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları (the Revolutionary
Cultural Eastern Hearths, or DDKO). Most Kurdish nationalist organizations that
emerged later were inspired by the DDKO.
Mustafa Barzani’s rebellion that led to the first Kurdish-Iraqi war between 1961
and 1970 had set an example for the Kurds in Turkey. Additionally, Che Guevara
and Debray’s (1967) foco theory that laid out the effectiveness of guerilla warfare
influenced the Turkish left who believed in the necessity of the use of violence to
achieve political goals. Although the government defeated the militarized leftist
organizations by 1972, their strategy of rural mobilization was emulated by the
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PKK a decade later. In the 1970s, Marxist perspectives on nationalism were
influential on the Kurdish intellectuals who believed that a nationalist revolution
would save Kurdistan from foreign colonizers. They viewed the Soviet Union and
the Turkish left as allies, though it later appeared that the Turkish left was not
very supportive of the independence of Kurds.
The Kurdish left employed several strategies, such as participating in elections,
publishing magazines, forming associations, and participating in street
demonstrations, to name a few. The Kurdish left was divided into various groups
due to ideological disagreements, such as differing views on the Sino-Soviet split,
class alliances, the goals of the struggle, and the means to achieve these goals.
Despite their activism, the Kurdish left was largely restricted to the urban areas.
None of the Kurdish leftist groups started armed struggle or was able to reach
and recruit the peasants who consisted of a considerable majority of the Kurdish
society, except for two organizations: Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçuları (the
National Liberators of Kurdistan, or the KUK) and the PKK. The KUK and the
PKK recruited mainly from the same pool: peasants and students. The KUK
started an armed rebellion and sought support from the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish
tribes. The KUK did not seek to undermine landlords and tribal leaders. The
PKK, on the other hand, actively challenged them. The KUK and the PKK were
rivals that engaged in violent clashes before 1980. Whereas the leader of the PKK,
Öcalan left Turkey, went to Syria before the coup of 1980 in Turkey, and
established a base in Lebanon, the KUK did not survive the repression following
the coup.
Given that the Kurdish left reached ideological and strategic maturity and
produced several viable political movements in the 1970s, Tezcür (2015) seeks to
explain why the path for the Kurdish nationalism was carved by violence and why
it was the PKK and not any of the other organizations that became the main
representative of the Kurdish nationalism. Although there were several
movements, each had different views about “the desirability, timing, and type of
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armed struggle” and the PKK’s rivals blamed it for “taking unnecessary risks
when the conditions were not ripe for revolution” (Tezcür 2015, 253). Abdullah
Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, however, did not wait for the conditions to be ripe,
he actively worked to create the conditions. Nevertheless, he claimed that the
nature of the Turkish state necessitated armed resistance to liberate Kurdistan
and emancipate Kurdish individuals from their enslaved souls.
Tezcür argues that Öcalan turned out to be right and it is precisely its strategic
use of violence that made the PKK more successful than other movements that
were viable candidates to represent the Kurdish nationalism. Shortly after its
emergence, the PKK started to target powerful landlords in Urfa in an
unprecedented manner and built a reputation as a formidable power. This
reputation helped them stand out, gain popularity, and start to organize in other
provinces as the other groups “remained passive and found excuses not to act”
(Tezcür 2015, 256). Most Kurdish organizations were against the land inequality
that was prevalent in the Kurdish society, but only PKK dared to challenge the
landlords who were quite powerful. Öcalan “had no qualms with the use of
violence to crush internal opposition, and eliminate defectors” (Tezcür 2015,
259). Yet, the PKK gained sympathizers also by taking action strategically on
issues that were visible to the public and that showed that they looked out for the
interests of the Kurds. The PKK connected with the Kurdish people and made
them feel that the PKK valued them and got their back. The PKK intervened on
issues and sided with the people against their oppressors. They educated their
sympathizers and instilled national consciousness in them.
Tezcür notes that “all Kurdish nationalist organizations perceived the Turkish
state as a ‘colonizer’ and Kurdistan as a ‘colony.’ The PKK violence was a strategic
decision on the part of its leadership to compete effectively against other Kurdish
organizations” (Tezcür 2015, 256). As a latecomer among many organizations,
the PKK’s deliberate use of violence early on, rather than publishing ideological
publications, was aimed at developing a niche. This strategy proved successful as
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the PKK became the leading Kurdish nationalist organization in less than two
years and their members consisted of around 75 percent of all people accused of
Kurdish secessionism who were put on trial by the military regime following the
1980 coup. After establishing itself as the most prominent Kurdish nationalist
organization, the PKK started an armed struggle against the state by attacking the
army in two different towns simultaneously (August 15, 1984). The PKK’s main
strategy of guerilla warfare “represented a third generation of leftist militant
activism influenced by the Chinese and Vietnamese examples and took lessons
from the failures of both foco theory and urban guerilla strategy in the aftermath
of the 1959 Cuban Revolution” (Tezcür 2015, 258).
There were several macro and mid-level factors that facilitated the onset of a
conflict between the state and the PKK, an organization that claims to represent
the Kurdish population of Turkey. First and foremost, the state’s colonization of
the region has long created resentment. Although the state was able to get it
under control through security measures and by co-opting tribal leaders, the
impact of the colonization is visible in the daily life of Kurdish individuals. Their
culture and language that was dominant up until the republic has gradually been
reduced to a second-class status. Public education was offered only in Turkish,
and so, children received education in the language of their colonizers which
significantly contributed to the decline of their own language. The colonization
the Kurdish population has endured led to the creation of various organizations,
both violent and non-violent, in protest. The resentment of the Kurds had
manifested itself in various ways and it was not certain that an armed conflict
would take place, or if it did, would last. Regardless of the shape or form that the
resistance against the colonization could have taken in several alternative
scenarios, it is important to take note that the colonization and its consequences
are among the main causes of resentment for the Kurds.
Secondly, state repression created further grievances. Due to the uprisings in the
past, the state had been cautious against the risk of a large-scale rebellion, so it
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repressed the region to prevent a secessionist mobilization. But the repression
added to the grievances that were already accumulating and the resulting anger
contributed to the PKK’s recruitment efforts as the PKK offered the prospective
militants a way to channel their anger to respond to unjust policies. Third, the
mountainous terrain made the PKK’s guerilla warfare possible and helped them
avoid Turkey’s powerful army. Particularly, the weakness of the state authority in
the mountainous region next to the border with Iraq helped the PKK militants
avoid the state. Fourth, logistical and financial support and the provision of arms
by external sources helped the PKK’s armed struggle, without which, the PKK
may not have survived against the state forces as long or may have posed lower
levels of threat to the state (Tezcür 2015).
The discussion in this section shows that the conditions in the Kurdish territories
during this second stage of Kurdish nationalism were markedly different from
those of the first phase. The early nationalists were eliminated by the state and
their influence had been erased. In terms of the regional elites, the regime
successfully co-opted the tribal leaders. In other words, the elites during the first
stage were ineffective by this point. Yet, the Kurdish public was getting aggrieved
by horizontal inequalities that had been discriminating against their culture,
identity, and way of life. It was these grievances that led to the birth of several
leftist and nationalist organizations in the 1960s. A new young class of
intellectuals who were exposed to leftist and nationalist ideas in western Turkey
successfully highlighted the injustice the Kurds had endured and pointed the
blame at the state. Unlike previous nationalists, they were not descendants of
feudal leaders, they were just ordinary Kurds. They defended Marxist and
nationalist ideas as solutions to the ongoing injustice. This time, because of the
horizontal inequalities created by the state over decades, the Kurdish society was
much more receptive to the appeals of these new groups of elites and this interest
only grew over time. Among several groups, the reason the PKK emerged as the
dominant force of Kurdish nationalism was its strategic actions against other
groups, tribal leaders, and the state. The PKK successfully played into the
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grievances of the Kurds and created the image that the PKK was ready to
challenge everyone who threatened the rights and interests of the Kurds. Even
though the state and the tribal chiefs were still powerful, the PKK was very much
aware of the opportunity game. This awareness had a significant contribution for
the PKK to strategically challenge other groups and tribal leaders, start an armed
struggle, but more importantly, outlast the state repression and remain a threat.
For the first time in Kurdish history in Turkey, nationalism started to take roots
among ordinary people. The use of ideological elements facilitated the
recruitment of young fighters, ensured the resilience of the movement, and made
it much more difficult for the state to repress it.

The Kurdish Revolution in Iraq
After World War I, the Kurdish population ended up living in four different
states. Although the Kurdish groups that were active in different states supported
each other at times, Kurdish nationalism developed on four separate fronts, each
entering into separate struggles against their respective colonizer. After World
War I, Iraq fell under British influence and the Kurds in Iraq tried to convince the
British to grant them independence. Sheik Mahmoud was recognized as the
governor of Sulaymaniyah by the British (December 1, 1918), but after failing to
convince the British, Mahmoud went a step further and proclaimed himself to be
the King of Kurdistan (May 23, 1919). This proclamation led to his exile following
a defeat at the hands of the British troops in late June 1919. A few years later,
after its victory against the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia, Turkey tried to
incorporate the vilayet of Mosul into Turkey. The British prevented this attempt
and worked to ensure that Mosul would remain a part of British-mandated Iraq
due to the oil fields in the region. The case was taken to the League of Nations.
The decision of a League of Nations commission in December 1925 on this border
dispute favored the British claims, and neither Turkey could take the region, nor
the Kurds could achieve independence. The vilayet of Mosul was given to Iraq, a
prospective state with an Arab-majority population (Stansfield 2006).
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A League of Nations report “had made the inclusion of Mosul into Iraq
conditional on the appointment of Kurdish officials in the vilayet and on the
introduction of Kurdish in the regional administration, courtrooms, and schools;
but neither the British authorities nor the Baghdad government did much to meet
these conditions” (Leezenberg 2020, 63). Britain was reluctant to go through
with its earlier promise of autonomy and language reforms were also delayed for
several years despite repeated promises. The government had been stalling the
Kurds because the Iraqi elites were Arab nationalists who tried to emulate
assimilationist nationalism found in Turkey, though they were not as successful
in implementing similar policies. Following Kurdish protests, the Local
Languages Law was finally ratified in 1931 “in anticipation of Iraq’s admission
into the League of Nations, and in reaction to continuing Kurdish agitation”
(Leezenberg 2020, 63). However, the law failed to address the Kurdish demands.
The education in Kurdish was available only in a dozen of primary schools.
Although the Kurds protested this and asked education in Kurdish to be
expanded to more schools and to secondary and higher education, Britain refused
these demands. The underlying reason was the goal to integrate the Kurdish
population into the Arab state (Hassanpour, Skutnabb-Kangas, and Chyet 1996).
As the Iraqi government sought to join the League of Nations and pursued
independence, the Kurds were somewhat concerned about how the Iraqi
government would treat them after the British leave. These concerns led to
demonstrations and the Iraqi state responded with repression. At the time, the
Kurdish urban elites had been motivated by leftist and nationalist ideologies and
sought self-determination. Similar to the situation in Turkey, the tribal leaders,
however, were mainly concerned about the interests of their tribes, though
Kurdish nationalism still appealed to them. Also similar to Turkey, the urban
elites found the tribal social order to be an obstacle for their political goals, but
the two groups still could find a mutual ground against their common enemy, the
Iraqi government. As the unrest turned into sporadic rebellions, a charismatic
tribal leader, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, became a nationalist symbol of resistance.
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The tribal and urban Kurds together founded the Kurdish Democratic Party (later
renamed the Kurdistan Democratic Party - Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê, or
the PDK) on August 16, 1946, and Barzani became its leader (Stansfield 2006).
The Kurds were frustrated with the government’s oppression and the PDK grew
in response to increasing grievances among the Kurds. The PDK established
contacts with a new prospective leader, Abd al-Karim Qasim, against the
monarchy that ruled over Iraq. After Qasim deposed the monarchy on July 14,
1958, he rewarded the Kurds for their support by declaring them as partners with
the Arabs in a provisional constitution and allowed Mulla Mustafa Barzani to
return from his exile the same year. The PDK had transformed into an
increasingly leftist party in the absence of Barzani, yet he was still influential over
the tribes after his return, which helped him quickly rebuild his authority. He
consolidated his power by attacking the tribes that opposed him. It appeared that
Qasim and the Kurds were off to a fresh start, but the good relationship did not
last very long. Barzani reiterated the Kurdish demands for improved rights, and
upon the refusal of his demands, his forces mobilized against the state as he
initiated a rebellion which he called the Kurdish Revolution (September 11, 1961).
This revolution, despite some periods of relative peace, lasted until the invasion
of Iraq by the United States in 2003. In the meantime, the Kurds were far from
united as the urban leftists led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani did not
support Barzani’s undisputed right to lead the Kurds. This fracture turned into
conflicts at regular intervals between 1966 and 1996, allowing the Iraqi
government to weaken the Kurdish nationalists. Despite this fracture, however,
the conflict between the Kurds and the central government persisted for decades
(Stansfield 2006).
In 1966, the Iraqi government supported the Ahmed-Talabani faction to fight
Barzani who received support from Iran and Israel. After the Ba’ath revolution in
Iraq in 1968, the ruling elite changed, but Barzani was still the leader of the
Kurdish revolution. The new regime continued to fight him with the help of the
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Ahmed-Talabani faction. Yet, Barzani’s success made it necessary for the state to
negotiate with him. With the deal called the March Agreement, the regime
promised autonomy to the Kurds and the borders of the autonomous region were
to be determined by a commission. The commitment problem was present in this
case, as well, as the government did not honor their end of the bargain and
Barzani sought more concessions. Barzani believed that he was still in a superior
position and pushed for the inclusion of Kirkuk in the autonomous zone. The
regime was firmly against this demand and the Iraqi counteroffer was reflected in
the Autonomy Law of March 11, 1974, which was rejected by Barzani. When it
became clear that both parties could not find a mutual agreement, Mulla Mustafa
Barzani renewed his push for rebellion. He was ultimately defeated, however, and
was forced to go into exile in Iran. This was as much of a diplomatic success as it
was a military one for the Iraqi government. The regime had reached an
agreement with Iran to stop supporting the PDK, and the end of support led to
the demise of Mustafa Barzani’s leadership. Barzani’s defeat facilitated the rise of
another Kurdish party, Yekîtiya Nîştimanî ya Kurdistanê (the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, or the YNK), which was led by Jalal Talabani. The PDK, on the other
hand, reassembled its cadres under the leadership of Idris and Massoud Barzani,
sons of Mulla Mustafa (Stansfield 2006).
The Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988 further complicated the situation for
the Kurds. Iran invaded Iraq in September 1980 and planned to weaken
Saddam’s regime by supporting the Kurds. The Kurds agreed to cooperate with
Iran to gain an advantage against the regime. The Iraqi forces were forced to fight
a defensive war after being expelled from Iran in 1982. Despite its efforts to
preserve its control in the north by buying off the tribal leaders, the Iraqi regime
eventually lost control by 1987 as the Kurds formed a coalition called the Kurdish
Front which declared its alliance with Iran. This alliance was unacceptable for the
regime as “an Iranian victory in the war presented an existential threat. It
therefore saw the Kurds’ growing insurgency as capital treason and Kurdistan as
the Achilles’ heel of its military defences” (Hiltermann 2008, 3). The growing US
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support for Iraq led Saddam to believe that the international environment was
now favoring them against Iran. To solve the security problem in the north,
Saddam appointed his cousin, Al-Majid, and gave him broad powers. Only in
three weeks, Al-Majid used poison gas to smoke out the Kurdish guerillas. AlMajid later razed the villages to make them inhospitable to the rebels. On
February 23, 1988, the Iraqi army started the Anfal campaign. During the
campaign, the regime used chemical weapons against civilians. In one instance,
the Iraqi air forces killed around 5,000 people, mostly civilians, using nerve gas.
This attack devastated Kurdish morale and resolve. In addition to the chemical
attacks, the regime separated boys and men between 15 and 60 years of age from
their families in Topzawa and killed them in the mass execution sites. The
number of killings is thought to be between 50,000 to 100,000 based on the
estimations of Human Rights Watch. The pattern of killings in the region was
“consistent with the regime's objective of Arabising Kirkuk” (Hiltermann 2008,
7).
After the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991, the Kurds saw it as an
opportunity and started another uprising. But they quickly failed. Fearing
another massacre, the Kurdish refugees fled to the mountains in mass. This time,
the United States stepped in and established a safe haven and no-fly zone which
allowed the Kurds to form a de facto state outside of the regimes’ reach in the
north. A resolution in the United Nations Security Council condemned the Iraqi
government for its repression of the Kurds. The intervention of the United States
allowed the Kurds to be safe from the state’s repression from this point forward.
Yet, the friction between the PDK and YNK was still present and it led to a civil
war between 1994 and 1998. After a peace deal was brokered by the United
States, peace, relative prosperity, and democracy finally began to grow in the de
facto state of Kurdistan in northern Iraq (Gunter 2008, 14).
Education in Kurdish was one of the central issues for the Kurds, even before the
independence of Iraq. Arabs in the South viewed education in Kurdish and the
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autonomy in the Kurdish majority regions to be a threat. Whereas the Kurds
wanted self-government, Arab nationalists pursued assimilationist policies
towards them. It was not possible for the Iraqi government to repress Kurdish
nationalists, because, despite their division, they were relatively stronger against
Iraq than the PKK was against Turkey. As a result, there was a continuity in the
ideas and goals of their movements since World War I despite changes in
leadership. As a result, the Kurdish elites had been preparing for their selfgovernment and for creating the Kurdish nation. By the 1990s, the progress for
education in Kurdish was very limited as the Kurdish population was subject to a
policy of Arabization. But by this time, “all secondary school textbooks had been
translated into Kurdish” (Hassanpour, Skutnabb-Kangas, and Chyet 1996, 372).
Thus, the Kurdish elites had been getting prepared to offer education in Kurdish.
When they finally had gotten the opportunity, the regional administration was
able to offer education in Kurdish for their future generations.

Evaluating the Influence of Cultural Rights on Conflict
Onset
Civil conflict is, more often than not, about nationalism and the civil conflicts
involving the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq are not exceptions. Sheik Ubeydullah was
the first leader to have nationalist motivations in the Kurdish provinces. The
battles that Hamidiye Regiments participated in in the Balkans exposed Kurdish
men to nationalist notions. Yet as the Ottoman Empire crumbled, Kurdish
nationalism was still not sufficiently widespread among the Kurds. This is hardly
surprising. Around that time, nationalism was not widespread among the Turks,
either. Nationalist ideologies remained restricted to the elites who were planning
to establish their future nation-states and were competing against existing elites
as well as nationalist elites of other ethnic groups.
The Kurdish nationalists in Istanbul did not have the ability to effectively
mobilize the Kurdish people. The fact that the tribal chiefs would determine
whether tribe members would mobilize or not introduced advantages and
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disadvantages. The main potential advantage for the nationalists was that if they
convinced a tribal leader to join the nationalist movement, they would have been
able to mobilize the entire tribe, not because the members of the tribe would also
be nationalists, but rather because they would follow the orders of their tribal
leader. Yet this was precisely also the main disadvantage. A tribal leader who was
not convinced by the nationalist cause would be able to block out the
mobilization of pretty much the entire tribe. In fact, tribal leaders were the status
quo feudal leaders who did not have an understanding of or ideological leanings
towards nationalism. Even if they did understand it, it would not have been in
their interests to advocate nationalism.
Indeed, in the Turkish case, tribal divisions were obstacles against nationalist
mobilization as many tribal leaders, for the reasons discussed, chose not to
support Kurdish nationalists. Some even went further and supported the
Kemalists. The Kurdish nationalists’ use of charismatic sheiks as the leaders of a
rebellion was a brilliant move to bring in more tribes together and to potentially
override tribal leaders, but it turned out to be insufficient. The Turkish
nationalists, on the other hand, did not face this kind of problem as they were
recruiting fighters for the war of independence. Turks did not have a tribal social
structure, thus people would have to be mobilized more directly. Even though an
average Turkish peasant was not a nationalist, the war was fought against the
Great Powers and their proxies on multiple fronts. Fighting for the homeland
against the invading infidels was a powerful motivator, even though the
devastation of the recent wars had brought difficulties.
For the secessionist Kurdish nationalists, and even for the autonomists, cultural
rights were an essential part of their political goals in the early nineteenth
century. Following the Young Turk revolution, the KTTC envisioned a
multiethnic political system in which the Kurdish people would modernize as a
separate ethnic group with its own autonomous political entity in which Kurds
would be educated using the Kurdish language as a medium of instruction. They
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made preparations to make it happen, including the development of the Kurdish
language to function as a medium of instruction and the opening of a Kurdish
school in Istanbul. Similarly, more than a decade later, the Azadi leadership
emphasized the importance of cultural rights by citing cultural grievances as
some of the primary reasons for their resistance against the new Turkish state.
Having a religious population, the Kurdish society was aggrieved by the abolition
of the Caliphate and the Sharia courts. They viewed the secularization of the state
that was forced upon them to be a colonial undertaking. The Azadi was also
critical of the language laws that promoted the Turkish language in public life.
The state went further and made Turkish the only option available in courts and
bureaucracy, but more importantly, in schools. The state monopolized the
education of children and deprived the Kurdish children of receiving education in
their mother tongue.
The government successfully suppressed the Sheik Said rebellion and eliminated
the Kurdish nationalists from Istanbul who led the nationalist movements in a
way that would intimidate the remaining nationalists, those who may have
survived the independence tribunals. Though there were several rebellions after
Sheik Said’s uprising, none of them posed a similar level of threat to the state.
Later, many tribal leaders co-opted with the government. As the Turkish state
was creating the Turkish nation after the war of independence, lacking the
prominent nationalist elites, Kurdish nationalism was in a period of dormancy.
Yet the lack of elites did not mean that Kurdish nationalism was condemned to
death. Because nationalist ideologies were alive and well, offering a blueprint for
aspiring future Kurdish nationalists. What made them rediscover these ideas was
the nationalism of the Turkish state which was a constant reminder of their
second-class status. Every day before starting classes, children who are citizens,
both in public and in private schools, were required to take the student pledge
between 1933 and 2013 which is translated as follows: “I’m a Turk, upright and
hardworking. My principle is to protect my younger, respect my older, and love
my homeland and nation more than myself. My goal is to rise and go forward. O
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Great Atatürk! I swear pledge to marching ceaselessly on the road you paved, and
towards the target you laid out. May my being be a gift to the [collective] Turkish
being. Lucky to be a Turk!” (Polat 2011, 76).
The last sentence is a motto introduced by Mustafa Kemal, who was granted
Atatürk (meaning the father of the Turks) as his last name, and this motto was
included in the pledge in 1972. The wording of the last sentence is “ne mutlu
Türküm diyene” which more literally translates to “how happy is the one who
says I’m a Turk” (Polat 2011, 76). It did not matter that many Kurds did not feel a
part of the Turkish identity because it was tied to an ethnic group that was not
theirs. They had to take the pledge in their ethnic homeland in a language that
was foreign to them. Even further, Turkey had even denied the existence of the
Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. The government advocated Sun Theory which
claimed that “all languages derived from one original primeval Turkic language in
central Asia. Isolated in the mountain fastnesses of eastern Anatolia, the Kurds
had simply forgotten their mother tongue” (Gunter 2008, 5). In line with these
claims, the Kurds were also called “Mountain Turks” who forgot their Turkish
origins. This strategy was from the playbook of the nationalist assimilationist
policies of France. By the early twentieth century, “if the jealous cult” of the
French language “had not stamped out all competitors, it had at least persuaded
many that such competitors had never really existed,” because they branched out
of the same language (Weber 1976, 71). Indeed, “as early as 1907 a laureate of the
Academy had declared that popular speech and literary language developed from
the same source: Old French” (Weber 1976, 71). The current constitution in
Turkey, which was ratified by a referendum in 1982 during the military junta
regime, included provisions that specifically targeted the Kurdish identity. The
preamble of the constitution declared: “The determination that no protection
shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests,
the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity” (Gunter 2008, 5).
Though they did not specifically name it, two articles in the constitution banned
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the use of Kurdish in any capacity in public spaces including even Kurdish music
(Karakoç and Özen 2020).
Sheik Ubeydullah and the Azadi were against incoming colonization through
policies of centralization. A lack of public education in Kurdish was not the only
source of grievances of the Azadi, but it was certainly among the most important
ones for its importance in the development of future Kurds. The absence of this
natural right was not difficult to notice and it had a strong likelihood to produce
grievances over the course of decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, the impact of
these policies was strong enough to transform the Kurdish provinces and the
Kurdish population, but not strong enough to completely assimilate them to the
levels that the French had achieved. In fact, modernization and access to tertiary
education exposed many young Kurds, children of poor peasants, to a wider
political world and various ideologies, ironically, in the Turkish language. The
process of spread of leftist ideologies, as discussed in a preceding section,
eventually led to the rise of PKK, a group that used guerilla warfare to achieve its
political goals. The PKK relied mainly on the voluntary recruitment of Kurds who
joined the organization in reaction to the Turkish state. Its voluntary recruitment
was not seriously curtailed by the tribal social order due to mounting grievances.
The PKK branded itself as a savior from the oppression of tribal leaders and
landlords even before it started its armed struggle against the state. The PKK
became the main representative of Kurdish nationalism, which emerged, this
time, within a Marxist framework. Two years after the ratification of the
constitution in 1982, the PKK initiated its armed struggle against the state.
Since the spread of leftist Kurdish organizations in the 1960s, Kurds demanded
the cultural, linguistic, and political rights that they have been deprived of. “Until
recently, however, the government ruthlessly suppressed these demands for fear
they would lead to the breakup of the state itself. This official refusal to brook any
moderate Kurdish opposition helped encourage extremism and the creation of”
the PKK (Gunter 2008, 6). This military solution had not brought any meaningful
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progress, as the conflict resulted in “the death of about 40 000 people, the
burning and forced evacuation of over 5000 Kurdish villages, severe
environmental devastation, and the internal displacement of over a million
people” (Savran 2020, 778). Facing the reality that it is not an easy goal to secede
from Turkey, the PKK changed its position from pursuing secession to pursuing
autonomy within a democratic Turkey (Gunter 2008, 7). The government’s
hardline approach, however, did not adapt in a similar manner, even though the
military solution has repeatedly failed. The government’s policies were influenced
by the position of the Turkish military. This hardliner position did not face a
strong challenge from civilian governments due to the weakness of unstable
political coalitions and the persistence of the pressure from the military on this
issue.
The government’s approach, however, eased following the replacement of the
political elites under Erdoğan’s single-party majority governments and
subsequent reforms that expanded the civilian control over the military (Savran
2020). Erdoğan was the first leader to recognize Turkey’s “Kurdish problem”
which was a big step given that even the word Kurdish was used by the
mainstream politicians sparingly, if ever (Gunter 2008, 9). Other reforms that
would have been deemed too extreme by the government, such as the expansion
of basic freedoms and minority rights, public broadcasting in Kurdish, and
increased freedoms for non-violent Kurdish activism signaled the government’s
willingness to solve the Kurdish problem and led to the peace process between
2013 and 2015 to negotiate the more substantial reforms, such as autonomy,
constitutional recognition, and education in the mother tongue, that the Kurds
have demanded.
The conditions seemed ripe for reforms, though it turned out that they were not.
During the peace process, the government expected disarmament but it was not
willing to offer the expected reforms. Although the government elites were now
different and they wanted to solve the Kurdish problem, they had the same
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concerns that the previous elites had had. The government was not sure whether
agreeing with the PKK’s demands would bring a permanent solution and the PKK
would not pursue secession in the future. Seeing the government’s hesitance and
the slowness of the process, the PKK was not willing to disarm (Savran 2020). In
fact, it turned out that the PKK was taking advantage of the eased security
operations during the peace process. The PKK was already making preparations
to bring the conflict to the urban areas in a way that it had not been able to by
erecting sandbags and trenches to deter the government intervention if the
negotiations would fail (Onat and Çubukçu 2019). Furthermore, the regional
power dynamics had changed in the PKK’s favor due to the Syrian civil war.
Following the successful resistance of Kobanî against ISIS in Syria by the PKKaffiliated Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (the Democratic Union Party, or PYD) and
its armed-wing Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (the People’s Defense Units, or YPG),
the PKK and its affiliates finally were able to control a territory after decades.
Even though the PKK has been widely recognized as a terrorist organization, its
affiliates operating in Syria, the PYD and the YPG became legitimate actors and
were even allied by the United States during the campaign against ISIS. The
empowerment of the PKK in a significant and rapid manner made the Turkish
government even more uncomfortable “because of fears and uncertainty
regarding its implications to the existing order” (Savran 2020, 788).
Consequently, the government was hesitant to take further steps to enact reforms
that would appease its Kurdish citizens.
Although elites of an organization may have their own political agenda, the
grievances of their pool of recruits and how easily they would radicalize and
mobilize against the government have a substantial level of influence over the
actions of the organization. During the conflict between the PKK and the
government, “the Kurdish ethnic identity has grown increasingly important to
many Kurds as a result of the politicization of their identity during the threedecades-long civil war” (Karakoç and Özen 2020, 22). To be clear, the PKK’s
views do not represent the position of all Kurds because a substantial portion of
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the Kurdish population has voted for Erdoğan’s party since 2002. Yet, given their
political salience, the denial of cultural rights seems to be pushing the Kurdish
population in the direction of the PKK. Whereas only 30 percent of the Kurds
agreed with the statement that “PKK represents Kurds” in 2011, this ratio almost
doubled in four years, increasing to 55 percent in 2015. During the same period,
there had been an increase in support for linguistic and cultural rights: support
for education in the mother tongue increased from 65 percent to 83 percent,
turning the names of villages and towns back to their original Kurdish versions
from 74 percent to 87 percent, providing services in the Kurdish language in
institutions from 82 percent to 90 percent, and giving Friday sermons in the
Kurdish language from 70 percent to 87 percent. There had been increased
support also in political issues: support for independence increased from 24
percent to 38 percent, for Kurdish as a second official language increased from 56
percent to 74 percent, for autonomy increased from 56 percent to 66 percent, for
a regional parliament from 49 percent to 65 percent, and for a regional flag from
40 percent to 58 percent between 2011 and 2015. The level of support for political
rights is considerably high, but it appears low in comparison to cultural rights.
The overwhelming support for cultural rights also indicates that the Kurdish
citizens of Turkey support cultural rights regardless of their party affiliation or
their position on political rights and a majority of them seem to see their future in
Turkey. The position of a median Kurdish individual in Turkey, therefore,
converges with the demands of the PKK even if the individual may not support
the PKK (Karakoç and Özen 2020). The peace process collapsed, and after 1984,
the conflict started for the second time in July 2015. The government’s
persistence in the denial of the cultural and political rights of the Kurds played a
major role in the recurrence of the conflict. Regardless of the future
consequences that the government has been worried about, if the government
agreed with enacting the expected reforms, the conflict, may not have recurred.
Whereas there are also considerable differences, the conflict between Iraq and its
Kurdish population has some parallels with the case in Turkey and thus may offer
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some insights. The Kurds in Iraq were also worried about their autonomy and
cultural rights, and the state was concerned that allowing the Kurds to preserve
their distinct identity could lead to secessionist demands. The tribal social order
has undermined the nationalist goals of Iraqi Kurds to this day. A successful
alliance between the tribes and the nationalist ideas allowed the Kurdish
resistance to persist for decades, but at the same time, nationalist ideas have not
become powerful enough to eliminate the tribal divisions. Whereas the PKK, as a
new actor, largely overcame obstacles created by the tribal divisions, it was not
possible in the Iraqi case as the tribes have remained involved in the resistance
against the state in the entire process.
Though there was a chance for peace in the 1970s, Iraq’s insistence on the
borders of the Kurdish autonomous region and Barzani’s miscalculations caused
the conflict to persist. To that end, the Saddam regime tried to Arabize the
Kurdish provinces to make sure the provinces would stay in Iraq, even if the
Kurds were to secede in the future. The Kurds in Iraq faced extreme forms of
repression during the Iran-Iraq war, including mass killings committed by the
Saddam regime. The intervention of the United States in 1991 brought their
suffering to an end. After the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds
pushed for an autonomous federal state, or if it fails, for independence. The
Shiites, the majority group, needed the Kurdish votes to ratify the new
constitution. Thus, they had to agree with some of the concessions that the Kurds
had demanded, including an autonomous Kurdish Regional Government in
which the Kurds enjoy their cultural and social rights. Fearing the demonstration
effect on its own Kurdish population, however, Turkey was against an ethnicallybased Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and the government heavily criticized the
Kurdish attempts to annex Kirkuk into their prospective state. Nevertheless,
Turkey was not able to do much to influence the outcome and had to accept the
system of federal governance in Iraq as indicated in the Iraqi Constitution
adopted in October 2005 (Gunter 2008, 15–18).
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The swift rise of ISIS brought uncertainties for Iraq, as it did for Turkey. In 2014,
several Iraqi provinces were invaded by ISIS and the Baghdad regime was unable
to take these provinces back. After three years of struggle, ISIS was eventually
defeated, but in the meantime, the KRG filled the gap in the adjacent provinces to
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (or the KRI) and expanded its borders. Despite
major economic risks posed by potential reactions from neighboring states in a
landlocked territory, the KRG decided to take advantage of the weakness of the
central government and pursued their nationalist aspirations for independence.
The referendum in September 2017 passed with an overwhelming majority as 93
percent of the votes supported the independence. Turkey, Iran, and Baghdad,
however, blockaded the region to prevent economic activities and force the KRG
to cancel the referendum. Upon the KRG’s refusal to cancel the referendum and
hand over the disputed areas, the Iraqi government started a military campaign
to restore the pre-2014 borders. The Iraqi army quickly recaptured the area,
including Kirkuk (Kaplan 2019). Even though the PDK was prepared to fight, a
faction in the YNK struck a deal with Qasem Suleimani of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps and ordered their troops to abandon their posts
without notifying the other forces. This withdrawal caught the PDK off-guard and
facilitated the Iraqi troops to advance quickly and recapture Kirkuk (Hama and
Abdulla 2019).
The PDK and YNK acted in harmony against ISIS because their goals were easy to
rally around. They were fighting to defend their homeland and to protect the
Kurds and their way of life against an invader. In the Battle of Kirkuk, however,
the two sides did not have reliable cooperation. Indeed, these two sides are not
the best partners and they fought multiple civil conflicts against each other in the
past. But when the conditions demanded that they put their differences aside and
the Kurdish interests to the fore, such as in the 1980s, they managed to make it
work. The events around the 2017 referendum can be interpreted to be crucial for
the Iraqi Kurds as they were set out to determine their future. The overwhelming
support for independence in the referendum signaled the desire of the Kurds to
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determine their own fate. Yet, I argue that the reason the Kurdish alliance fell
through so quickly was that they were not very motivated to fight to begin with.
Nationalism facilitates the mobilization of an aggrieved population to achieve
nationalist political goals. In this instance, the YNK did not want to fight an
unnecessary uphill battle. The Iraqi government did not threaten its Kurdish
population, its culture, or its way of life. It rather wanted to return to the pre-ISIS
status quo which resulted from an agreement between the government and the
Kurdish elites. Thus, the grievances of the Kurds were insufficient to keep their
resolve. In the Kurdish case in Iraq, a lack of educational language rights did not
entirely drive rebellion as the existing tribal elites had already politicized this
issue along with others and mobilized the Kurds against the Iraqi state. Yet, the
collapse of the independence referendum is a sign that grievances caused by
horizontal cultural inequalities had fueled mobilization for decades, as its
absence in 2017 led to the collapse of the resistance against the state in only five
days.
If the PKK was in a similar situation with low opportunity as it has had in the
past, I speculate that it would not have affected the resolve of its elites and
fighters as much, because it has been fighting for the political goals around which
serious grievances have formed and have been present. Indeed, the PKK
experiences periods of decline, such as in the late 1990s. Yet, it did not lead them
to give up their main demands. In other words, high grievances could potentially
overcome the inhibiting power of the low opportunity to fight, and as a result,
mobilization could still occur. Yet, in the case of Iraqi Kurds, their low
opportunity was coupled with low grievances. Their political situation was,
indeed, not ideal and they would have preferred to declare their independence
over the provinces they possessed after the fall of ISIS. However, the Kurds still
had a home in which their cultural, social, and political rights were protected and
their political goals were not in response to existential threats over their culture,
identity, and their homeland.
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To conclude, the Iraqi case contains some potential lessons for the Turkish
government. The government’s concerns for not making a peace deal with the
PKK were shown to be somewhat valid with the KRG’s independence
referendum. An agreement does not ensure that it will last as both sides are
unlikely to come to an agreement that the PKK will be perfectly happy with.
Given an opportunity, the PKK may renege on its commitments and pursue
secession. Yet, Turkey still has some important advantages compared to Iraq. The
Turkish military is considerably stronger than the Iraqi military and the support
of the Kurds for independence in Turkey is much lower than in Iraq. In a peace
agreement, the government would potentially end up in an advantageous position
in terms of its security arrangements. Nevertheless, none of these factors rule out
the possibility that the PKK may push for secession in the future simply because
it is impossible to rule out this possibility. Kurdish nationalism is already
sufficiently widespread among the Kurdish masses. Even if the government were
to defeat the PKK, given a sufficient level of opportunity in the future, former
PKK sympathizers could still remobilize and start an uprising under new
leadership. There is only one solution that would give the government what it
wants: assimilating the Kurdish population in a way that they not only speak
Turkish but also accept being Turks. While the government may have been
somewhat successful with this, it seems very unlikely to achieve the conversion of
a large majority of the Kurdish population given how widespread Kurdish
nationalism is today. Therefore, the policies of cultural accommodation have a
better chance to facilitate peace than employing only security-oriented policies.

Conclusion
This chapter is dedicated to exploring the relationship between the horizontal
cultural inequalities, nationalism, and conflict onset in the Kurdish cases in
Turkey and Iraq. Although the horizontal cultural inequalities are not the only
factors that would facilitate mobilization in these cases, or in any case for that
matter given that mobilization also requires conditions favorable for taking arms,
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I attempted to cover the progression of horizontal cultural inequalities in these
cases while emphasizing the role of nationalism and grievances in mobilization.
Following the brief introductory section, the second section discusses the role of
Bedir Khan Beg, Sheik Ubaydallah, and Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments on
the origins of Kurdish nationalism. The third section investigates the
developments following the Young Turk Revolution which turned the Ottoman
Empire into a Turkish state. Whereas the relative freedoms enjoyed after the fall
of Abdulhamid II’s autocratic regime offered the Kurdish nationalists in Istanbul
prospects to lay the foundations of a Kurdish nation within the empire, the Young
Turks later decided that it is not in their interests to allow the Kurdish
nationalists to organize. Consequently, they had to operate in the Kurdish
provinces in the east moving forward. During their short window of operation in
the capital, the Kurdish elites started planning the development of the Kurdish
language and the modernization of the Kurdish people. In the fourth section, the
events following the end of the First World War are examined. The Treaty of
Sèvres made it possible for the Kurds to achieve independence, though at a large
cost, as the borders of their future state would be much smaller than the Kurdish
elites envisioned. The success of the Turkish nationalists to stop the partitioning
of Anatolia, however, made this treaty invalid and eliminated the possibility of
even a small Kurdish state.
The fifth section discusses the Kurdish issue following the Treaty of Lausanne
which superseded the Treaty of Sèvres. After the borders of Turkey were
recognized by the great powers, the Kurdish issue became a domestic matter for
Turkey and the prospects for an independent Kurdish state within the borders of
modern-day Turkey shrank significantly. The Kurdish nationalists decided sheiks
would play a leading role in the rebellion that they had planned for the next step.
Because sheiks were able to influence Kurds who were outside their tribes and
this ability was important given that the tribal social structure hindered the
mobilization efforts due to uncooperative tribal leaders who did not care about
nationalist notions. Nevertheless, the uprising led by Sheik Said was crushed by
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the government and the ensuing government repression put Kurdish nationalism
in a period of dormancy. The sixth section is dedicated to discussing the rise of
the PKK, a Marxist-Leninist organization that has a nationalist orientation, and
its onset of armed struggle against the government. After decades of
discrimination, the grievances of the Kurdish population, who were rather
indifferent to the nationalist appeals of the Kurdish elites from Istanbul in the
1910s and 1920s, made them receptive to nationalist notions. Young intellectuals
from ordinary Kurdish families set up leftist nationalist organizations. The PKK
targeted other Kurdish groups that opposed them and emerged as the dominant
force of Kurdish nationalism. After establishing regional leadership, the PKK
started its armed struggle against the state. After these five sections that cover the
history of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, the seventh section offers a summary of
the progression of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq to use a part of the developments
here for the discussion in the following section. Relatively stronger position the
Iraqi Kurds had allowed them to resist and the infusion of tribal and nationalist
goals shaped the nature of the Kurdish resistance in Iraq. The Kurds fought for
autonomy and cultural rights across their land, but they failed to achieve it until
the US intervention. The resulting agreement with the new democratic Iraqi
regime addressed the grievances of its Kurdish population. Consequently, the
conflict following the independence referendum in 2017 did not last long.
In these six sections, the history of Kurdish cultural grievances and the
progression of these grievances in each step are laid out. The eighth section
evaluates the significance of cultural grievances and education in the heritage
language for mobilization and conflict onset in the Kurdish cases. The right to
education in Kurdish as a medium of instruction has been one of the central
demands of the Kurds since the early twentieth century. While the demand for
autonomy has been very important to the Kurdish political elites, polls show that
it is mainly various forms of identity-based discrimination and denial of rights
that are the main drivers of the grievances of the Kurdish public in Turkey. Even
though multiple factors have facilitated the recruitment of the Kurds,
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assimilationist policies and the resulting grievances are among the most
important ones. The demand for education in the heritage language remains one
of the most desired policy changes for the Kurdish people. Furthermore, the
Kurdish citizens of Turkey view it as potentially the most important step the
government can take to end the ongoing conflict (KONDA 2010). In the Iraqi
case, even though the Kurds are not perfectly happy with the current federal
arrangement, they are content with their cultural rights. The recognition of their
cultural rights and having public education in their mother tongue undermined
their mobilization for independence and the unity between the Kurdish elites
who, as a result, reverted to pursuing their self-interests rather than working
together against threats to their nation in this instance.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I first summarize this work, discuss the implications
of this study, and offer suggestions for future research. Intrastate conflicts are the
most common form of political violence since World War II. Figure 7.1 shows the
distribution of the conflict types based on the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v21.1
and ACD2EPR 2021 data (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008;
Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Intrastate conflicts and internationalized intrastate
conflicts constitute nearly the entire set of conflicts since the mid-1970s. Around
this time, the number of total conflicts also experienced a sharp increase and this
increase is driven by ethnic conflicts. Though religious fundamentalism has led to
an increase in non-ethnic conflicts in the 2010s, ethnic conflicts remain high
despite seeing some decline after their peak in the 1980s.
Influenced by the conception of horizontal inequalities, the EPR dataset was
created to offer more fine-grained data at a sub-national level. In addition, this
dataset also looks at inequalities between ethnic groups that are thought to fuel
violence. Whereas earlier studies relied on proxies that are not directly connected
to grievances that are associated with ethnic conflicts, such as income inequality,
ethnic fractionalization, and democracy level, the EPR dataset offers a more
direct proxy for grievances created by horizontal political inequalities and
classifies groups based on their access to executive political power. Cederman,
Wimmer, and Min (2010) and Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) argue
that horizontal political inequalities create grievances that are associated with
conflict because modern nationalist principles refuse alien rule. These
inequalities turn to grievances in four steps: group identification, intergroup
comparison, evaluation of injustice, and framing and attribution of blame.
Building on Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) and Cederman, Gleditsch, and
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Figure 7.1 Total Number of Conflicts in the World by Type Over Years
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Buhaug (2013), in this work, I attempt to expand this literature to explore how
grievances facilitate ethnic conflict. I argue that, although the investigation of
horizontal political inequalities helps us explore disparities in terms of access to
power, their theoretical connection to ethnonationalism is not very strong. This
connection is notable because political claims based on ethnic groups have been
made through nationalism. Instead, horizontal political inequalities can be used
as a proxy for institutional arrangements that can account for discrimination and
injustice that some ethnic groups face. Yet, if we are interested in specific forms
of discrimination that trigger ethnonationalist demands on political power, I
argue that educational language policies offer a more direct proxy for horizontal
cultural inequalities that are associated with ethnic mobilization around modern
nationalist demands. More specifically, I argue that educational language policies
aggrieve discriminated ethnic minorities who then turn to their ethnonationalist
elites who promise to challenge the government to correct their unjust
conditions. Consequently, the spread of a constructed ethnonational identity
among coethnics, in response to the discrimination by the government, facilitates
mobilization around political goals even in the absence of institutional means to
support that mobilization. In doing so, educational language policies that
discriminate against minorities increase the likelihood of onset.
To start with, I rely on a strong theoretical foundation to support this claim. In
Chapter 2, I explore various theories on nationalism, including primordialist,
instrumentalist, constructivist, and institutionalist views, to explain the origins of
nationalism, its constructed nature, and its connection with institutions.
However, I note that the theories of nationalism cannot be generalized and can
only be applied directly to the majority groups. I contend that the theories are
more suitable to explain the nation-building phase, which is still essential for this
work, yet I argue that the unique challenges of minority nationalism need to be
addressed. I note that these theories fail to explain ethnonationalist mobilization
of minorities particularly given that ethnonationalist elites do not have the
institutional means to indoctrinate their coethnics and to encourage them to
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mobilize. Despite this disadvantage, minority nationalism still often manages to
spread to the masses. To overcome the discrepancy between majority and
minority groups on nationalism, I conceptualize minority nationalism as a
distinct form, not in terms of the nature of nationalist ideas, but about the unique
conditions minorities have had to operate in modern nation-states. As a result,
the daily lives of the members of ethnic minorities have been heavily influenced
by the actions and policies of the state in a new way that had not existed before
modernity. The imposition of national borders and expanded bureaucracy have
forced minorities to live under the rule of states that represent the majority
groups. Given the drastic nature of this change, it is essential to explore the
relationship between the states and their minority groups in modern political
settings specifically in terms of why and how grievances build against the state
and whether these grievances are connected to political violence.
In Chapter 3, I argue that nationalism works through horizontal inequalities to
facilitate the four steps stated above. Ethnonationalist elites from discriminated
groups reach out to their coethnics to develop group consciousness in them, help
them compare their disadvantaged conditions with the members of other groups,
and show them those who are responsible for the injustice that targets them. For
those reasons, horizontal inequalities are more likely than vertical inequalities to
facilitate conflict. I also discuss in this chapter why individuals are moved by
discrimination that targets their ethnic group. I argue that, at the social level, the
modern principle of authenticity manifests itself as the need to preserve the
originality of their culture from external threats and triggers a reaction against
discrimination by states.
In Chapter 4, I show that horizontal cultural inequalities are most likely to
achieve the four steps for ethnonationalist leaders. Among these types of
inequalities, policies around language stand out because language is an essential
part of our social interaction, and inequalities targeting language are impossible
to escape from. The importance of language provides a cognitive advantage for
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the group identification and group comparison steps. It is also easier to evaluate
such inequalities targeting their language, culture, and identity as unjust and
blame the state for them. Ethnic minorities are likely to view educational
language policies that discriminate against their language unjust for two reasons.
First, these policies attack their dignity by showing and institutionalizing that
they are of second-class status. Secondly, referring back to the principle of
authenticity, these policies eventually lead to the decline of their language in
social life and threatens the survival of their language and unique culture, and as
a result, triggers a reaction from ethnonationalist groups to reverse this trend. To
be clear, ethnic groups would not necessarily be aggrieved by these
developments. What I claim is that, on average, they are more likely to be
aggrieved by this type of inequality than others that are not associated with their
identity.
After establishing the theoretical framework, I offer quantitative and qualitative
support for my claims. In Chapter 5, I find empirical support in a large-n study. I
first show that conflict onset is more common among groups that do not receive
education in their language. Next, I offer a series of models that support my
claims and I discuss the results of the models. In Chapter 6, I offer case studies
using a most similar case design to process trace the conflict mechanisms and
show how discriminating educational language policies make the public more
receptive to nationalist claims over time, and when these claims are satisfied,
makes them less aggrieved against the state. These claims can be observed in the
early failures of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey after the fall of the Ottoman
Empire as many Kurdish tribes supported the Turkish nationalists. Additionally,
they can be observed in the mobilization of the PKK in the 1970s building on
grievances against local tribal leaders and against the government who played a
role in the discrimination of the Kurds, and finally, in the quick failure of the
independence attempts of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq when these
grievances were largely absent in 2017.
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As discussed in Chapter 4, states are not very inclined to offer their minorities the
right to receive education in their language. In fact, they do not even prefer
offering classes teaching the children from minorities their native languages as a
subject. Minority groups that do receive education in their language are mainly
those that are ethnoreligious minorities or those that had largely been
assimilated to the language of the majority before the modernization of the state.
Even though this is an issue that can potentially fuel grievances for ethnic
minorities to the extent that they may rise against their state, governments are
not inclined to offer their minorities education in their language as a part of a
conscious plan to assimilate them under their nation-building project.
This work establishes a connection between horizontal cultural inequalities in the
form of educational language policies and ethnonationalist mobilization. In doing
so, it highlights that ethnic conflict cannot be theorized by solely relying on
instrumental rationalist explanations, because value rationalism plays an
essential role in ethnic mobilization. Scholars of conflict can employ these ideas
in their studies to further explore the correlates of conflict in its different stages.
Given its role in mobilization, value rationalism would also be visible during the
duration of conflicts, leading to an extended conflict. Because after the onset, the
ethnonationalist representatives emerge as new actors. If they have a substantial
level of support among their coethnics, they become resilient and are hard to
defeat permanently. They turn into a separate interest group that seeks
legitimacy and wants to survive. Yet, governments are reluctant to share power
with their past enemies due to commitment problems. Unless the outcome is a
settlement that is agreed upon by the organization, the conflict may be more
likely to recur until the grievances of the ethnic members are addressed.
In addition to scholarly benefits, an improved understanding of the role of
different forms of grievances in conflict dynamics can also inform our policies. If
policies that affect minorities are not employed with a potential impact on
grievances in mind, such policies run the risk of fueling grievances and threaten
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long-term stability. As a result, the cost of employing discriminatory policies can
be high at the global level. Given that most nation-states include several
minorities, they are prone to issues arising from identity-related causes. On the
other hand, inclusive policies can minimize such problems. Regardless of the
nature of the concerns, whether it is humanitarian around protecting minorities
or avoiding costly civil wars, understanding sources of grievances and employing
policies addressing them may be crucial to achieving long-term peace within
states.
There is evidence from case studies suggesting that addressing grievances does
support peace (Albertus and Kaplan 2013). This study offers additional evidence
using large-n analysis that inclusive policies on language in education are
associated with lower levels of conflict onset. Although inclusive policies lower
the chance of onset, the governments still may prefer assimilating their
minorities as a part of their nation-building projects. But if the grievances lead to
conflict, as argued in this work, then governments may not be able to get away
with improving only the cultural rights of their minorities after the onset to
achieve peace. The rivalry between the armed organization and the government
may be difficult to overcome if the organization has an agenda that is
incompatible with the accommodations the state would be willing to make, such
as the pursuit of secession. Thus, governments would have a better chance of
avoiding conflict by accommodating their minorities before an ethnonationalist
mobilization. In other words, governments would be more likely to achieve longterm peace by acknowledging the cultural rights of their minorities before an
onset. But even after the onset, governments would have a better chance to
achieve long-term peace by acknowledging the cultural rights of their minorities
than by defeating the armed organizations claiming to represent the groups or by
reaching a settlement that does not address the sources of grievances of the
discriminated minorities. Referring back to the Basque case, the decision of the
Spanish government to provide cultural rights following the transition to
democracy appears to have been successful. The grievances against the state have
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decreased, and along with this decrease, the support for violent activities of the
ETA has faded over time (Dowsett 2010). This lowered support likely negatively
impacted the recruitment of the ETA. Eventually, the low support for the
organization and successful police operations led to the demise of the ETA
(Binnie 2018). Handling the conflict has not been simple for Spain, but the
policies aimed at lowering the grievances of its Basque population seem to have
paid off.
Although this study addresses an important gap, there are several avenues for
future research. First, whereas the claims of this work hold in the MENA region,
it is uncertain whether it would be as successful in an analysis extended to the
world. The theory is developed to account for cases around the world, but there
may be regional factors that are influential on the results. For example, policies
around language are quite different in post-colonial Africa than in the rest of the
world. Having experienced assimilation by colonial states, a majority of African
states are reliant on the language of their colonizers despite not having a
population of native speakers of these colonial languages originating from their
colonial home state. Not only this reliance has grown over time, but it is also the
case that a change is unlikely because the colonial languages serve as a unifying
force between various ethnic groups. If a majority group was to replace the
colonial language with its own, other ethnic groups would challenge it. Therefore,
more data collection is needed to address this question and it was not possible
within the scope of this study due to limitations in time.
Secondly, more research should be done on group mobilization. Although this
study is not the first to claim that nationalism plays a role in the conflict
mechanisms, it dedicates a considerable portion to theorize why and how
nationalism influences conflict dynamics, which is not common. More work
should be done on why some groups mobilize around ethnonationalist goals
whereas others do not. The discussion on France in the eighteenth century and
other European states in the nineteenth century suggests that the presence of a
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class of elites, mainly bourgeois or aristocratic classes, who internalize nationalist
principles and dedicate their resources to create the intellectual and ideational
basis for the modernization of their coethnics is essential, and its absence leaves
the lower classes vulnerable to the forces of assimilation by the majority group
that controls the state. However, it is not the only factor, as can be seen in the
Kurdish case provided in this work. The discussion of the Kurds in Turkey shows
that, similar to the European cases, a class of Kurdish elites in the capital
attempted to achieve this task, but ultimately failed against the majority elites.
Yet, the cultural discrimination experienced over decades led to the rise of new
potential nationalist movements, and one of them, the PKK, prevailed against
others. In other words, instead of being already present, a class of intellectual
elites who create the nation can themselves be created by some other factors.
More data need to be collected not only groups that already mobilized, but also
on groups that have not mobilized to explore this topic further.
Third, as another important form of horizontal cultural inequalities, religious
discrimination should also be investigated. Although I claim in this work that
language is a more relevant cultural feature when studying conflict due to the way
modern nation-states function simply because it is public and inescapable unlike
religion, it does not mean that religious inequalities are unimportant. In fact, for
this reason, religious assimilation attempts using state power are difficult to find
during modern times. What often happens is that states discriminate against
minority religions by providing lower amounts of state funds than the prioritized
religion, by not officially recognizing the minority religions, or by banning
religious symbols or customs of these religions. Such policies aggrieve the people
who subscribe to the discriminated religions. Religious minorities may rise
against state, not necessarily because the members of the majority group
subscribe to a different religion than the one they believe in, but in response to
discrimination by the state. Therefore, policies around religion deserve attention
to improve our understanding of the association between religion and conflict
onset.
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Finally, a theoretical connection between language policies and nationalism is
established in this study. Yet, the temporal and spatial aspects of this connection
need to be explored further. Temporally, it is not clear whether this connection is
stronger or weaker in different time periods. Since their inception, nationalist
ideas have evolved over time. It can be useful to study how nationalism has
evolved and whether the evolution of nationalism over time is relevant for the
study of conflict. For instance, it is unclear whether and how nationalism may
have been affected by the recent information technologies. Spatially, every region
has gone through a unique process of political development. Thus, the evolution
of nationalism is not only time-bound, it is also dependent on space. For
example, whereas many earlier European cases of nationalism drove policies of
homogenization and nation-building, newly decolonized African states found
themselves in multicultural settings where majority groups were not able to
establish a majority rule within the artificial borders they ended up in based on
the colonial borders of the past. Additionally, their dependence on the language
of their past colonizers that initiated their modernization made it difficult for
African majorities to overcome this dependence and build nations in the
European sense. My preliminary research shows that the only region in Africa
where majorities somewhat overcome these limitations and replaced the
language of their colonizers with their own languages are the Arabic-speaking
nations of North Africa. Given such regional differences, it is also important to
study regional characteristics of nationalist ideas and how they may be associated
with language policies and conflict onset.
This work is still relevant in contemporary politics because the sovereignty of
nation-states is the organizing principle of world politics. Nation-states are
different from other forms of states that preceded them. Nation-states are
colonial and intrusive. They expand the power of the state into minority spaces
and force a pre-determined form of their majority culture upon their minorities.
Minority cultures are endangered today as a result of the encroachment of the
majority culture. In fact, there is an ongoing linguistic genocide as languages
200

have been dying at an alarming rate in the past century (May 2012, 2). In 2000,
Crystal noted that 4% of the world's population speaks 96% of its languages
(Crystal 2000, 14). Languages that do not have political support are vulnerable to
the forces that continuously weaken them against majority languages until their
eventual death. This is a woeful development for the speakers of the endangered
languages and the cultural heritage of the world. I argue that, in addition, it is
also relevant for achieving peace. Perhaps a majority of the languages with a low
number of speakers do not have enough speakers to sustain an armed rebellion.
But many groups that do have a considerable number of speakers and whose
language would have flourished without the intrusion of the state are aggrieved
by it and are willing to mobilize to protect their culture and language, many of
which are mentioned throughout this work.
Africa offers interesting cases where groups are not particularly adamant about
protecting their own language and culture, but rather, they prefer their colonial
language rather than another language being imposed on them by the majority.
In Mauritania, the Arabic-speaking majority has been pursuing policies of
Arabization across the country, gradually replacing French in public life. The
Black African minorities from the southern part of the country have been
frustrated by these developments. They view French as the language of unity and
Arabic as a language of assimilation. Even though they have their own ethnic
languages with the status of national languages, the speakers of Pulaar, Soninke,
and Wolof prefer preserving French as the language they use in their public life
instead of having to learn Arabic, a language they have no historical ties with
(France24 2010; Leclerc 2018).
Cameroon is another country where political cleavages emerge along the
linguistic divide. The Anglophone regions left Nigeria and joined Cameroon
following a referendum in 1961. They joined with an arrangement that recognized
their autonomy under a federal system. However, the federal system was
abolished by the Francophones in 1972. As a result, the Anglophones felt
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betrayed. Because whereas they had a federal administration of their own as an
equal to the French portion of the state, they only constitute around 20% of the
population in the unitary system, residing as the majority in only 2 out of 10
regions. The Anglophone Cameroonians who live in the Northwest and
Southwest provinces have been frustrated with the end of their autonomy which
was previously protected by the constitution. They are also aggrieved by policies
that discriminate against them. Under the unitary system, the Anglophone
Cameroonians argue that they are not enjoying the same rights as the
Francophones. These issues led to a conflict in 2017 that is still ongoing, where
armed groups from the Anglophone push for the secession of Ambazonia.
Although this case has more to do with status reversal, the political divide around
language is still interesting. To clarify, both the Anglophone and the Francophone
Cameroonians consist of multiple ethnic groups. There was nothing noteworthy
bringing these groups on each side together before their colonization. What
brings various Anglophone Cameroonian ethnic groups is simply having English
as their colonial language and they oppose being governed by the French state
(Washington Post 2019).
The rise of the Scots language along with the Scottish National Party (or, the
SNP) is also an interesting case. Scots did not have political recognition as a
distinct language from English until recently. In fact, it is not clear whether it
constitutes a language even for many Scottish people. Despite not receiving much
attention previously, the Scots language has been increasingly popular since the
increase in the number of people who identify with the Scottish nationality and
the emergence of the SNP as a political force in Scotland. Despite the failure in
the referendum for independence, “the SNP has been enthusiastic in both
funding for Scots and for developing language policy” (Lawson 2014, 149).
Lawson notes that a common theme during her interviews with the Scottish
people on the attitude towards the Scots language was that they are angered by
“having been made to feel inferior for speaking Scots, and anger at having been
educated in a system that attaches little value to the Scots language” (Lawson
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2014, 152). One of the interviewed individuals described the linguistic
discrimination she faced as follows: “Ah’ve been telt ma whole life tae speak
properly. Ah’ dae. A’ speak like me. Whit's ‘unproper’ aboot that? It wis nothin’
but offensive tae be a post doc at ma uni and telt by an auld Prof fae England that
ah’ didnae speak properly” (Lawson 2014, 152).2 The growing importance of the
Scots language for the Scottish people shows that even when the linguistic
differences look inconsequential to an outsider, experiences of discrimination
and nationalist ideas change the meaning derived by its speakers from such
differences.
Linguistic issues can also raise tensions between states, as recently observed
between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. After overcoming the Greek veto for its
membership in the European Union by agreeing to change its name from the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of North Macedonia
following a referendum, North Macedonia now faces another veto from Bulgaria.
The incumbent government of Bulgaria demands North Macedonia to
acknowledge that the people of Macedonia do not speak Macedonian, they rather
speak a South Slavic language that was derived from Bulgarian (Brezar 2021).
The official Bulgarian history claims that the North Macedonian people are, in
fact, Bulgarian people who were brainwashed by the communist regime in
Yugoslavia which created an artificial Macedonian identity and language. This
nationalistic view is used for domestic political gains in Bulgaria (Deutsche Welle
2020). One may consider this a very unnecessary and irrational move, given that
there is no potential benefit for Bulgaria, in fact, the abuse of the veto power in
this instance rather hurts the reputation of the country in the European Union. It
is doubtful whether or not it is rational even for the political party that advocates
for it. Yet, actions of symbolic or ideational importance are important because

Lawson provides a translation of the comments to English as follows: “I have been told my
whole life to speak properly. I do. I speak like me. What’s ‘unproper’ about that? It was nothing
but offensive to be a post doc at my university and told by an old Professor from England that I
didn’t speak properly.”
2
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they are used to rally people around political organizations and goals, as can be
seen in this case. From China to Canada and to South Africa, linguistic issues
have been at the core of ethnic problems in many cases. Yet, the literature on
conflict has not paid much attention to government policies that have an
ideational basis. I hope that these cases inspire more work on this topic and the
suggestions made in this study help guide future work on ethnic conflict.
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